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Abstrat
Strategi inter-organizational networks reet a fruitful but fragile kind of
both ooperation and ompetition between their independent and voluntarily
partiipating members that an be organizations, parts of enterprises, or
individual persons. The motivation to partiipate is to oer apabilities to
others and at the same time to integrate others' apabilities in order to better
or even at all fulll own tasks or to reah own goals. Cooperation in these
networks is led by trustful interations and is based on risky pre-investments
that lead to mutual dependenies and reiproal expetations.
This thesis addresses the modeling and support of strategi inter-organiza-
tional networks, whih inludes the support of utility- but at the same time
trust-based ooperations, the management of expetations, and the inter-
play between individuals' ations and network strutures (known as miro-
meso or miro-maro phenomena). With an agent-oriented logi-based ap-
proah alled SNet, we model agent-internal rationales, the interplay between
agents, and stati and dynami aspets within strategi inter-organizational
networks and allow for stati analysis and dynami simulations. SNet par-
tially extends and ombines existing languages: (1) the agent-oriented mod-
eling language i* for modeling agent internal goals, apabilities, resoures,
plans, et. and inter agent dependenies; (2) the high-level logi-based plan-
ning language ConGolog with its underlying formalism, the situation alu-
lus, whih allows us to formulate agent ontrollers that pursue goal-oriented
tasks while onurrently monitoring and reating to onditions in the envi-
ronment; and (3) the dedutive objet-base ConeptBase with its underly-
ing representation language Telos and its query language CBQL. The agents
that an be modeled in SNet are not purely reative, but they are also de-
liberative, i. e. they ommuniate, augment their apabilities by delegation,
shedule tasks, and they plan and at utility- and trust-based.
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Zusammenfassung
Strategishe inter-organisationale Netzwerke stellen eine fruhtbare aber zu-
gleih auh zerbrehlihe Art der Kooperation und des Wettbewerbs zwis-
hen ihren Netzwerkteilnehmern dar. Die selbstandigen und sih frei-
willig beteiligenden Mitglieder konnen Organisationen, Unternehmensbere-
ihe oder einzelne Personen sein. Die Motivation aller, an den Vorzugen des
Netzwerkes teilzuhaben, ist, dass sie gleihzeitig ihre Fahigkeiten anderen
zur Verfugung stellen sowie die Fahigkeiten anderer verwenden konnen, um
eigene Aufgaben und Ziele besser oder uberhaupt erst erledigen bzw. er-
reihen zu konnen. Kooperationen in diesen Netzwerken sind gepragt von
Interaktionen, die stark auf Vertrauen beruhen. Riskante Vorleistungen, in
die jedes Mitglied treten muss, fuhren zu wehselseitigen Abhangigkeiten
und reziproken Erwartungshaltungen.
Diese Dissertation widmet sih der Modellierung und Unterstutzung strate-
gisher inter-organisationaler Netzwerke. Dabei werden zum Beispiel die
folgenden Aspekte beruksihtigt: die sowohl auf Nutzen aber auh auf Ver-
trauen basierenden Kooperationen, das Management von Erwartungshal-
tung und das Wehselspiel zwishen den Aktionen eines einzelnes Individu-
ums und der Struktur des Netzwerks (bekannt als Mikro-Meso oder Mikro-
Makro Phanomene). Durh einen Agenten orientierten und Logik basierten
Ansatz, den wir SNet nennen, modellieren wir Agenten interne Entshei-
dungsndungen, das Miteinander der Agenten im Netzwerk sowie die statis-
hen und dynamishen Aspekte strategisher inter-organisationaler Netzw-
erke, um sowohl statishe Analysen als auh dynamishe Simulationen zu
ermoglihen. SNet basiert auf den folgenden bereits existierenden Sprahen,
erweitert sie teilweise und fugt sie fur SNet geeignet zusammen: (1) Die
Agenten orientierte Modellierungssprahe i* zur Modellierung der Agenten
internen Ziele, Fahigkeiten, Ressouren, Plane et. und die Abhangigkeiten
zwishen den Agenten; (2) die high-level Logik basierte Plan Sprahe Con-
Golog, die auf dem Situationen Kalkul beruht und es uns gestattet, das Ver-
halten der Agenten derart zu formulieren, dass sie sih zielorientiert verhalten
aber gleihzeitig auh ihre Umgebung wahrnehmen und auf Gegebenheiten
reagieren konnen sowie (3) das deduktive und objektorientierte Datenbank
Managementsystem ConeptBase, welhes auf der Reprasentationssprahe
Telos basiert. Die mit SNet modellierten Agenten sind niht blo reaktiv,
sondern sie sind ebenso deliberativ, d.h. sie kommunizieren, erweitern ihre
Moglihkeiten durh Delegation, ordnen Aufgaben in ihren Zeitplan, und sie
planen und agieren nutzen- und vertrauensbasiert.
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Chapter 1
Introdution
Due to the globalization tendeny in the business world in the last years, markets
beome more and more turbulent. Therefore, enterprises have to disard inertness and
beome more exible in order to be able to persist. One popular strategy in this ontext
is based on strategi ooperations between enterprises. Resoures and information thus
ould be used jointly and therefore eÆieny ould be inreased. In addition, with the
help of ooperating partners, one an pursue new goals that by themselves were not
reahable. In this ontext we are interested in onsidering these nowadays emerging
network strutures, whih are subsumed under the notion of strategi inter-organiza-
tional networks, from a omputer sienti perspetive.
At the beginning of this hapter, we motivate why strategi inter-organizational
networks need to be formalized and the network members need deision support. We
explain whih formalisms are { from our point of view { a good hoie to model and
simulate our domain of interest. Next, we summarize the goals and ontributions of
the thesis. Thereafter, we briey all the topis of eah of the following hapters. At
the end of this hapter, we give an overview of our published results.
1.1 Motivation - Soiologial and Computer Si-
ene Perspetive
The Soiologial Perspetive
Strategi networks are a kind of trust-based inter-organizational networks, whih build
themselves by a heterogeneous group of ators in order to pursue long-term goals.
Consequently, the goals are not projet-bound, i.e. short-term. So-alled foal ators
are responsible for the initiation and the durability of the networks. From our point of
view, these networks are an autonomous form of soial arrangement. They are led by
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trust-based interations, i. e. a onatenation of risky pre-investments
1
with reiproity
expetations leads to a network of dependenies. Coleman [Col94℄ says: \Agents that
interat have to rely mutually. Inuened by and depending on the soiety, eah agent
has to deide loally and work together with agents they have made good experienes
with, agents they trust."
These long-term inter-organizational networks promise high prot for their mem-
bers but always have the risk of falling apart with strong losses for the members. But
why are these kinds of networks so fragile? Inter-organizational networks do not t into
one of the two usual ategories organization or market . On one hand eah member be-
longing to these networks is voluntarily in the network and ats selsh like in a market,
but the relations are long-termed and are based on ooperation. On the other hand,
these networks are not organizations, beause the stability and durability is endangered
permanently by ompetition. Due to this \bak and forth" harater of inter-organiza-
tional soial networks, apparent paradoxons have emerged: \ooperative ompetition-
relationship" or simpler \oopetition". Powell [Pow90℄ says: Inter-organizational soial
networks promise to ombine the benets of two traditional oordination mehanism
of modern soieties: the exibility and speed of ompetitive market relationships, and
the stability and long duration of ooperative, organizational relationships.
We follow Weyer's [Wey00℄ denition of \a soial network as an autonomous form of
oordination of interations" whose essene is the \trusting ooperation of autonomous,
but interdependent agents" who ooperate for a limited time, onsidering their partners'
interests, beause they an thus fulll their individual goals better than through non-
oordinated ativities. The notion of an agent an stand for a whole organization, a
part of an enterprise, up to single persons advoating enterprise targets or their own
interests. Furthermore, an intentional agent ould be an artiial one, who is inserted
to analyze the network evolvement with newly added intentional fores.
Consequently, we an say that strategi inter-organizational networks reet a fruit-
ful but fragile kind of ooperation and ompetition at the same time between organi-
zations. Thus, it is worth to model these networks for a better understanding and to
oer them omputational support.
The Computer Siene Perspetive
In omputer siene { as far as we know { no omprehensive formalism, language, or
implementation that deals with strategi inter-organizational networks exists. First
attempts to haraterize the funtioning of strategi inter-organizational networks have
been made by our soiologial olleagues and projet partners Funken, Ellrih, and
Meister [EFM01℄.
1
Here investments are not limited to monetary aspets, but ould also be, for example information
ow or admitted rights.
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We think that an agent-based approah is appropriate to emphasize that our agents,
whih stand for network members, are intentional and autonomous. For example, it
seems to be natural to integrate a deision-making omponent at the agent level. So,
agents an make their own loal deisions under onsideration of trust as well as utility
aspets. Trust has to take the entral role when steering agents' plans to ooperate with
other agents in models of strategi inter-organizational networks. Existing ore trust
to spei network agents will enhane the possibility for network ations rather than
individual ations, and thus inreases the apabilities of the network. Existing network
trust { ondene { will enable agents to ommit more rapidly to ations requested
by ustomers, without prior interation with possible subontrators. For example, to
trust in existing network rules of a network inreases ondene.
Nowadays, agent orientation is often used to ope with autonomous ators that have
to make rational deisions, are integrated into a kind of soial struture (network), and
have to behave reative or proative. Comparing agent-oriented with strutured and
objet-oriented software engineering, proedures and methods are replaed by plans
and ations. Communiation, negotiation, and soial trustful interations get into the
foreground. Ators have goals and desires, whih they want to reah but often only
an reah with the help of other ators. Thus, the delegation of ativities and resulting
dependeny strutures between ators with their dierent apabilities are typial for
the struture of suh a network of individuals.
It seems to be possible and fruitful to develop an approah that is in many parts
logi-based. A logi-based approah oers dedution and therefore naturally supports
deision-making an autonomous agent has to perform in order to be able to at ra-
tionally. Already during the modeling phase, elements like FOL formulas desribing
goals and pre and post onditioning of tasks an aim at logi-based agent ontrol. To
ompensate the disadvantages of a huge searh spae and of low ontrol of agents' a-
tivities, we inlude a logi-based high level planning language like ConGolog [dGLL00℄.
Formal methods to automated syntatial heking an also be oered in a logi-based
manner via dedution, for instane in ConeptBase [JEG
+
95℄.
To pursue the aim of modeling and simulating of strategi inter-organizational net-
works, we think the following is still missing: (a) a omprehensive omputational de-
sription of strategi inter-organizational networks; (b) a language to model strategi
inter-organizational networks for the purpose of simulations; and () an appropriate
environment to simulate models of strategi inter-organizational networks.
To statially model strategi inter-organizational networks, we need a language that
allows us to represent eah member's individual goals, apabilities, plans, resoures,
and strategi dependenies to other members. Furthermore, we need to model the
orresponding dynami aspets in order to perform planning, to delegate tasks, and to
make their own deisions onerning ooperation and sheduling of tasks.
In SNet we try to apture both parts. SNet stands for soial networks and omprises
oneptual as well as implementation work. For this modeling and simulation environ-
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ment for strategi inter-organizational networks, we make use of, partially modify, and
ombine the following languages: the modeling language i* , the logi-based high level
planning language ConGolog , and the dedutive objet base ConeptBase. These three
languages, a big part of the thesis is based on, are introdued in Chapter 3.
1.2 Goals and Contributions
The goal of the thesis is to provide a deeper formalizable understanding about the
funtioning of strategi inter-organizational networks, to propose an agent-oriented
and predominantly logi-based way along the whole software development path from
requirements analysis over design to the implementation of these networks, and to
make a rst step towards a deision support system for strategi inter-organizational
networks. For that purpose, we adopt and integrate the agent-based modeling language
i*, the high-level logi-based planning language ConGolog, and the dedutive objet
base ConeptBase.
The work does not t into one researh area but partially into the following dierent
areas:
 Agent-oriented software engineering
 Stati and dynami modeling of strategi trust-based ooperations
 Deision-theoreti logi-based high level plan generation
In partiular, the thesis makes the following ontributions:
Agent-Oriented Requirements Engineering.
Individuals operating in strategi inter-organizational networks follow ertain hara-
teristis. They, for example, behave goal and utility oriented { i. e. pursue their own
goals and try to maximize their own utility { but at the same time try to strengthen
their networking interations with other members of the network for long-term ooper-
ations. This aspet is alled double xation. These and other requirements onerning
members (agents) of strategi inter-organizational networks and the network itself have
to be modeled. We think that an agent-oriented approah ts well to model the het-
erogenous members of the network individually.
Trust, Condene, and Distrust - The TCD Model.
Trust reets the main oordination mehanism within strategi inter-organizational
networks. Trust heavily inuenes future strategi ooperations, beause they usually
are long-term. Besides trust between individuals, we have trust in the network as a
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whole, whih we all ondene. Furthermore, there an be distrust between ooper-
ating network members. We develop a ertain view, espeially on distrust, that seems
to t in strategi inter-organizational networks. We integrate the aspets of trust, on-
dene, and distrust in strategi inter-organizational networks in a model we all the
TCD model . The TCD model also onsiders the so alled miro-meso phenomenon
of soial networks, whih aptures the mutual interplay between individual network
ativities and the network struture as a whole.
A Multi-Perspetive Modeling Methodology.
Trust, ondene, and distrust in strategi inter-organizational networks are omplex
phenomena that are not easily aptured by simplisti, single-faeted models. Thus, we
present a multi-perspetive modeling methodology { inluding trust, ondene, and
distrust, strategi dependenies, strategi rationales, plans and expetation manage-
ment {, whih provides a fundamental omputational desription with regard to i*,
ConGolog, and ConeptBase.
A Modied Variant of i*.
As already stated earlier, the modeling language i* with its strategi dependenies and
strategi rationale elements in the ontext of early requirements engineering seems to
be a good starting point for modeling strategi inter-organizational networks. But the
gap between i* and exeutable program ode is too large. Therefore, we introdue
a modied i* language by syntatially adding new elements { for example, in the
ontext of pre and post onditioning of ativities { and by restriting the semantis for
our purpose.
Transforming Modied i* Models to Exeutable ConGolog Program Code.
Strategi inter-organizational networks that are modeled in the modied variant of i*
already ontain both stati and rudimentary dynami aspets of the networks. So,
we are able to introdue transformation rules to map these modied i* models to
program ode fragments in the logi-based high-level planning language ConGolog.
These fragments ontain the domain-dependent part of the ConGolog program we are
aiming at and an be diretly rened by the user who is familiar with ConGolog.
A Logi-Based Planning and Simulation Environment.
We provide an environment for deliberative, goal-, and utility-oriented agents that
is able to embed the generated domain-dependent ConGolog program fragments for
exeution and simulation purposes. This environment also oers domain-independent
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omponents, for instane, onerning utility and trust maximization, deision theoreti
planning, sheduling of ativities, delegation, and negotiation.
Monitoring in Strategi Inter-Organizational Network Models.
Espeially in the ontext of delegation of long-term tasks it seems to be unnatural that
the delegator { the person who delegated a task { does not ontrol the delegatee {
the person who adopted the delegated task { and does not want to have information
about the progress made. Thus, monitoring, in partiular in the ontext of those fragile
strategi inter-organizational networks, is a kind of estimation and lowering of possible
risks.
Implementation and Evaluation of SNet.
Besides the oneptual modeling aspets of SNet, an implementation shows the inter-
play between i*, ConGolog, and ConeptBase. Furthermore, simulation results lose
the loop by giving the user a feedbak onerning the possible development of the
network as a whole under the onditions that have been modeled.
1.3 Struture of the Thesis
The rest of the thesis is strutured as follows:
In Chapter 2 we disuss work that is related to our researh area and put our work in
its proper plae. We sketh the area of agent orientation. Additionally, we have a look
at the modeling of trust to nd a way to make it useful for omputation aspets. Sine
we need deliberative agents in SNet, we introdue the area of agent ontrol languages
and talk about planning in agent domains.
Chapter 3 is a foundation hapter that ontains languages and tehniques we partially
make ontributions to and use to implement SNet, our modeling and simulation en-
vironment for strategi inter-organizational networks. In partiular, we introdue the
agent-based modeling language i* for early requirements analysis, the logi-based high-
level planning language ConGolog and its underlying formalism, the situation alulus,
the dedutive metadata management system ConeptBase, and its representation lan-
guage, Telos.
In Chapter 4 we present our multi-faetted requirements-driven approah to model
strategi inter-organizational networks. We develop our trust, ondene, and distrust
driven model for modeling and simulating strategi inter-organizational networks: the
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TCD Model . This requirement engineering part of the thesis serves as a basis onern-
ing SNet.
In Chapter 5 we introdue our agent modeling and simulation methodology SNet . We
derive a modied variant of i* that makes the transformation of network models to
ConGolog program ode easier. This transformation proess is shown on a oneptual
level in detail. These ConGolog fragments have to be integrated into our domain in-
dependent simulation environment to make our agents deliberative. As a prerequisite
for deliberation in SNet, we explain how agents plan, ome up with their individ-
ual deisions, delegate tasks, and behave rational, utility-based, and trustful to other
agents. SNet will be rened by deision theory from pure reativity to a deliberative
approah. We allow agents to hoose their ooperation partners and to delegate tasks
autonomously.
In Chapter 6 we give an overview of the implementation of SNet and evaluate SNet
by two examples. We show SNet's software arhiteture. For example, we introdue
how to represent modied i* with the help of the organization modeling environment
OME, how to integrate a trust and utility alulation, or how to implement delegation
in SNet.
In Chapter 7 we show an approah that allows ators to observe and evaluate tasks they
delegated to other ators. We start desribing the prerequisites to establish monitor-
ing within strategi inter-organizational networks and end up with a onrete proposal
onerning monitoring in SNet. In this ontext, we think that a value representing the
distrust one agent has into another agent is a rst hint how muh an agent is willing
to pay for monitoring.
In Chapter 8 we summarize the ontributions of the thesis, disuss several seleted as-
pets, and give an outlook on future work.
1.4 Published Results
Predominant parts of the thesis have already been published in dierent onferene and
workshop proeedings as well as in journals. Therefore, no itation will take plae at
the orresponding plaes. In what follows we desribe in whih ontext eah of these
ontributions are used within the thesis. These papers reet the development steps
towards our agent-based modeling and simulation methodology SNet.
 Our publiations [GJK
+
01b℄, [GJK
+
01a℄, and [GJKL01℄ reet researh results
onerning requirements engineering on strategi inter-organizational networks,
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whih we use in Chapter 4. Additionally, these ontributions ontain some early
pereptions needed for Chapter 5.
 The journal artile [GJKL03℄ disusses the above mentioned ontributions and
additionally desribes the software arhiteture of our modeling and simulation
methodology SNet: Setion 6.1.
 While the CAiSE'02 onferene artile [GJLV02℄ onentrates on the modiation
of i* and the transformation to exeutable programs { see Setions 5.1 and 5.2 {,
 the CAiSE'03 ontribution [GJLS03℄ fouses on deliberation in SNet and planning
aspets { see Setions 5.3 and 5.4.
 The journal artile [GJLS05℄ disusses former ontributions on agent modeling
and simulation in SNet { Chapter 5 { and inludes a omparison to business
proess management .
 The AOIS-04 (agent-oriented information systems) workshop artile [GSA
+
04℄
disusses three possible future researh diretions onerning modeling and sim-
ulation of strategi inter-organizational networks in SNet: monitoring, modeling
roles instead of individual agents, and meta agent development. While the rst
area is desribed in Chapter 7, the others are just mentioned in the onlusion
hapter, Chapter 8, and left to be elaborated in the thesis of my olleague, Do-
minik Shmitz.
 The ECIS-05 artile [KGSS05℄ goes bak to the root and shows the appliability
of the TCD model { Chapter 4 { in a real world health-are environment.
Additionally, the diploma thesis of Thomas Vits [Vit01℄ and the diploma thesis of
Dominik Shmitz [Sh03℄ inspired the work leading to this thesis. Their ontributions
are also integrated in several of the publiations listed above.
Chapter 2
Related Work
In this hapter we introdue researh results that are related to our work. Whenever
possible, we also try to show the border to areas that are marginally relevant to the
topi of the thesis. Closely related work that we diretly use in the thesis { the agent-
based modeling language i*, the logi-based high-level planning language ConGolog,
and the meta-data manager ConeptBase { is presented more broadly in a separate
foundational hapter, Chapter 3. We either make omprehensive use to this work or
even make ontributions to them. Furthermore, we present related work that deals
with trust in soial networks in Chapter 4.
In this hapter we start in the area of agent-oriented software engineering. In parti-
ular, we disuss agent-oriented software development methodologies, and development
tools. We emphasize the agent-oriented software development methodology Tropos,
whih plays an important role in this thesis. Next, we enter the eld of agent-based
modeling and simulation. Sine trust is the main oordination mehanism in soial
networks, Setion 2.3 presents approahes in formalizing trust. SNet is not just made
for modeling purposes but also for simulation and deision support. Thus, we briey
disuss the eld of agent ontrol and agent-based planning. In the last setion, we
disuss SNet in the ontext of the work mentioned in this hapter.
2.1 Agent-Oriented Software Engineering
Nowadays, agent orientation is often used to ope with autonomous ators that have
to make rational deisions, are integrated into a kind of soial struture (network), and
have to behave reatively or proatively. Comparing agent-oriented with strutured and
objet-oriented software engineering, proedures and methods are replaed by plans
and ations. Communiation, negotiation, and soial trustful interations get into the
foreground. Ators have goals and desires, whih they want to reah but often only
an reah with the help of other ators. Thus, the delegation of ativities and resulting
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dependeny strutures between ators with their dierent apabilities are typial for
the struture of suh a network of individuals.
In agent-oriented software engineering (AOSE), the dierent phases of the engineer-
ing proess we know from strutured or objet-oriented programming { from require-
ments analysis over arhitetural and detailed design to implementation { have to be
adapted.
Several methodologies likeTopos [BGG
+
04℄, Gaia [WJK00℄, PASSI [Cos02℄, Prome-
theus [PW02℄, and ADELFE [BGPG02℄ propose modeling languages and onepts to
support parts of an (or the whole) agent-oriented software engineering proess. These
methodologies make use of agent-oriented software development tools { for example
FIPA-OS Toolkit, JADE, agentTool, Zeus-Toolkit, or JACK Intelligent Agents [Cob00℄.
The Tropos methodology [CKM02℄ [BGG
+
04℄ { the name derives from the Greek
\trope", whih means \way of doing things" or \turn" or \hange" { supports the whole
software development proess. In ontrast to other methodologies, Tropos already
fouses on the early requirements phase. Therefore, the modeling language i* with
its strategi dependeny and strategi rationale model is adopted.
1
Tropos supports
the following onepts. An ator represents a physial, soial or software agent and a
role or position that has strategi goals and intentionalities. A goal an be satised
by ativities or by reahed sub-goals. A so-alled softgoal has a qualitative touh.
Ativities an make positive or negative ontributions to them. Plans resp. tasks
an be rened resp. deomposed. Resoures are physial or informational entities.
Dependenies between two ators onerning fullling a goal, exeution of a plan, or
delivering a resoure an be modeled. The apability shows the ability of an ator. The
onept of belief represents ator knowledge of the world.
In Tropos, ator modeling and dependeny modeling an be done in so-alled ator
diagrams. i* alls these kinds of models strategi dependeny models. We will use the
original i* notation in this thesis.
Goal modeling is used during the early
2
and late requirements phase to rene goals
into goal hierarhies and to disover new dependenies. During the design phase, it is
used to see the dierent (sub-)ators in the domain of disourse. Goal modeling sup-
ports three reasoning tehniques: (1) means-end analysis is for nding plans, resoures,
and softgoals to ahieve a goal, (2) ontribution analysis is an extension of means-end
analysis in the sense that positive and negative ontributions of subgoals are taken
into onsideration, too, (3) AND/OR deomposition indexAND/OR deomposition of
(root-) goals allows for rening goal strutures. Plan modeling in Tropos uses the same
analysis tehnique as goal modeling. Here, the fous is on the exeution resp. deom-
position of a plan. Goal and plan modeling is supported by so-alled goal diagrams,
1
Sine i* plays an important role in SNet, too, we present i* in detail in Setion 3.1.
2
Early requirements engineering is not widely pratied. (Soial) ators are modeled with their
dependenies to other ators onerning, for example, goals and plans.
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whih are the same as i*'s strategi rationale models.
Capability Modeling in Tropos inludes the late phase of arhitetural design, the
detailed design phase, and parts of the implementation phase. Eah ator's \individ-
ual" and \soial" apabilities, i. e. his plans, goals, and resoures resp. his ability to
manage dependenies, have to be speied and oded afterwards. The orresponding
representation of the apability model are the apability and plan diagram. While the
former makes use of UML ativity diagrams, the latter uses AUML (Agent UML) in-
teration diagrams [OPB00℄. Existing agent ommuniation languages like FIPA-ACL
or KQML have been adopted in the ontext of detailed design, too.
Last but not least, onerning the implementation, Tropos uses the agent-oriented
software development environment JACK Intelligent Agents [Cob00℄.
Seure Tropos and Formal Tropos are ontributions that extend the Tropos method-
ology. Shmitz et al. ompare these two with SNet more detailed in [SLJ06℄.
Seure Tropos (ST) [GMMZ04℄ [GMMZ05℄ is a formal framework for modeling and
analyzing seurity and trust requirements already at the organization level by auto-
mati veriation using a suitable delegation logi that an be mehanized within Dat-
alog [GM78℄ [AHV95℄. It is important to distinguish between ators that manipulate
servies and those that own the orresponding servies. In ST the notion of servie
is used to refer to a goal, softgoal, task, or resoure. The following new relationships
between two ators onerning a servie augment Tropos: Trust reets the belief that
the ator does not misuse a servie. Delegation is for a formal passage of permission.
By provisioning an ator gives another ator the permission to fulll a servie. Own-
ership is a relation between an ator and a servie. It indiates that an ator has full
authority onerning aess and disposition of his servies. ST renes delegation and
trust relationships to apture and model seurity aspets. So, ST distinguishes between
two kinds of delegation. Delegation of permission gives the delegatee the permission to
fulll a serve, i. e. he does not need to fulll it. Via delegation of exeution the delegator
wants the delegatee to at least perform a servie.
Formal Tropos (FT) [FPMT01℄ [FLP
+
04℄ enrihes Tropos by a temporal spei-
ation language. T-Tool allows for mapping suh a Formal Tropos speiation to a
language that an be handled by a state-of-the-art model heker: NuSMV [CCG
+
02℄.
Thus, Formal Tropos is an attempt to have formal methods and automati veriation
{ in partiular onsisteny heking, simulation, and property veriation { already in
the early phase of software development and not just, as usual, in the later phase. To get
a Formal Tropos speiation, the i* model is augmented by dynami onstraints like
priorization of tasks and ardinality onstraints of intentional elements (tasks, goals,
softgoals, resoures). The speiation itself is a sequene of lass delarations suh
as: entities, ators, intentional elements, and dependenies. They inlude temporal
onstraints. SuÆient as well as neessary onditions an be expressed. Fulllment
onstraints hold whenever ertain goals are satised, plans are performed, resoures
are made available, or a dependum is delivered. Formal Tropos has been inspired by
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KAOS [Lei01℄, a goal- and agent-oriented framework for (early) requirements analysis,
whih, in ontrast to FT, is based on theorem proving tehniques.
TAOM4e (Tool for Agent-Oriented Modeling for Elipse) [GMPS05℄, [PS05℄ and
GR-Tool [GMS05℄ are two other derivatives in the ontext of Tropos. The former is a
visual modeling environment that in based on the Elipse developers platform in the
eld of Tropos. The latter is a tool that supports forward and bakward reasoning on
goal analysis strutures.
In the last deade, agent-oriented software development has beome more and more
important both in industrial pratie and in siene. Consequently, a lot of development
methodologies have emerged:
The agent-oriented software development methodologies have dierent origins.
MaSE|textbf (Multi-agent Systems Engineering) [DeL01℄, PASSI|textbf (Proess for
Agent Soieties Speiation and Implementation) [Cos02℄, Prometheus|textbf [PW02℄,
and Massive (Multi-Agent Systems Iterative View Engineering) are objet-oriented ap-
proahes augmented by agent-spei aspets. Gaia (Generi Arhiteture for Infor-
mation Availability) [WJK00℄ and ADELFE (Atelier pour le developement de log-
iels 'a fontionnalite'e emergente; the orresponding English translation is: Toolkit
for Designing Software with Emergent Funtionalities) [BGPG02℄ diretly make use
of agent-spei abstrations like group, role, or organization. Tropos, as mentioned
above, is strongly onneted to requirements engineering and expliitly supports the
early requirements phase.
During all development phases, the methodologies use dierent modeling languages
or development tools. As we saw, Tropos uses the modeling language i*. MaSE,
PASSI, and ADELFE strongly rely on UML respetively its orresponding agent-based
extension, AUML, during the analysis and design phase. Some of these methodologies
are strongly onneted to an agent-oriented software development environment, i. e.
their implementation aims at suh a toolkit: Prometheus and Tropos make use of
JACK Intelligent Agents [Cob00℄ for implementation purposes. Analogously, MaSE
uses agentTools. While agentTools has been developed only to support MaSE, JACK
is an open tool, whih augments JAVA with agent-oriented elements and is not tailored
to one spei methodology. Agent-oriented software development methodologies, as
mentioned here, are open to reate all kinds of agent software and all kinds of agent
soieties.
During the analysis phase in all methodologies we are looking at, some kind of
goals or goal hierarhies are reated, a rst assignment to roles and agents is done, and
possible interations between agents and agents and their environment (input, output)
an be seen. Tropos makes dependenies between agents expliit in the early analysis
phase. In this phase Prometheus, PASSI, ADELFE, and MaSE desribe the system's
behaviour via use ases and interations by sequene diagrams. Massive's approah
diers from the others. It represents the system in a view-oriented manner. In seven,
partially overlapping, views, a so-alled produt model is desribed. This model inludes
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the analysis as well as the design phase. For example, the task view generates task hier-
arhies and (non-) funtional requirements via use ases, or the interation view hints
at ooperation and ompetition, reates protools, and determines a ommuniation
struture.
During the arhitetural and detailed design phase, the agents' internals are de-
sribed. ADELFE, for instane, expliitly equips agents with ooperation-driven soial
attitudes (harateristis). Loal ooperation rules enable the agents to detet and
solve so-alled non-ooperation situations. These situations orrespond to ooperation
failures, for example, a lak of understanding, ambiguity, or onits onerning sare
resoures. ADELFE gives the programmer mehanisms to perform a kind of error
handling here. It is not possible to diretly integrate sheduling and delegation meh-
anisms. Gaia expliitly supports the dierenes of the miro and the meso level
3
of
soieties.
The methodologies desribed here expliitly support the ommuniation between
agents. Prometheus, for example, takes the use ase senarios of the analysis phase to
reate so-alled interation diagrams in the design phase. PASSI uses lass diagrams
and OCL onstraints to desribe agent's knowledge and ommuniation. MaSE allows
to reate a minimum set of ommuniation in the analysis phase via sequene diagrams.
During the design phase, a set of onversation { whih represents possible ommunia-
tion during run time { is derived from MaSE's role model. When the agents' internals
are made expliit, ommuniation lass diagrams, whih are nite state mahines, are
generated.
Besides arhitetural, knowledge, resoure, and physial aspets, PASSI oers to
integrate soial aspets in its multi-dimensional design proess. Prometheus, for exam-
ple, does not support any soial onepts in its urrent version but wants to onsider
it as future work.
Tropos and Prometheus allow for formal methods to automated syntatial hek-
ing of the models built. Gaia and Tropos partially oer logi-based onepts, but
not in all software development phases. The other methodologies, whih aim at the
implementation, generate JAVA ode skeletons.
Comprehensive information on agent-oriented software engineering is, for instane,
given in the books of Luk, Ashri, D'Inverno [LAD04℄ and Wei, Jakob [WJ05℄. As seen
above, there are many dierent agent-oriented software development methodologies.
[BCG
+
04℄ represents an rst work to unify three of these methodologies: ADELFE,
Gaia, and PASSI.
3
In soiology the miro level of soiety represents single individuals, the maro level the soiety as
a whole, and the meso level stands for soial networks of individuals.
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2.2 Agent-Based Modeling and Simulation
In general, the simulation of eonomi or soial systems is hard. More aurately, the
omputational omplexity needed to nd the equilibrium set of ations of n interating
ators in m markets inreases exponentially in nm (see [CM99℄). This negative result
has been reeted in some impossibility theorems in the literature (for example see Rust
et al. [Rus96℄).
Agent-based simulation (ABS) might oer one way to overome this problem { of
ourse in an agent-spei non-general manner. The essene here is that the rules of
real-life markets are enoded in the agents. Often this is done via simple behaviour rules.
Thus, the omputational omplexity \only" inreases exponentially in the number of
agents. As a global lassiation, ABS works in a bottom up manner (in ontrast to
disrete event simulation). Additionally, ABS has an explorative harater and works
indutively (not dedutively). Firstly, we address two projets that fous on agent-
based simulation with very simple reative agents: SEAS (Syntheti Environment for
Analysis and Simulation) and AgentSheets. Then, we look at some approahes that
deal with modeling and simulation of more omplex agent soieties.
SEAS (Syntheti Environment for Analysis and Simulation) has been developed at
the Krannert Graduate Shool of Management at Purdue University by A. Chaturvedi
et al. (see, for example, [CDS04℄ and [CM99℄). SEAS allows the reation of fully
funtioning syntheti eonomies that mirror the real eonomy in ombining all its key
aspets via large-sale experiments and simulation. SEAS onsists of interlinked goods,
stok, bond, labor, and urreny markets. There are two types of interating agents: live
agents and virtual agents. While the former are human beings ating as buyers, sellers,
regulators, or intermediaries, the latter are \artiially intelligent software agents, who
mimi human onsumers in a narrow domain". Typial for SEAS is the use of a huge
amount of simple reative rule-based software agents, whih have to be alibrated in
advane by real-world experienes, in ombination with human inuene.
For example, the system has been used suessfully in simulating the PC omputer
manufaturers. Human agents play omputer makers and hannels while thousands
of artiial agents perform the roles of business ustomers. Another SEAS example
is alled \measured response". It simulates onsequenes of a bio-terrorist attak in
titious mid-sized ities. The simulation omprises just a few human ators but over
450; 000 artiial agents, whih reet itizens with their feeling of well-being in terms
of seurity, health, information, mobility, and ivil liberties. The rate of transmission of
infetions is modeled. In a third example { \USAREC" { 100; 000 agents are modeled
to represent 1:4 million individuals in the age of 17   21 who are interested in the
Army. The agents dier in age, gender, rae, mental ategory, eduation, and region.
Based on existing data, simulations onerning the behaviour of these potential future
soldiers ould be performed. All in all, SEAS oers good opportunities to simulate
large numbers of very simple reative agents with in-between inuene of humans.
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AgentSheets [Rep00℄ is an agent-based simulation-authoring tool. Thousands of
agents an be designed to interat in a game on a spreadsheet-like grid. The agents
are very simple, rule-based, and purely reative. AgentSheets ould be seen as a more
general kind of game of life. The idea is that agents that meet on the grid inuene eah
other in a well dened simple manner. From these loal eets a global development
onerning the whole agent-soiety should emerge.
There is another eld of agent-based simulation where agents are used to simulate
and visualize rowds of groups of reatures or even humans in movies. Due to ost
aspets, movies produing ompanies annot hire rowds of people to work for mass-
senes. So, they simulate eah reature's behaviour by one software agent. By this
means eah reature behaves in a similar way, for example eeing in a pani senario, but
they obviously slightly dier in their behaviour and therefore pretend to be individuals.
In traÆ simulations, for example the ow through a roundabout, it ould be important
that the simulated ar drivers behave individually following their own goals. Other
appliation areas of ABS besides eonomy are, for instane, traÆ, Soiology, omputer
network attaks, eology, or onstrution.
Two interdisiplinary German priority researh programmes dealt with modeling
and simulation of agent soieties. The \Soionis" programme, whih we belonged
to, served a researh area between soiology and omputer siene [FFM04℄: \The
objetive is to develop intelligent omputer tehnologies by piking up paradigms of
our soial world and to use omputer tehnology in order to verify and to develop
soiologial models of soieties and organizations." Fisher and Florian, for example,
explore and model the proess of soial struture building in natural as well as artiial
soial systems with the help of the habitus eld theory of Pierre Bourdieu. They rstly
developed agent arhitetures and soial models that ohere the habitus eld theory.
The approahes are evaluated by modeling eletroni transport markets. Seondly,
they made orresponding experimentations at the meso level. Thirdly, they fous at
the interplay of maro phenomena onerning autonomy and self-regulating properties
of multi-agent systems. So, Fisher and Florian show that the theoretial onept of the
habitus eld theory of Bordieu is suÆient to develop models that reognize phenomena
of the miro, meso, and maro level of soiety. The other priority researh programme
deals with \Intelligent Agents in Business Appliations".
There are other kinds of soial simulations that are based on statistially motivated
models. For example, the miro simulation models alled \MikMod" of the Fraunhofer
FIT
4
(see [Qui99℄ and [BSQA07℄) allow to simulate and analyze onsequenes of the
hanging of tax and soial laws. This kind of modeling and statisti simulation is out
of the sope of the thesis. Simulations in the ontext of weather foreast or swarm
simulations are not in our researh area either.
4
Fraunhofer FIT, Shloss Birlinghoven, Sankt Augustin, Germany
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2.3 Trust in Agent Soieties
In [WAP00℄ Witkowski, Artikis, and Pitt keep trak of questions onerning trust in
multi-agent systems. In partiular they examine (1) how trust aets the formation of
trading partnerships, (2) whether trust developed over a period an equate to \loyalty",
and (3) whether a less than srupulous agent an exploit the individual nature of trust
to its advantage. They oer an interesting denition of trust : \Trust is the assessment
by whih one individual, A, expets that another individual, B, will perform (or not
perform) a given ation on whih its (A's) welfare depends, but over whih it has
restrited ontrol." They expliitly say that trust implies a degree of dependeny of
A to B and these dependenies may be reiproal. In asymmetri relationships the
relevane of trust is dereased. They see \the denition of trust both as a funtion of
subjetive beliefs and as a funtion of experienes" as we do, too.
Quantitative measures of trust and distrust an also be found in Marsh [Mar94℄.
He, for example, sees distrust as the opposite of trust.
Castelfranhi and Falone have made many ontributions in the area of formalizing
trust in (virtual) soieties (for example see [CF01℄). They say that \Only a ognitive
agent an trust another agent: only an agent endowed with goals and beliefs". Castel-
franhi and Falone identify two risks when one agent trusts in another. Firstly, \the
risk of failure" and seondly \the risk of wasting the eorts". As we will onsider in
Chapter 4, Castelfranhi and Falone distinguish between ore trust and ondene or
system trust. Castelfranhi's and Falone's model to formalize trust takes into aount
the agent's mental attitudes suh as the trusting agent's beliefs about the trustee's
opportunity, ability, and willingness to perform a desired task.
We already mentioned Seure Tropos (ST) [GMMZ04℄ [GMMZ05℄ in the last setion.
It extends the Tropos methodology with seure and trust aspets.
Coleman [Col94℄ onsiders trust as a deision under risk. Trust is given by a trustor
if her expetations of gain (G) and the estimated probability of the trustee's trust-
worthiness (p) are greater than the expetation of loss (L) and the trustee's untrust-
worthiness:
1 p
p
G > (1  p)  L.
2.4 Agent Control Languages and Planning
Planning in omputer siene, resp. in artiial intelligene, is to nd or onstrut
a ourse of ations that fullls goals and holds onditions within a given problem
struture. Russell and Norvig say that \planning and problem solving are onsidered
dierent subjets beause of the dierenes in the representations of goals, states, and
ations, and the dierenes in the representation and onstrution of ations sequenes".
They identify three key ideas behind planning: \The rst key idea behind planning is
to \open" up the representation of states, goals, and ations. Planning algorithms
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use desriptions in some formula language, usually rst-order logi or a subset thereof.
States and goals are represented by sets of sentenes, and ations are represented by
logial desriptions of preonditions and eets. This enables the planner to make
diret onnetions between states and ations." \The seond key idea behind planning
is that planning is free to add ations to the plan wherever they are needed, rather than
in an inremental sequene starting at the initial state." \The third key idea behind
planning is that most parts of the world are independent of most other parts."
Russell and Norvig state that \planning omes down to an exerise in nding a lan-
guage that is just expressive enough for the problems you want to solve, but still admits
a reasonably eÆient algorithm." The logi-based high-level planning language Con-
Golog, whih we present in detail in Setion 3.2, allows for automati plan generation
and for narrowing the searh spae by integrating strutured program elements.
Wang's and Lesperane's Approah { Combining i* and ConGolog
Both Wang and Lesperane [WL01℄ { who are also aÆliated with the Tropos projet {
and us proposed to ombine i* and ConGolog independently. But our researh groups
took dierent approahes and followed dierent intentions. We just introdued a small
number of ConGolog onstruts { only those that are neessary for our domain { in
i* and made modiations on i*. Wang and Lesperane developed a language to sup-
port annotations of ConGolog onstruts to i* diagrams. Like us, they, for example,
oer nondeterministi ations. But single agents are not enabled to deide themselves
whih way to go. They formulate mapping rules for the translation of their annotated
i* diagrams to partially support a generated ConGolog program while we oer an au-
tomati translation. Wang and Lesperane provide the user with a lot of freedom but
the ondent use of ConGolog is presumed.
2.5 Disussion
The modeling language i* primarily aims at the early requirements phase but oers
many elements to make it a rst hoie as a basis for SNet. For example, i* allows
for modeling individual agent's goals, resoures, and apabilities as well as inter-agent
dependenies.
For our purpose we need ommuniation between agents in order to negotiate and
ask for ooperations to pursue shared goals. We have to implement ommuniation
protools that allow a delegator agent to send values important for a ooperation to
several possible ooperation partners. These agents again an answer how and when to
ooperate. All in all, we want to implement a kind of speeh at based ommuniation
protool. In SNet \non-verbal" ommuniation should take plae when agents perform
or do not perform tasks that are important for the agent.
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While Gaia and Tropos partially oer logi-based onepts, it seems to be possible
and fruitful to extend the logi-based parts: Already during the modeling phase, ele-
ments like FOL formulas desribing goals and pre and post onditioning of tasks an
aim at logi-based agent ontrol. Formal methods to automated syntatial heking,
like used in Tropos and Prometheus, an also be oered in a logi-based manner via
dedution, for instane in ConeptBase.
However when dealing with strategi inter-organizational networks, it is reom-
mended to diretly inlude deision theoretial and soial omponents for simulation
purposes in order to ope with the ore steering mehanism of these networks, whih
is trust. Furthermore, to inlude sheduling and delegation mehanisms besides the
trust omponents allows to make positive and negative ooperation experienes, whih
agents make during a simulation, and lead them to a modied (non-)trustful soial
behaviour in the future. Therefore, our approah will be muh more restrited than
other agent-based software development methodologies.
Like Gaia we want to support the permanent interplay between individual agents
(miro level of soiety) and the network (meso level of soiety).
Soial onepts like trust and distrust are at the ore of strategi inter-organiza-
tional networks. The understanding of trust in the ontext of reiproity expetation
ombined with restrited ontrol of delegated ativities (Witkowski et al.) seems to be a
good approah for SNet. Trustful interating agents make themselves vulnerable when
believing in others ontributions in the future. Castelfranhi and Falone's statement
{ only a ognitive agent an trust another agent { indiates that purely reative agents
do not suÆe but deliberative agents are neessary. Agents have to pursue their own
goals and evaluate between plan alternatives they have. A quantitative measure of
trust has the advantage that it lends itself niely to omputing a deision whether to
delegate a task to a trustee or to update the level of trust depending on the outome of
an interation with the trustee. Coleman's simple formula to see trustful interations
as a deision under risk { whih omprises the subjetive probability of the trustee's
trust-worthiness, the expeted gain, and expeted loss { is a good starting point for a
deision theoreti planning omponent. Yu's and Mylopoulos's way to integrate trust
in i* aims at introduing trust more statially at the early requirements phase. For our
work, trust needs to be ombined with utility and deision omponents. But, of ourse,
trust has to be quantied and assigned to individual agents.
Our understanding of distrust is quite dierent from the general understanding in
the literature. As desribed in [Mar94℄ { see also Setion 2.3 { distrust is often seen as
the opposite of trust, i. e. a lak of trust between two ators implies a ertain portion of
distrust immediately. Therefore, trust and distrust are zero-sum. We take a ompletely
dierent stand. While the level of trust reets the level of trustful ations in SNet,
the level of risky investments, the willingness of ommitting in dependenies, and the
level of ommitment, the level of distrust enourages the agent to engage in monitoring.
Of ourse, there is a onnetion between trust and distrust. But it is indiret. The
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depender's inreased distrust level against the dependee, for example, ould on one hand
eet (the more obvious) that he lowers his future engagement onerning ooperations
with this ator. But on the other hand it ould be more gainful to make more and more
ommitments in order not to show any unertainty and to redue the ommitments
later, abruptly or slowly { see [EFM01℄.
In the literature the semantis of distrust is the opposite or the absene of trust (see
for example Marsh). But from their point of view, (individual) trust and distrust do
not orrelate that strongly, but distrust orrelates with the level of awareness an agent
has against another agent.
Comparable to Tropos and Prometheus, in SNet, the dedutive objet-base manager
ConeptBase allows for formal methods to automated syntatial heking of the models
built.
In ontrast to Gaia and Tropos, SNet oers logi-based onepts in all phases up to
the implementation and simulation afterwards. The other methodologies, whih aim
at the implementation, generate JAVA ode skeletons.
We have seen a lot of similarities between existing agent-oriented software devel-
opment methodologies and SNet. But on the other hand there are many dierenes,
too. One aspet of SNet is the simulation of agents in strategi inter-organizational
networks to oer deision support. SNet's semantis does not allow to widely support
the development of open agent software but is restrited to one onrete simulation
environment. It integrates onrete ommuniation and task sheduling protools and
the agents' interations are based on a trustful interating agent soiety.
Planning in SNet is not one big planning task after all goals, states, possible ations,
and further restritions and utility measures have been determined adequately. But
agents in SNet perform planning whenever they have to hoose between dierent ways
to reah a goal they urrently want to reah. Eah way that inludes help of another
agent, i. e. delegation is neessary, and further planning ativities of this helping agent
have to be ativated. Thus, the planning agent depends on ontributions other agents
promise to make. In SNet an agent subjetively values suh promises depending on
the trust he has and experienes he has made with the other agent. It seems to be a
good hoie to use ConGolog for this planning tasks in SNet, beause the knowledge
about the plans an be enoded diretly in ConGolog. Furthermore, ConGolog { resp.
IndiGolog as a variant thereof { oers projetion mehanisms, so that the dierent
utility and trust development an be estimated and an be ompared individually.
ConGolog is implemented in Prolog. So it is possible to modify (interrupt) its planning
ativities and add, for example, means of ommuniation between agents or inlude
the sheduling of tasks. Besides the planning aspets, ConGolog is good to use for
representing our domain and narrowing the searh spae within this domain.
Finally, we agree with Yu, Coleman, and many others that expliit modeling of goals
and dependenies is ruial with respet to networks in general and our speial fous
on trust, ondene, and distrust in partiular. We therefore inlude Yu's strategi
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rationale (SR) model as well as his strategi dependeny (SD) model (see Setion 3.1)
as perspetives in our approah. However, our view here is again more dynami than
in previous work whih leads to a muh loser integration with the other two per-
spetives than investigated in previous researh: Strategi dependenies are treated
as the reasons for speeh at based delegations, and the latter are evaluated partially
with respet to the former. Conversely, planning from strategi goals (aptured in the
strategi rationale submodel) may generate strategi dependenies to other ators if
ertain subgoals or tasks turn out to be ineÆient to handle for the planning agent
itself.
Chapter 3
Foundations
The thesis is based on languages and formalisms we want to present in this hapter. To
some of them, we make diret or indiret ontributions. Others take an important role
in SNet, our modeling and simulation methodology for strategi inter-organizational
networks.
We start this hapter with Eri Yu's agent-based modeling language i* [Yu95℄,
[YM94℄. i* allows for statially modeling intentional ators with both their interdepen-
denies among eah other and their internal struture explaining their behaviour.
Within the high-level planning language ConGolog [dGLL00℄, whih we show next,
and its underlying formalism { the Situation Calulus [MC63℄ { one an desribe and
reason about dynamially evolving domains. Additionally, the Situation Calulus {
and therefore ConGolog { an ope with the frame problem [MH69℄.
The orresponding underlying semantis of i* is formalized in the knowledge repre-
sentation language Telos [MBJK90℄. In the same way, the semantis of the dedutive
objet manager ConeptBase [JEG
+
95℄ { see Setion 3.3 { is based on Telos, too. Con-
eptBase allows for representing data and meta data in an objet-oriented manner and
is equipped with a query language. We take a loser look at ConeptBase and Telos in
the last setion.
Readers who are familiar with some of these languages may skip the orresponding
parts of this foundational hapter.
3.1 The Agent-Based Modeling Language i*
i* { pronouned \i-star" { is an aronym for \distributed intentionality" and was de-
veloped by Eri Yu and John Mylopoulos at the University of Toronto,  f. [Yu95℄,
[YM94℄. This agent-based modeling language oers a oneptual framework for model-
ing soial settings, based on the notions of ator and goal. It fouses on the modeling,
analysis, and design of agent networks in the early phase of requirements engineering.
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i* assumes that soial settings involve soial ators who depend on eah other for goals
to be ahieved, tasks to be performed, and resoures to be furnished. The novelty of
i* is not only to handle the deomposition or omposition of proesses and ows, but
additionally it allows for making intentionalities expliit.
i* inludes two models. The Strategi Dependeny (SD) Model desribes the ex-
ternal relationships (dependenies) of ators in an organizational setting. The omple-
mentary Strategi Rationale (SR) Model oers an insight of agents' intern strutures
showing their intentionalities for desribing and supporting the reasoning that eah
ator performs onerning his relationships with other ators.
The i* SD and SR models shown in this thesis, see for example Figure 3.1 and
Figure 3.2, are mostly onstruted and exported as a graphial representation with the
help of the graphial model editor of the Organization Modeling Environment (OME).
A desription of OME and the orresponding adaptations onerning SNet are given in
Setion 6.1.
3.1.1 The Strategi Dependeny (SD) Model
The strategi dependeny model { SD model { desribes a proess in terms of ators
(nodes) and the dependenies (links) between them, so that the underlying motivations
and reasons for ations are aptured. Intentional relationships within an agent are not
modeled here. Through a dependeny relationship, the depender beomes able to
do things that he otherwise would not be able to do in isolation but also beomes
vulnerable. So, if the dependee is not able to provide the dependum, the depender
might not be able to pursue ertain intern goals anymore. Note that the depending
ator is alled the depender , and the ator who is depended upon: the dependee. The
objet around whih the dependeny relationship enters is alled the dependum.
Altogether, the SD model oers four dependeny types, whih are based on the type
of the dependum:
 Goal dependenies desribe onditions in the world the dependee should fulll
for the depender. It is up to the depender to hoose between dierent means for
reahing his goal.
 With the help of task dependenies, one an desribe some kind of delegation.
The dependum hints at the sort of ativity the dependee has to perform.
 Resoure dependenies are used whenever the dependee has to make objets or
information available for the depender.
 A softgoal dependeny is a ombination of a goal and a task dependeny. The de-
pender has to fulll onditions, whih are { in ontrast to (hard-)goals { not that
learly dened. Therefore, the depender has the hoie to support this depen-
deny more or less omprehensively. Often the depender has an idea onerning
the level that should be reahed.
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Figure 3.1: An SD Model Example
In typial settings eah ator both appears as depender and dependee. On one hand
an ator an augment his potentials by asking for support, on the other hand he oers
his apabilities. As a result a meshwork of dependenies ours.
The entrepreneurship domain { our running example. In Figure 3.1 we an
identify three ators (irles) with their dierent dependenies among eah other overed
in a SD model: Entrepreneurship Center, Potential Entrepreneur, and Business Angel.
1
We use an exerpt of the MIT entrepreneurship network example domain. Several
examples within the thesis are taken from the entrepreneurship domain. Thus, we
briey introdue it. The Entrepreneurship Center (E-Center) is responsible for the
performane of networking events. These are informal meetings providing an easy
way to get in touh with dierent kinds of people within the entrepreneurship sene.
The business angel takes the role of the investor while the potential entrepreneur has a
business idea and needs money and business advie (depited as resoure dependenies)
in order to realize his ideas. The labels of the dependeny links are direted haraters
\D", whih stands for an arrowhead direted from the depender to the dependum and
1
We often { like in this gure { use OME (see Setion 6.1) to onstrut our SD and SR models and
present them graphially in the thesis.
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further to the dependee.
For instane, while the Business Angel depends on the E-Center onerning provid-
ing opportunities for new investments (task dependeny), the potential entrepreneur
depends on the goal to get aess to the network (goal dependeny). Vie versa, the
E-Center needs new entrepreneurs with new ideas to strengthen the whole network.
This is exposed via a softgoal dependeny, beause eah new entrepreneur joining the
network provides a small but not in detail speied ontribution to that softgoal. The
business angel delegates the task to elaborate a business plan to the entrepreneur hop-
ing that the business idea is good and wants to hold shares of the start-up that is going
to be founded.
SD models hide the internal struture of an agent. So, we are not able to desribe
one agent's motivations, intentions, and rationales. Exatly this role is adopted by the
SR models we turn to next.
3.1.2 The Strategi Rationale (SR) Model
In the last subsetion, we presented the strategi dependeny model of the i* frame-
work, whih provides a desription of external relationships among ators. It hides the
proesses that are inside an ator, for example how inoming dependenies { here the
ator oers his apabilities as a dependee { are related to outgoing dependenies { here
the ator is the depender adopting others' help or delegating tasks.
The strategi rationale model { SR model { desribes the intentional relationships
that are internal to ators, so that they an be reasoned about. It shows how an ator
meets its inoming dependenies (or internal goals and desires) by modeling an ator's
\ways of doing things" { whih Yu alls tasks. Proess alternatives an be generated
and evaluated. Nodes of the SR model ould be goals, tasks, resoures, and softgoals,
respetively, while links ould be either means-ends links, task deomposition links, or
softgoal ontribution links.
Unlike the onventional, non-intentional modeling of ativities and their deompo-
sition into sub-ativities, the SR model reognizes the presene of freedom and hoie
at eah level of deomposition. Eah omponent of a task is an intentional element ,
whih an be a goal, a task, a resoure, or a softgoal.
 Sine there might be more than one way to ahieve a goal, to perform a task,
to produe a resoure, or to satise a softgoal, Yu introdues an intervening
means-ends link . A means-ends link indiates a relationship between an end {
whih an be a goal to be ahieved, a task to be aomplished, a resoure to be
produed, or a softgoal to be satised { and a means for attaining it. A means
is usually a task.
 Via task deomposition links, more omplex tasks are divided up into more el-
ementary tasks. These links an be open, ommitted, or ritial depending on
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the ator's belief in how failure of the element will aet the suess of a plan in
exeution.
 An ator need not address inoming dependenies entirely by its own eort. Inten-
tional elements an be delegated to other ators by way of outgoing dependenies.
The onept of delegation is at the very heart of SNet and will be disussed in
Chapter 5.
 The dierene between goals and softgoals is not immediately obvious. Goals
have exat suÆient onditions, for example the exeution of a ertain task that
ould fulll them { via means-ends links. Softgoals on the other side are not
that learly dened, but more qualitative. Tasks might not only fulll them, but
also support or diminish them. Here the third type of links { ontribution links
{ ome into play. Positive ontribution links to softgoals an be labeled with
Help (having a positive inuene but do not suÆiently meet the softgoal), Make
(suÆient), and Some+ (positive in an unknown degree). The orresponding
negative ontributions are labeled with Hurt, Break, and Some-. So, it is only
natural that goals have a more straight-forward labeling based on hard fats like
\nanial bakground is ok" than softgoals, whih are named vaguer, for instane
"beome rih".
Figure 3.2 depits an example of a SR model. Compared to our SD model, see Fig-
ure 3.1, we fous on some internal rationales of the business angel and the potential
entrepreneur. Moreover, we added an ator faulty, but do not model him very detailed.
Dependenies are impliit in the SR model. For example, the task dependeny elaborate
a business plan in the SD model beomes a subtask of the obviously quite extensive
task invest in a new entrepreneur in the SR model and belongs to the entrepreneur, i. e.
is delegated. So, the performane of this delegated task is neessary for the ompletion
of the so alled super-task. The softgoal dependeny good business idea from the SD
model gets its ontributions on an indiret way when looking at the SR model. The
faulty member, who needs the entrepreneur's business plan to be able to perform an
evaluation, supports the softgoal by an unknown value. The label Unknown is used,
beause the review ould be positive or negative.
Considering, for example, the softgoal minimize risk, we an illustrate dierent
kinds of ontribution links: (1) The fat that an expert delivers his expertise onerning
the business of investment gives some (undened) positive ontribution: Some+. (2)
Investing in an entrepreneur by giving him money hurts this softgoal. Here, Hurt is
used instead of (3) Some-, beause the risk an be alulated in advane. (4) If the
business angel deides to earn his money by other means, by onsulting entrepreneurs,
the softgoal minimize risk is satised fully by a Make ontribution, beause onsulting
fees have to be payed independently from the start-up's suess and the BA needs not
invest. Therefore, he an not lose money.
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Figure 3.2: An SR Model Example
3.1.3 The Notions Ator, Role, Position, and Agent in i*
So far we identied the ators modeled as instanes, i. e. onrete individuals, groups,
or departments. In our examples all the three ators are represented as individuals.
i* itself distinguishes between ators, positions, roles, and agents. While the former is
the most general one, the latter three are a speialization of the rst one,  f. [YL00℄
and [GMP02℄:
 In i* the term ator is used to refer generially to any unit to whih intentional
dependenies an be asribed.
 An agent is an ator with onrete, physial manifestations, suh as a human
individual.
 A role is an abstrat haraterization of the behaviour of a soial ator within
some speialized ontext or domain of endeavor. Dependenies are assoiated
with a role when these dependenies apply regardless of who plays the role. For
instane, an individual Bob might play the role of an entrepreneur for a long time
and after he beomes rih he plays the role of a business angel.
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 A position is intermediate in abstration between a role and an agent. It is a set
of roles typially played by one agent.
Positions an over roles, agents an oupy positions, and agents an also play roles
diretly. Throughout the thesis we want to use ator, role, position, and agent in the
same way as in the original i* framework as desribed above.
3.2 ConGolog and the Situation Calulus
ConGolog [dGLL00℄ is based on the situation alulus [MC63℄, an inreasingly popular
language for representing and reasoning about the preonditions and eets of ations.
The situation alulus is a variant of rst-order logi,
2
enrihed with speial funtion
and prediate symbols to desribe and reason about dynami domains.
ConGolog allows us to formulate agent ontrollers that pursue goal-oriented tasks
while onurrently monitoring and reating to onditions in the environment. In on-
trast to other formalisms in this area, the initial situation in ConGolog an be inom-
pletely speied by a olletion of axioms and the primitive ations an be user-dened
by axioms in the situation alulus. Additionally, the situation alulus, and therefore
ConGolog, too, deals with the so-alled frame problem [MH69℄. Until Raymond Reiter
proposed a solution { a detailed desription is given in [Rei91℄ { at the beginning of the
90-ies, the situation alulus had suered under the frame problem.
3
Briey, handling
the frame problem means nding an easy way to desribe all the things that do not
hange during the evolution of the world. Normally, ations having an inuene on the
world aet only some loal areas and leave the rest of the world unaeted. Thus, the
number of frame axioms needed { using a straight forward approah { is tremendously
high. A sophistiated ation theory that is able to handle the frame problem is shown
in the following subsetions, whih introdue both the situation alulus and ConGolog.
3.2.1 The Situation Calulus
The situation alulus is a logial language for representing and reasoning about ations
and their eets on the world [MC63℄. All terms in the language are one of three sorts:
ordinary objets, ations, or situations. There is a speial onstant S
0
used to denote
the initial situation, namely that situation in whih no ations have yet ourred.
There is a distinguished binary funtion symbol do where do(a; s) denotes the suessor
2
Stritly speaking, a small dose of seond-order logi is required as well, an issue whih should not
onern us here.
3
The frame problem is a general problem for all languages reasoning about ations and their eets
and not a situation alulus spei problem.
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situation to situation s resulting from performing the ation a.
4
Relations whose truth
values vary from situation to situation are alled relational uents, and are denoted by
prediate symbols taking a situation term as their last argument. Similarly, funtions
varying aross situations are alled funtional uents and are denoted analogously.
Finally, there is a speial prediate Poss(a; s) used to state that ation a is exeutable
in situation s.
For example, the olor of a box is green in the initial situation S
0
. This ould
be denoted by the funtional uent Color(box; S
0
) = green. The new situation
after performing an ation painting the box blue { paint(box; blue) { is noted as
do(paint(box; blue); S
0
). Intuitively, the uent desribing the olor of the box should
hange its value and beome blue in this new situation:
Color(box; do(paint(box; blue); S
0
)) = blue.
Within the situation alulus, we an formulate theories that desribe how the world
hanges as the result of the available ations { like we did in the example above in an
intuitive way. A basi ation theory was proposed by Raymond Reiter (see [Rei01℄):
D = D
S
0
[ D
ap
[ D
ss
[ D
una
[ D
una
[ : (3.1)
In partiular, the dynami worlds an be formalized by:
 D
S
0
{ axioms desribing the initial situation,
 D
ap
{ axioms handling preonditions of ations,
 D
ss
{ axioms formalizing the transitions, whih are aused by performing ations,
from a urrent state to the suessor state,
 D
una
{ unique names axioms onerning so-alled primitive ations,
  { and some foundational domain independent axioms.
Initial state axioms D
S
0
. The values of uents an be dened in the initial situation
S
0
, whih is the only situation with no predeessor-situation, i. e. no ation has been
performed before. For example, let's state that the olor of an objet (onstant) box is
green and a robot rob has a sprayer lled with blue olor { onstant sprayer
blue
{ in
his hand in the initial situation:
Color(box; S
0
) = green
InHand(rob; sprayer
blue
); S
0
)
(3.2)
While the former axiom initializes a funtional uent, the latter one initializes a rela-
tional uent. The funtional uent indiates that the box has to have exatly one olor,
whih is green in (3.2). The rational uents allows the robot to hold several objets
in his hand. Of ourse, besides situation dependent prediates, situation independent
prediates an be dened as usual.
4
Often you an read the term primitive ation when talking about elementary instrutions. In the
ontext of the situation alulus, we use the term ation to denote the same.
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Ation preondition axioms D
ap
. For eah primitive ation a, we dene under
what onditions a an be exeuted in situation s: Poss(a; s)  (a; s). For example,
a robot rob an only pik up a blue sprayer sprayer
blue
if two onditions are fullled:
the robot rob does not have any objet Obj in his hand, and there is no
5
robot R
holding the demanded sprayer in his hand. This an be formalized in the following
ation preondition axiom onerning the ation pikup:
Poss(pikup(rob; sprayer
blue
); s) :InHand(rob; Obj; s) ^
:InHand(R; sprayer
blue
; s)
(3.3)
Note that we use as onvention that free variables (here R and Obj) are impliitly
universally quantied.
Suessor state axioms D
ss
. A suessor state axiom of a uent F desribes both
the eets and non-eets of ations on this uent F and therefore the set of all these
axioms serves as a solution of the frame problem in the situation alulus. Ations
ause eets on uents. Consider our oloring-example. The following two sentenes
are so-alled eet axioms, representing the inuene of two ations on the value of the
InHand uent.
InHand(rob; sprayer
blue
; do(pikup(rob; sprayer
blue
); s))
:InHand(rob; sprayer
blue
; do(laydown(rob; sprayer
blue
); s))
(3.4)
The rst eet axiom desribes a positive eet on the relational uent InHand whereas
the seond one desribes a negative eet. Even if pikup or laydown should be the
only ations that have an inuene on the truth value of the uent InHand, one
has to formalize all the \non-eets" on InHand of the other ations, for example
spray(rob; Obj). We expliitly have to formalize that InHand keeps its value from
situation s to situation do(spray(rob; Obj); s). Otherwise, we would not be able to
reason about this uent any more after the ation spray has been performed. One
so-alled frame axiom { here a positive one { is
InHand(rob; sprayer
blue
; do(spray(rob; Obj); s))  InHand(rob; sprayer
blue
; s)
(3.5)
In usual worlds the number of ations inuening a ertain uent is negligible small
ompared to the number of ations that do not have any inuene. The solution Reiter
proposed for this frame problem is as follows: Normalize all the eet axioms onerning
5
Note that we do not demand that R 6= rob here.
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eah uent, for example onerning InHand:
a = pikup(rob; sprayer
blue
) 
InHand(rob; sprayer
blue
; do(a; s))
a = laydown(rob; sprayer
blue
) 
:InHand(rob; sprayer
blue
; do(a; s))
(3.6)
In general we get the following sheme of normalized eet axioms for eah uent F :

+
F
(~x; a; s) F (~x; a; do(a; s))

 
F
(~x; a; s) :F (~x; a; do(a; s))
(3.7)
Together with the unique names axioms for ations (see below) and a ompleteness
assumption, i. e. saying 
+
F
(~x; a; s) reets all the positive eets on F and 
 
F
(~x; a; s)
all the negative ones, we get one suessor state axiom for eah uent F overing all
the orresponding eet- and frame axioms:
F (~x; a; do(a; s)) 
+
F
(~x; a; s) _
F (~x; a; s) ^ :
 
F
(~x; a; s)
(3.8)
Performing ation a makes the relational uent F expliitly true if 
+
F
(~x; a; s) holds,
expliitly false if 
 
F
(~x; a; s) holds, and leaves in unhanged otherwise. So, impliitly all
ations neither mentioned in 
+
F
(~x; a; s) nor in 
 
F
(~x; a; s) leave the uent F unhanged.
Thus, all frame axioms onerning F are overed in one orresponding suessor state
axiom.
When we assume that pikup and laydown are the only ations that are able to
hange InHand here, then the suessor state axiom of our InHand uent would be:
InHand(rob; sprayer
blue
; do(a; s)) 
a = pikup(rob; sprayer
blue
) _
InHand(rob; sprayer
blue
; s) ^ a 6= laydown(rob; sprayer
blue
)
(3.9)
This formula states: If ation a is exeuted in situation s, then there are exatly two
possible ways that our robot has a blue sprayer in his hand after this ation has taken
plae: Firstly, a has been a pikup ation whih rob has exeuted to take sprayer
blue
.
Seondly, rob already has had sprayer
blue
in his hand in situation s and a was not a
laydown(rob; sprayer
blue
) ation.
Let us look at an example of a suessor state axiom of a funtional uent. An
objet Obj hanges its olor if there is a robot Rob having a blue sprayer in his hand
and spraying this objet. After this ation the objet will be olored blue. The objet
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remains its olor if the ation that has been performed has not been a spray ation or if
the ation has been a spray ation but another objet O (O 6= Obj) has been sprayed.
Color(Obj; do(a; s)) = Newol 
9R: a = spray(R;Obj) ^ InHand(R; sprayer
blue
; s) ^Newol = blue _
Newol = Color(Obj; s)^
[:9X; Y: a = spray(X; Y ) _ 9O: a = spray(R;O) ^O 6= Obj℄
(3.10)
As an example of a suessor state axiom that we need in our implementation of SNet
onsider a simple model of time, whih progresses in a disrete fashion by 1 unit as a
result of a speial ation loktik. The time of a situation an then be speied with
the help of a funtional uent T ime(s) and the following suessor state axiom:
T ime(do(a; s)) = T  a = loktik ^ T = T ime(s) + 1_
a 6= loktik ^ T = T ime(s)
(3.11)
We remark already here that we are using a temporal version of the situation alulus
with disrete linear time, where time advanes as speied by this axiom.
Unique names axioms for ations: D
una
.
A(x
1
; :::; x
n
) = A(y
1
; :::; y
n
)  x
1
= y
1
^ ::: ^ x
n
= y
n
(3.12)
This axiom expresses that idential ations have idential arguments. Reading the
formula from right to left one an say: Ations are dierent if they have dierent
names or they dier at least in one argument. For instane, spray(rob
1
; obj) and
spray(rob
2
; obj) are dierent ations, beause rob
1
and rob
2
are dierent objets.
Foundational domain independent axioms for situations: . Four founda-
tional axioms desribe the oherene between situations.
(1) do(a
1
; s
1
) = do(a
2
; s
2
)  a
1
= a
2
^ s
1
= s
2
(2) 8P:P (S
0
) ^ 8a; s:[P (s)  P (do(a; s))℄  8s:P (s)
(3):s  S
0
(4) s  do(a; s
0
)  s v s
0
(3.13)
 is an ordering relation. s  s
0
expresses that the ation sequene s
0
an be obtained
by starting in s and performing any number of ations. v is an abbreviation for
s  s
0
_ s = s
0
.
1. The rst axiom is a unique names axiom for situations: Whenever non-initial
situations are the same, both the lastly performed ations as well as the situations
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before performing these ations have to be the same. Reading this axiom as its
ontraposition from right to left it says: You reah dierent situations either after
performing dierent ations or if the predeessor situations were dierent.
2. The seond axiom is a seond order indution axiom, whih has the same struture
as Peano's axiomatization of the natural numbers. Here the sort situation is
limited to the smallest set ontaining the initial situation S
0
and the transitive
losure under applying do to an ation and a situation. It beomes lear why we
talk about situations as a history, i. e. a sequene of ations here, and do not talk
about states. Situations are the same if they have the same history while states
are the same if the uents have the same truth value. Thus, states an repeat
themselves whereas situations an not.
3. Axiom (3) prohibits that there is any situation before the initial situation S
0
, i. e.
that S
0
an be reahed by performing some ations.
4. The last axiom onstitutes, s
0
is reahable from s by performing zero or any
number of ations if and only if eah suessor situation of s
0
is reahable from s
by performing at least one ation.
As a result, in any model of the foundational axioms , the situations an be represented
as nodes of a tree with S
0
being the root node and the ations as the orresponding
transitions.
Planning in the Situation Calulus. Classial Planning in AI means to nd a
way to reah a goal within a given domain theory. Here our basi ation theory D {
as desribed above { is given dening our domain and let (s) be our goal formula
ontaining a free situation variable s. The planning task is to nd an appropriate
situation s, i. e. a sequene of ations ~a so that the following entailment holds:
D j= Legal(~a; S
0
) ^ (do(~a; S
0
)) (3.14)
 do(~a; S
0
) is an abbreviation for do(a
n
; do(a
n 1
; :::; do(a
1
; S
0
):::)) and
 Legal(~a; S
0
) stands for Poss(a
1
; S
0
) ^ Poss(a
2
; do(a
1
; S
0
)) ^ :::
^Poss(a
n
; do(a
n 1
; :::; do(a
1
; S
0
):::)).
Intuitively speaking, planning in the situation alulus is to nd a sequene of ations
with eah single ation satisfying the ation preondition axioms in the orresponding
situation that leads to a situation in whih the goal formula holds.
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The qualiation and the ramiation problem. We briey address two more
problems of ation logis in the ontext of the situation alulus: the qualiation prob-
lem and the ramiation problem. By using equivalene \" in the ation preondition
axioms, we avoid to treat with the qualiation problem. In priniple, the onditions
\on the right-hand side", i. e. the onditions that allow an ation to be performed
{ Reiter alls them \important" qualiations { are only a subset of a larger set of
onditions. Although the important qualiations are true additional, not mentioned
\minor" qualiations might blok the exeution. But there is no obvious way to solve
it. In the presene of integrity onstraints, indiret eets on the world our and have
to be mentioned. Considering these indiret eets is alled the ramiation problem.
For more information onerning ramiation in basi ation theories, the reader is
referred to [LR94℄ and [Rei01℄.
3.2.2 The Sequential, Temporal Situation Calulus
Javier Pinto and Raymond Reiter enrih the situation alulus. They integrate \three
fundamental properties of real ations { they our in time, they normally have dura-
tions, and frequently they our together, i. e. onurrently" [Rei01℄ into the situation
alulus.
In the situation alulus, as given by MCarthy, ations are instantaneous. Ations
do not have any duration and therefore an not our onurrently. To beome able
to handle an ation as a proess, Pinto and Reiter rstly represents them by relational
uents. Seondly, they introdue duration-less ations { as Pinto and Reiter did before,
see [PR93℄, [Pin94℄, [PR95℄ { to start and stop these proesses. For example, the ation
walk(x; y) ould be represented by the start ation startwalk(x; y), the end ation
endwalk(x; y), and the relational uent walking(x; y).
So, it is possible to express onurreny via interleaving.
6
The representation of
time is purely qualitative, i. e. the formalism does not allow to reason about the time
between two ations.
7
Additionally, in the situation alulus, we an not express true
onurreny, i. e. that ations really start at the same time. For instane, desribing
the senario of a duel prerequisites true onurreny: A duelist dies if the other one
shoots and is only able to shoot if he is alive. Thus, via interleaving it is not possible
to handle the ase in whih both duelists shoot simultaneously and onsequently die.
To overome these limitations, Reiter introdues the Sequential, Temporal Situation
Calulus. He adds \a new temporal argument to all instantaneous ations, denoting
the atual time at whih that ation ours." to give time an expliit representation in
6
As Reiter states in [Rei01℄: \Coneptually, two ations are interleaved when one of them is the next
ation to our after the other, and usually an interleaving aount of suh a onurrent ourrene is
onsidered appropriate if the outome is independent of the order in whih the ations are interleaved."
7
As we will see later, in SNet we need a quantative model of time.
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the situation alulus. For instane, the ation startwalk(table; door; t) auses someone
walking from the table to the door at time t.
Reiter proposes an axiomatization of the Sequential, Temporal Situation Calulus
by leaving the four foundational axioms, as desribed in Setion 3.2.1, Formula (3.13),
unhanged and adding one new axiom as well as introduing two new funtion symbols
to the language of the situation alulus.
 A new funtion symbol time : ation! reals maps ations to their time of our-
rene. Consequently, for eah ation A(~x; t), we need an axiom time(A(~x; t)) = t
to give us the time of ation A.
 The seond new funtion symbol is start : situation ! reals. start(s) indiates
the starting time of situation s.
 The new required foundational axiom is start(do(a; s)) = time(a). Notie that
nothing is said about S
0
expliitly. It is left to the modeler to speify a starting
time for the initial situation or not.
The four foundational axioms  of the original situation alulus { see For-
mula (3.13) { together with the axioms above represent the foundational axioms for
the sequential, temporal situation alulus.
Reiter states that in the sequential, temporal situation alulus the uent exeutable(s)
holds in situations s if the starting time of all the ations leading to this situation is
nondereasing:
exeutable(s)
def
= (8a; s

):do(a; s

) v s 
Poss(a; s

) ^ start(s

)  time(a):
(3.15)
3.2.3 The High-Level Planning Language ConGolog
ConGolog [dGLL00℄ { an extension of Golog [LRL
+
97℄ enrihed with onurreny { is a
logi-based high-level planning language that relies on the Situation Calulus [MC63℄
and oers an interpreter written in Prolog. As one part ConGolog provides a do-
main desription language to speify ations with their preonditions and eets on
the world. In another part it allows for a proedural desription for plan skeletons:
sequenes of ations, tests whether formulas hold, nondeterministi exeution of plans,
nondeterministi hoie of arguments, et.
The formal semantis of ConGolog uses a onventional transition semantis den-
ing single steps of omputation where onurreny is interpreted as an interleaving of
primitive ations and test ations. The semantis is based on two speial prediates:
Trans and Final.
 While Final(Æ; s) expresses whether program Æ may legally terminate in situation
s,
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 primitive ation
? test ation
[
1
; 
2
; : : : ; 
n
℄ sequene
if  then 
1
else 
2
onditional
while  do  loop
ndet(
1
; 
2
) nondeterministi hoie of ations
pi(x; ) nondeterministi hoie of arguments
star() nondeterministi iteration
on(
1
; 
2
) onurrent exeution
pon(
1
; 
2
) prioritized onurrent exeution
interrupt(; ) triggers  whenever  holds
pro((
!
x
); ) proedure denition
Figure 3.3: Programming-Construts of ConGolog
 Trans(Æ; s; Æ
0
; s
0
) reets whether program Æ in situation s may legally exeute
one step ending in situation s
0
with program Æ
0
remaining.
These prediates are axiomatized { partially indutively { onerning the struture
of their rst argument, i. e. the program Æ. Consequently for eah of the twelve
programming-onstruts { see Figure 3.3 { there is an axiom for both the Final and
the Trans prediate. In order to give a rough impression we have a look at some of
these 24 axioms and give intuitive desriptions. For details see [dGLL00℄.
 Program Æ is a primitive ation (1st ase in Figure 3.3):
Final(a; s)  False
Trans(a; s; Æ
0
; s
0
)  Poss(a[s℄; s) ^ Æ
0
= nil ^ s
0
= do(a; s)
If the program onsists of one primitive ation a, there is no possibility that the
program ould be empty. In the ase that a an be legally exeuted, the resulting
program is the empty program and the situation afterwards is the situation you
reah starting from s and exeuting a.
 Program Æ is a sequene of ations (3rd ase in Figure 3.3):
Final(Æ
1
; Æ
2
; s)  Final(Æ
1
; s) ^ Final(Æ
2
; s)
Trans(Æ
1
; Æ
2
; s; Æ
0
; s
0
)  9:Æ
0
= (; Æ
2
) ^ Trans(Æ
1
; s; ; s
0
)
_Final(Æ
1
; s) ^ Trans(Æ
2
; s; Æ
0
; s
0
)
The program Æ is a sequene of Æ
1
and Æ
2
. Æ is in a nal onguration if and only
if both parts, Æ
1
and Æ
2
, are in a nal onguration. If the single-step exeution
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of the rst part Æ
1
, results in a program  you have to onatenate  and Æ
2
to
get the resulting program. If Æ
1
is the empty program, you have to perform Æ
2
,
i. e. Æ
1
does not have any inuene anymore.
Legal Termination of a Program. We dene a prediate Do(Æ; s; s
0
) expressing
that program Æ starting in situation s an legally terminate in situation s
0
:
Do(Æ; s; s
0
)
def
= 9Æ
0
:T rans

(Æ; s; Æ
0
; s
0
) ^ Final(Æ
0
; s
0
) (3.16)
Trans

represents the transitive losure of the above dened transition relation Trans.
Thus, Do(Æ; s; s
0
) holds if and only if there is a program Æ
0
remaining in situation s
0
reahed via repeatedly single-step exeution of the program Æ starting in situation s
and Æ
0
an be terminated in s
0
.
Exogenous Ations. As far, the ation whih has to be performed next is determined
by the urrent situation, the program within the speied domain, and in ase of
nondeterministi elements by the interpreter's hoie.
A new kind of ations are so-alled exogenous ations. These are ations from
outside that interfere. With a new prediate Exo(a) { desribing under what onditions
ation a an our exogenously, i. e. ation preondition axioms onerning exogenous
ations { we dene a speial program Æ
EXO
for exogenous ations.
Æ
EXO
def
= (a:Exo(a)?; a)

(3.17)
This program onsists of a sequene of nondeterministially hosen exogenous ations
of an arbitrary length. The idea is not only to start the user-dened program Æ but
additionally onurrently the above exogenous program:
ÆjjÆ
EXO
(3.18)
Of ourse, exogenous ations are ontained in suessor state axioms as well.
Other Members of the Golog Family. Besides ConGolog, whih we already have
introdued, there are other derivations of Golog we want to mention.
 IndiGolog [dGL99℄ is an extension of ConGolog and takes sensing ations in the
presene of nondeterminism into onsideration. While a ConGolog program is
exeuted ompletely in an o-line style, i. e. searhing for a globally suess-
ful termination, an IndiGolog program onsists of both user-dened o-line and
on-line parts. On-line parts of the program an be used for sensing ativities.
In [dGLLSn02℄ De Giaomo et al. formalize epistemially feasible programs and
haraterize deliberation in IndiGolog. In this ontext, they make use of Sherl's
and Levesque's [SL93℄ K-Fluent, whih represents epistemially possible situa-
tions to desribe an agent's knowledge. In SNet we use the IndiGolog interpreter.
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 DTGolog [BRST00℄ is a variant that amalgamates Golog and deision theory.
Sine SNet does something similar, we introdue DTGolog in Setion 5.5 to om-
pare it with SNet.
 -Golog [GL00℄ adds ontinuous hange to Golog. This dialet of Golog deals
with ations that do not need to be instantaneous but have ontinual inuene on
the world like walking ations have, for example. It allows to speify event-driven
high-level robot plans, for example, an ation with duration an be interrupted
immediately by an ation with higher priority.
 p-Golog [Gro02℄ introdues noisy low-level proesses as programs with probabilis-
ti eets. Moreover, Golog's onept of plan projetion is extended towards
probabilisti projetion.
 Readylog [Fer07℄ allows for deision making in highly dynami real-time domains.
It an be used, for example, in multi-agent domains where opponents have on-
trary goals and try to foil the goals of opponents like in a roboti soer domain.
 Based on the Sequential Temporal Situation Calulus (for instane, see page 41),
Reiter onsequently introdues a Sequential Temporal Golog . In SNet we make
use of Reiter's Sequential Temporal Situation Calulus resp. Golog in order to
deal with time and to rene ations with duration in one primitive start and
another primitive end ation. We give more details in Chapter 5.
3.3 ConeptBase { A Dedutive Objet Base
ConeptBase [JEG
+
95℄ is a multi-user dedutive objet manager mainly intended for
oneptual modeling and oordination in design environments. It ombines the advan-
tages of both relational databases and objet orientation and is equipped with a dedu-
tion omponent. ConeptBase supports the Telos data model [MBJK90℄, in partiular
a variant thereof: O-Telos [Jeu92℄. Telos has been one of the rst knowledge repre-
sentation languages that integrated dedutive and objet-oriented aspets. O-Telos is
equivalent in expressiveness to Datalog [GM78℄ [AHV95℄ with stratied negation.
We extensively use the ConeptBase query language (CBQL) [STAU90℄ in SNet
to perform stati analyses on our networks as well as to transform our i* models to
ConGolog ode.
8
An extensional O-Telos objet base OB is a nite set dened as
OB  fP (o; x; l; y)jo; x; y 2 ID; l 2 LABg (3.19)
The elements of OB are alled objets. In the set of identiers ID, o identies the objet
itself, x and y identify the soure and destination omponent, and l is the objet's label.
8
We refer to Setion 6.1 for more details about the arhiteture of SNet
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Figure 3.4: Semanti Net View on an Example Objet Base
Representation: Strutured Semanti Net. Suh an extensional objet base an
be visualized as a strutured semanti net : Objets like P (o; o; l; o) are represented as
nodes with name l. P (o; x; in; ) orresponds with instantiations (\x is in lass "),
whih are depited as dotted links. A speialization P (o; ; isa; d) is shown by a shaded
link. Last but not least, all other objets P (o; x; l; y) are alled attributes and are
drawn as l-labeled direted links between x and y.
As an example of a strutured semanti net, see Figure 3.4,
9
we use a task deompo-
sition of an i* strategi rational model,  f. Figure 3.2. We introdue a link and a node
objet, LinkClass and NodeClass, whih are instanes of a lass objet at the predened
top level layer. Link has two attributes from and to that are both node objets. A
node has the attributes label and image. Instanes of link and node are deomposition
link resp. task (DeompLinkClass and TaskClass). At the token layer, we just have
onrete objets that are neither instantiated nor speialized any further. In the exam-
9
For reasons of readability, we omitted some instantiation links from the token layer to the metalass
layer: from lab2, and lab3 to label as well as from the objets \found a start-up", and \give shares" to
the objet String. Moreover, we shortened some identiers taken from Figure 3.2 for the same reason.
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ple, we have three instanes of task, whih build a task deomposition struture: found
a start-up (as supertask), elaborate a business plan, and give shares to BA (both as
subtasks) {  f. Figure 3.2. The number of layers is not restrited. Metalasses an be
instanes of a metametalass et.
Representation: Frame-Based Notation. Another syntati representation is the
frame-based notation, whih only relies on objet labels rather than objet identiers.
Around the label l of an objet o, one groups the labels of all other objets that have o
as soure omponent. We take some objets from the semanti net view in Figure 3.4
and desribe them in frame-based notation:
NodeClass in Class with
attribute
image : String;
label : String
end
TaskClass in NodeClass with
image
taskimage: "hexagon.gif"
end
Elaborate in TaskClass with
lable
lab1: "elaborate BP"
end
At the SimpleClass Layer, the TaskClass instantiates the image attribute of Node-
Class by a onrete hexagon image.
10
At the TokenLayer, Elaborate is a onrete task
{ therefore inherits the hexagon image { whih instantiates the label by "elaborate BP".
10
A task in i* is depited by a hexagon { see Setion 3.1.
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Chapter 4
Modeling Strategi
Inter-Organizational Networks
Strategi inter-organizational networks are a omplex phenomenon of their own. As
we saw, they are neither markets nor organizations (hierarhies), but they lie between
them. Therefore, they are haraterized by ompetition as well as ooperation. To
pursue the goal of modeling and simulation of these networks, we try to get a deeper
understanding and a formalization of their funtioning in this hapter.
We start by giving a denition of strategi inter-organizational networks. In this
ontext the miro-meso phenomenon, i. e. the permanent interplay of ations performed
by single agents and the network as a whole, is a means to apture the dynami devel-
opment of both single network members and the whole mesh of relationships between
the members. When talking about the dynamis, trustful interations between mem-
bers of the network play a entral role. Trust is the main oordination mehanism for
long-term ooperations. Therefore, we disuss interpersonal trust, ondene (trust in
the funtioning of the network), and distrust in a separate setion. In this ontext we
present our TCD model of trust, ondene, and distrust. Subsequently, we present a
multi-perspetive modeling methodology in order to apture the multifaeted aspets
neessary to model strategi inter-organizational networks. Thereafter, we show how
to ope with these dierent aspets, i. e. integrate them from the omputational point
of view. As a result, we get the starting point of SNet, our modeling and simulation
methodology for modeling and simulation of strategi inter-organizational networks,
whih we are going to present in the following hapters.
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Figure 4.1: The Miro-Maro Phenomenon
4.1 Charaterization of Strategi Inter-Organiza-
tional Networks
For a long time, soiologists have been examining the mutual inuenes of individuals
{ ating at the so-alled miro level { and soiety { representing the so-alled maro
level . Sine there are no simple ausal onnetivities between the miro and the maro
level, but very omplex interdependenies, an interesting wide area of researh was
opened, for Soiology as well as for Psyhology and partially other disiplines inluding
Computer Siene. On one hand individuals' ations at the miro level are inuened
by the strutures built in the soiety at the maro level. On the other hand, these
ations are able to hange strutures in the soiety. Due to this yli interdependeny,
one an nd the name miro-maro phenomenon in the literature, too. This interplay
of ations that emerge from strutures and that build strutures is roughly shown in
Figure 4.1.
There is evidene showing that the miro-maro phenomenon an be mapped to a
miro-meso phenomenon with similar behaviour where the meso level is represented by
network strutures like a soial network we are examining here.
Members of a network perform ations. These ations have an inuene on the
network as a whole, for example by strengthening the relationship between network
members. But on the other side, individual ations are a result of the environment, for
example they just beome meaningful or even possible in the ontext of the network
struture. So, eah single member's goals and possibilities to at, are besides individual
apabilities, tremendously inuened by the apabilities and restritions of the network
and the neessities they underlie as a member of this network.
Figure 4.2 roughly depits our dynami view on a strategi inter-organizational net-
work, in partiular under onsideration of the miro-meso orrelation. Agents (here as
network members) are heterogenous and independent, i. e. it is their own will to parti-
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Figure 4.2: Miro-Meso Correlation within Inter-Organizational Networks
ipate in the network. At the same time, an agent underlies a double xation. She both
has to take are for the interests of the network and for herself resp. her organization.
At the meso level, agents depend on eah other by strategi interdependenies. For
instane, one has to delegate ertain tasks of one's plan to others to enlarge one's own
sope and therefore to be able to reah a goal. In this ase strategi interdependen-
ies beome onrete. As stated before, ativities in the network are not just utility-
and goal-oriented but espeially motivated by trust, ondene, and distrust. As one
onsequene, the members often perform ations in the sense of risky pre-investments,
i. e. they have reiproity expetations for a reward, whih they hope to get in the fu-
ture. Network rules usually protet the network itself. For example, potential members
have to pay a fee when entering the network or members that intentionally weaken the
network have to leave it.
In the rest of this setion, we present our denition of strategi inter-organizatio-
nal networks in the following way. We start with stati aspets onerning individual
agents, ontinue with denitions onsidering the fat of being part of a network, and
onlude with the dynami view of networks, i. e. what has to be overed when time
passes by. Aspets like the role of trust and how to manage delegation patterns are
presented in later setions.
4.1.1 Properties of Partiipating Ators
Heterogenous Ators. Strategi inter-organizational networks onsist of heteroge-
nous ators. They represent single individuals, parts of ompanies, or ompanies as a
whole, have dierent apabilities, goals, resoures, et., and therefore enrih the net-
work ulture. Of ourse, dierent ators in the network might be able to provide similar
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servies that are required by other ators in the network, but they are dierent in their
internal way of working. For instane, one is preferred whenever a servie or produt
has to be delivered very quikly. Another one is known beause of his exellent work,
but at the same time he is quite expensive.
Independene of Ators. The ators are voluntarily members of an inter-organi-
zational network, beause they see the advantages of being involved in suh a network,
for example to be able to use resoures by ooperation they ould not use otherwise.
There is no ontrolling instane that instruts them to join or leave the network. There
are only agent-intern reasons that express the usefulness to partiipate or exit. So,
there is no membership by denition.
Of ourse, \independene" does not mean that nobody has to bear the onsequenes
of the ations he performs. The opposite is true. Ations reate strutures (see miro-
meso) that reet the position of eah ator and therefore his future possibilities. Ad-
ditionally, the entrane into and the stay in a network are onneted with written and
non-written rules, so-alled network rules. So, eah ator is free in his deision to join
the network and obey the rules or to stay outside.
4.1.2 Being Part of the Network
Double Fixation. Eah network partiipant underlies a so-alled double xation, i.e.
on one hand he has to pursue his own intern goals and on the other hand at the same
time he has to strengthen his position in the network for suessful future ooperations.
This balaning at is neessary for a long-term suess of both the network and the
partiipant. Both fousing on the realization of the own goals by negleting the rest of
the network and onentrating on supporting others without pursuing own goals leads
to a failure in a long run.
Network Rules. Soial networks are based on expliitly written and non-written
(ethial) rules that everybody who wants to join, stay in, or leave the network has to
obey. These rules are a strutural omponent of a soial network, whih dramatially
inuenes the ations of ators in the network with the aim to make the network more
robust, strengthen members that have a positive inuene, and protet these against
those that only see their own prot.
Usually, networks have a barrier of entrane, for example newomers have to pay a
ertain amount of money. The intended onsequene is that ators who are willing to
pay have an interest in long-term ativities within the network. These ativities again
support the network members and the network itself. So, long-term prot for all the
members is inreased, and the danger that someone wants to make prot quikly on
the shoulders of other members and exit the network is minimized.
4.1 Charaterization of Strategi Inter-Organizational Networks 53
Free-riders { i. e. persons that uses all servies but go away when it is time to pay
for the servies { are not interested in a permanent strong network, but they follow
short-term goals to make selsh gains and then exit the network. In order to be able
to prevent suh strategies that weaken the network, network rules are important. For
instane, if eah new member has to pay a lot of money at the beginning his sudden
exit would be less likely, beause he would lose all this money paid before.
The punishment of ators that violate rules normally is high. The reason is obvious.
Whenever network rules are broken, the network itself is alled into question. Even
though at a rst glane only some ators might be disriminated by others' misplaying,
the trust in the network as a whole is aeted. Thus, the long-term damage is muh
higher than the obvious rst damage.
Strategi Interdependenies The struture of our networks is haraterized by
strategi dependenies between their members. Eah ator strategially depends on
several other ators in the network, who enable him to reah goals he would not be
able to reah without the help of others. This mutual supply of resoures, knowledge, or
working power supports both the network's usual harater of amplifying engagement
and prot and its fragility at the same time. These strategi dependenies an be sub-
stantiated by urrent ooperation ativities with appropriate expetations of reiproity
due to risky pre-investments.
4.1.3 Dynami Aspets
Trust, Condene, and Distrust. Interpersonal trust between ators plays an
essential role in soial networks and therefore in strategi inter-organizational networks,
too. It is a neessary ondition onerning the initiation of ooperations. Trust has
a ertain absorbing eet, whih leads to investments without immediate revenue {
see \risky pre-investment" and \reiproity expetation" below. Certain mismathes
will be aepted or even expeted knowing that they will be ompensated or over-
ompensated later on resulting in a win-win situation. Condene means an individual's
trust in the network as a whole. A lak of ondene shows that the network is working
badly, for example there are unidentied members exploiting the network or network
rules weaken the network. From our point of view, distrust leads to monitoring between
network members, whih, as one result, dereases the eÆieny of the network. Details
about trust, ondene, and distrust are made expliit in the subsequent Setion 4.2.
Risky Pre-Investment. Ators in a soial network do not expet that eort and
gain are balaned all the time. Often they have to perform pre-investments under
the onsideration of a later revenue. This aspet makes strategi inter-organizational
networks fragile against so-alled free-riders. These ators are planning their own best
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exit-strategy without regarding (ethial) rules. So, as we have seen, on one hand this
aspet of risky pre-investments an weaken the network. But on the other hand, the
fat that ators are disposed to aept risks, gain ould be muh higher than outside the
network. In this ontext trust plays an important role in order to steer the willingness
to at risky.
Reiproity Expetation. The priniple of reiproity stands for a balane between
give and take. Every member has to have a well-adjusted relation between her expen-
diture and her revenue. Investment and gain need not be omparable objetively. In
strategi inter-organizational networks usually the revenue follows the investment with
a ertain delay ( f. \risky pre-investment").
4.2 Trust, Condene, and Distrust in Inter-Organi-
zational Networks: The TCD Approah
4.2.1 Trust vs. Condene
A typial denition in the network literature sees trust as \the willingness of a party to
be vulnerable to the ations of another party based on the expetation that the other
will perform a partiular ation important to the trustor, irrespetive of the ability
to monitor or ontrol that other party" [MDS95℄. There is no formal agreement on
reiproity, i. e. the relationship between give and take, investment and return where the
partners' prot mutually from the other partners' ations. Based on her expetations,
the trustor thus makes an expliit deision to rely on a third party, thereby making
herself vulnerable. If an expetation is not fullled, the trustor sustains some kind of
loss or damage [Luh88℄.
Coleman onsiders trust as a deision under risk { see [Col94℄. In the urrent
implementation of SNet, we take his denition, but in general SNet is open to arbitrary
trust models.
Often, the onept of trust is dened in a rather vague and misleadingly standardized
way, disregarding the foal point of network researh: what is the relationship between
trust in a given situation that the trustor exhibits towards onrete persons or organiza-
tions, and the ondene in the network as a whole? The network as a whole onsists of
a mesh of dependenies that is not manageable or ontrollable, nor even ompletely vis-
ible to the trustor, thus requiring ondene in the system (\Systemvertrauen" [Luh88℄;
f. also the distintion between personal and institutional trust [Zu86℄, and between
\faework" and \faeless ommitments" [Gid90℄; f. also [Sh95℄ and [LS97℄). Thus,
partiipation in a network results in double vulnerability: to identiable opportunists,
and to the generally inomprehensible mesh of dependenies of all network partners.
Where ondene is present, signiant eÆieny gains ensue: for example, if I am
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ondent that my network will somehow solve the subtasks, I an rapidly engage in
ommitments without taking the time of nding and gaining ommitments from sub-
ontrators.
This distintion between trust and ondene plays an important role for the regula-
tion and ontrol of soial networks. Networks need to develop binding rules regulating
members' behaviour. These rules aim at failitating trust-based interation, for ex-
ample by ensuring the ondentiality of information exhanged among partners, by
supporting network ulture (fair play), reputation, regulation of aess [Sta00℄, or by
expliitly dening santions for breahes of trust [LS97℄, [OS00℄. The question what
kinds of rules need to be dened is essential to the eÆieny and the long-term suess
of soial networks.
Finally, although oordination by means of trust and ondene an enable and
failitate ooperation, it has its osts. In networks, trust and ondene need to be
wathful, i.e. the partners need to be ontinually aware of their investments and thus the
risks that they inur. This wathfulness leads to a ontinuous (and potentially ostly)
monitoring of the individual partners' behaviour (trust) and the pereived eÆieny
of the network as a whole (ondene). On the other hand, wathfulness may also be
aused by distrust of or against individuals, where distrust is dened as the expetation
of opportunisti behaviour from partners, thus breaking the reiproity of trust-based
interation. We will introdue monitoring in strategi inter-organizational networks in
Chapter 7.
4.2.2 Distrust and Conits
Distrust has so far been largely negleted by soiologial researh; exeptions are for
example [Luh88℄. If onsidered at all, distrust is usually treated as danger that needs
to be avoided ( f. e. g. [Sh95℄), and only rarely as an opportunity for making network
strutures less rigid, and thus more suitable for innovations [Ker98℄. Reent investi-
gations on onit and distrust in organizations [KT96℄ and [LMB98℄ have established
the fat that distrust is an irreduible phenomenon that annot be oset against any
other soial mehanisms.
We suggest the use of distrust for operationalizing latent onits in networks not
unovered by traditional viewpoint methods. In addition to the well-known options
of \exit" (leaving the network) and \voie" (making distrust expliit), a third option
is open to eah dissatised network member: the agent an ultivate but hide her
distrust. This means that the agent ontinues as a network member, postponing her
deision for \voie" or \exit". But she starts to ollet information (whih is ostly
and time-onsuming), and interprets it in a subjetive way that is strongly inuened
by her distrust. Hene, distrust has an inherent tendeny to beome stronger [Luh88℄.
We talk about the inuene of distrust in Setion 7 in the ontext of monitoring.
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4.2.3 Distrust Beneath Trust and Condene
At rst glane, one might think distrust is a negative mental state agents in strategi
inter-organizational networks ould have. But distrust does not slow down network
ativities, but exatly the ontrary is true ( f. [GJK
+
01b℄). Firstly, it vitalizes the
network-ulture. Present distrust indues a permanent feeling of inseurity, whih again
makes the network ators more exible and more attentive. Distrust prevents that the
network swithes to a hierarhy resp. organization and leads to risk minimization, as
desribed earlier.
In [GJK
+
01b℄ a typial development of the distrust one ator has against another
is desribed in the following way: During a phase of ooperation the depender observes
some irregularities in his dependee's behaviour. This leads to a \more or less linear"
latent asent of his distrust level. Soiologists found out that there are speial thresholds
of awareness. If a depender's individual threshold is exeeded, he starts searhing
atively for the dependee's irregularities { he is looking for evidene that the dependee
is not trustful. Beside the eet that the probability of nding this negative evidene
is inreased, every irregularity of the dependee is estimated in another way. While the
depender has low distrust he values eah negative inident as a loal, single spotted
gae. But with high-level distrust he values eah of these inidents as an event of a
series of negative events. He searhes in the past for similar inidents. This behaviour
leads to a disproportionated inrease of distrust. Network researhers all this a self-
intensifying proess. That way the next distrust-threshold an be passed very quikly.
Here the one latent distrust-aumulation an swith to apparent ations, i. e. the
depender an introdue measures to arpet the dependee, to minimize his possible loss,
or even nish the ooperation. In Chapter 7 we introdue a monitoring framework in
the ontext of strategi inter-organizational networks, in whih distrust is one aspet
that determines the intensity of monitoring ativities.
This typial distrust development, as desribed here, is only typial if the ooper-
ating partner ats with bad intentions. Surely, it is possible that the level of distrust
dereases when the ooperation funtions well within a ertain sope. But it is proved
there has to be a lot of good ooperation in order to ompensate negative experienes.
Our understanding of distrust is quite dierent from the general understanding
in the literature. As desribed in [Mar94℄ { see also Setion 2.3 { distrust is often
seen as the opposite of trust, i. e. a lak of trust between two ators implies a ertain
portion of distrust immediately. Therefore, trust and distrust are zero-sum. We take a
ompletely dierent stane. While the level of trust reets the level of trustful ations
in SNet, the level of risky investments, the willingness of ommitting in dependenies,
and the level of ommitment, the level of distrust enourages the agent to engage in
monitoring. Of ourse, there is a onnetion between trust and distrust. But it is
indiret. The depender's inreased distrust level against the dependee, for example,
ould on one hand have the eet that he lowers his future engagement onerning
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Figure 4.3: The TCD-Model of Trust, Condene, and Distrust
ooperations with this ator. But on the other hand it ould be more gainful to make
more and more ommitments in order not to show any unertainty and to redue the
ommitments later on, abruptly or slowly { see [EFM01℄.
Mostly, the latter behaviour is not observable from outside, but an only be reon-
sidered after a worst-ase senario, for example when the ator went bankrupt. For
example, let's have a look at the one mighty German media tyoon Leo Kirh. With
risky investments on the eld of digital pay-TV, he went bankrupt. But over a long
time, nobody in the publi notied the disastrous standing of the Kirh Media Group
with its hundreds of employees, beause the orresponding bank institutes proteted
Leo Kirh by giving him more and more money. From our point of view, these redit
institutes demonstrate a trustful interation, while in the meantime their distrust was
immensely high. Knowing the bad situation Leo Kirh was in and therefore they them-
selves were in, they were led by hopes and fears. Similar examples of that extent, i.e.
massive losses of jobs and negative inuene on the national eonomy, beome more
and more visible. The ollapse of Japanese banks at the end of the 90-ies is only one
example.
58 4 Modeling Strategi Inter-Organizational Networks
Figure 4.4: Basi Ation Workow
4.2.4 The TCD Model
Summarizing the above disussion, we postulate a Trust-Condene-Distrust (TCD)
model of suess or failure of networks. This model is shown in the three \olumns"
(thik arrows) of Figure 4.3, eah leading up from ations in the network to hanges
in the struture { with a feedbak loop downwards to the ations via rules reated
by the struture. In the left olumn, ondene-based deisions to inur strategi
vulnerabilities reate mutual dependenies. In the middle trustful deisions for risky
and traeable investments inrease reputation, goodwill, and moral integrity. Whereas
the wathful distrust on the right aggregates latent onits by olletion, storage, and
(usually negative) interpretation of events. A balaned mix of all three aspets forms the
small orridor for suess in networks. The upper part of the gure shows three possible
ways of failure aused by imbalanes. On the upper left, too many dependenies and
goodwill without trust may lead to a so-alled suessful failure of family-like or even
maose relationships, whereas on the upper right over-aggregated distrust may ause
the nal onit for the network. And nally, the balaned mix annot be ensured by
simply reating a lot of network rules, beause then the transition of the network into
an organization will also ause the end of the network.
4.3 Expetation Management by Speeh Ats
Delegation proesses and monitoring ativities are reeted in the speeh ats used in
the network proesses (f. Figure 4.4). For modeling speeh ats, we use the Ation
Workow approah [MMWFF92℄.
The basi idea is that ooperation proesses onsist of atomi "loops" (reurrent
4.3 Expetation Management by Speeh Ats 59
Figure 4.5: Complex Ation Workow
or ad-ho) of ommuniative ations that are performed by a performer or supplier to
satisfy an internal or external ustomer. Potential breakdowns in the workow struture
an also be deteted and oped with. An ation workow onsists of four phases as
shown in Figure 4.4. An initial ustomer request, whereby the ustomer states his or
her ondition of satisfation, is followed by a ommitment phase, at the end of whih the
supplier has agreed to aept the - possibly hanged - ustomer request under ertain
onditions. During the subsequent performane phase, the supplier performs whatever
ations are neessary to fulll the ustomer request. The phase ends when the supplier
reports that the ommitment has been fullled. Finally, in the evaluation phase, the
ustomer has to evaluate whether the supplier really fullled the ommitment.
A key property of this approah is that it works reursively, i. e. in eah phase
sub-workows of the same pattern an be spun o with sub-ontrators ( f. Figure 4.5
and [Sh96℄). As an example we onsider the organization of an event.
1
Figure 4.6 gives
a rough impression of an event organizer showing both his internal struture inluding
plans how to organize an event and his onnetions to other network members for
onduting delegations when engaging one of them as a speaker during the event. The
MIT E-Center (entrepreneurship enter) serves as a kind of trigger to the organizer.
Some of the tasks that ompose the exeution of an event organization are depited
expliitly: searhing for an appropriate loation, managing the aommodation and the
payment, and, most important for us here, nding a speaker that ts into the event.
In this example the ation workow an reah a depth of at most three. The e-enter
negotiates with the event organizer. The organizer again has the possibility to delegate
the task of holding a leture to one of the speakers. Note that the event organizer
herself is (in priniple)
2
able to hold the leture by herself without the help of external
speakers.
In the network situation, delegation an be looked at in two ways, espeially in the
1
The event organizer might be a single person or an organization.
2
We do not aount for the resulting quality of a performed tasks before the next hapter.
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Figure 4.6: Event Organizer Looking for a Speaker
early phases of a workow. On the one hand, we an look at delegation or expeted
delegation to individual subontrators - this is the traditional ase studied in speeh
at theory. On the other hand, we an look at the expeted availability and reliability of
subontrators within the network as a whole. Pursuing this idea, we obtain a mapping
of our just addressed event organization example to typial delegation patterns in the
workow model. These are shown in the four ases of Figure 4.7:
 If there is little or no trust, the supplier will either do everything herself or
have an elaborate delegation proess in the oer phase, to ensure ommitment of
subontrators prior to ommitting to the ustomer (ases (a) and (b)).
 With growing ore trust in spei individuals, we see less delegation ativity in
the oer phase and more in the performane phase, but always with the same
group of sub-ontrators - the supplier trusts in the willingness and ability of
subontrators to fulll their role and an thus ommit faster (ase (b), ase ()
with spei subontrators only).
 Network trust, i. e. ondene, is haraterized by onentrating delegation on
the performane phase only, with a broad range of subontrating agents and sig-
niant sub-subontrating whih is not monitored in great detail by the original
ontrator (ase ()).
 Distrust within or beyond network delegation is haraterized by signiant ex-
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Figure 4.7: Relationships Between Trust, Condene, and Distrust with Expeted
Speeh At Delegation Patterns
tent, or delegation, of ativities in the evaluation phase, in partiular for spei
subontrats (against whose performers the distrust exists). It thus one again
beomes lear that distrust is dierent from the negation of trust (ase (d)).
4.4 A Multi-Perspetive Modeling Methodology
The disussion in the preeding setions showed that trust, ondene, and distrust
in strategi inter-organizational networks are omplex phenomena whih are not easily
aptured by simplisti, single-faeted models. Previous work in requirements engineer-
ing has attempted to address suh omplex multi-viewpoint situations by expliitly
modeling multiple, possibly oniting perspetives or viewpoints [GN99℄, and by man-
aging their stati and dynami inter-relationships through reasoning and/or simulation
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mehanisms. In this setion, we desribe suh a methodology for the TCD approah.
Our goal is to formulate a tehnially supported multi-perspetive framework whih
inludes the aspets of ore (individual) trust, ondene (system trust), and distrust
desribed in the setion before.
Firstly, it is lear that suh a methodology must enable a dynami, simulation-
oriented analysis of soial networks in addition to a stati one { trust, ondene, and
distrust manifest themselves in spei behaviour patterns, and these impats must
be made expliit and simulated in a model. Therefore, we integrate the logi-based
high-level planning language ConGolog (see Setion 3.2) in our methodology to make
the related modeling and simulation apabilities available to our framework.
Seondly, the disussion in the previous setions shows that the dynamis of trust,
ondene, and distrust are heavily inuened by the pereived relationships between
ommuniation ats of the agents and real ation done with respet to these ommuni-
ation ats. From this observation, we onlude the need { in ontrast to, for example,
Yu's approah { to inlude an expliit speeh at perspetive in our framework. This
speeh at perspetive interats with the planning perspetive provided by ConGolog.
Finally, we agree with Yu, Coleman, and many others that expliit modeling of goals
and dependenies is ruial with respet to networks in general and our speial fous
on trust, ondene, and distrust in partiular. We therefore inlude Yu's strategi
rationale (SR) model as well as his strategi dependeny (SD) model (see Setion 3.1)
as perspetives in our approah. However, our view here is again more dynami than
in previous work whih leads to a muh loser integration with the other two per-
spetives than investigated in previous researh: Strategi dependenies are treated
as the reasons for speeh at based delegations, and the latter are evaluated partially
with respet to the former. Conversely, planning from strategi goals (aptured in the
strategi rationale submodel) may generate strategi dependenies to other ators if
ertain subgoals or tasks turn out to be ineÆient to handle for the planning agent
itself.
Thus, a requirements management environment for soial networks has to deal with
a dynami mutual inuene among the perspetives, mediated by trust, ondene, and
distrust. For example, our methodology supports patterns suh as the following:
 Existing ore trust to spei network agents will enhane the possibility for
network ation rather than individual ation, and thus inrease the apabilities
of the network (modeled by reating more strategi dependenies and more speeh
at ommitments).
 Existing network trust (ondene) will enable agents to ommit more rapidly to
ations requested by ustomers, without prior ommuniative ats with possible
subontrators/ollaborators. This strongly inreases the reativeness of the net-
work as a whole. In ontrast, lak of trust will lengthen the oer phase within a
speeh at, and make the network slow and bureaurati.
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Figure 4.8: Interplay of TCD Modeling Perspetives
 Both of the above will have an impat on the omplexity, reliability and speed of
ollaborative ation plans generated.
 Performane monitoring and thus the evolution of trust, distrust, and ondene
will be based on relationships between goals, expetations (dened by ommu-
niative situations in speeh ats), plans and atual proesses. A ertain degree
of institutionalized network distrust is oered by monitoring rules.
Individual distrust is not symmetri to lak of trust but will instead again hange
plans by adding monitoring ations to it, thus reating overhead and reduing network
eetiveness in the long run.
SNet's TCD-based requirements modeling and management method is depited in
Figure 4.8. To make an explanation easier, we rst omit the middle part of the gure,
i. e. the trust, ondene, and distrust aspets, with its dotted links to the retangles.
Eah retangle symbolizes a separate perspetive. The area inside the agent boundary
deals with individual agents' intern aspets (the miro level of the network). Whereas
outside the agent boundary, we depit inter-agent relationships and ativities (the meso
level of the network).
 Agents' internal struture, for example goal hierarhies and orresponding tasks
to reah these goals, (the upper left retangle) following Yu's strategi rationale
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(SR) approah are not just reated and maintained dynamially but also mapped
to operationalize (base) plans. To make it easier to bridge the gap between i* and
derived ConGolog programs, we show how to modify the SR model among other
things by means of pre- and postonditions and give goal elements and delegation
patterns a spei semantis { see Setion 5.2. Additionally, for the fulllment of
one agent's goal other agents' ooperations might be inluded, so that strategi
dependenies on the meso level are generated.
 We use the ConGolog formalism to ompose a plan (the lower left retangle) from
delarative building bloks with pre- and post onditions, whih are predened
by the strategi rationale view. Agents are able to enlarge their own abilities
(see Figure 4.2) and therefore rene their own plans by delegating ertain tasks
to other agents. Plans whih are arranged for exeution and depend on other
agents' ontributions generate onrete dependenies.
 Strategi dependenies (the upper right retangle), following Yu's strategi de-
pendeny (SD) modeling formalism, are in part pre-existing from a-priori goal
and apability analysis (as desribed above), in part reated dynamially from
the reognition that ertain parts of a plan are better delegated to others.
 Plans and dependenies, initially often based on required agent role types rather
than onrete network partners, are mapped to spei ommuniative ations
(speeh ats) (the lower right retangle) in order to ensure a strategi dependeny
with a spei ontrat.
In the next step we desribe the inuene of the just omitted middle part of Figure 4.8
on eah of the above exposed perspetives.
 Condene in the network as a whole is neessary for agents when ooperating
with other network members. In this ontext trust in individuals inuenes the
pre-seletion of possible ooperation partners.
 When plans are going to be operationalized, several hoies have to be made. Eah
agent has to alulate and optimize short as well as long-term prots. Espeially
on a long run, agents onsider their trust and ondene bakground to alulate
the reliability of the expeted return of the others. On the other hand, eah
member has to be aware of the onsequenes of their own ations, for example
when they anel a task and ause other agents' failure of a goal.
 Distrust in other network members inuenes the level of awareness during the ex-
eution of plans (\trae model" in Figure 4.8). One result of high distrust should
be an inreased monitoring eort, whih again redues the expeted gain. Moni-
toring results again modify distrust between network partiipants, and therefore
they inuene the monitoring ativity.
 Both trust in individuals and trust in the network (ondene) are a preondition
for ators when deiding to engage themselves in a strategi network. Vie versa
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a strong network has an impat on eah member's ondene. As explained in
Setion 4.3, ondene in the network an lead to more eÆient ommitments
during delegation requests. Additionally, due to trustful relationships between
single agents, future ooperations beome more likely.
 We do not want to exlude that trust, ondene, and distrust mutually inuene
eah other in a diret way. But from our point of view, they are more separated
than ommonly disussed in the literature. If an agent has very high distrust
against another one, he either does not want to work together with him in future
(has low trust to him) or pretends to at trustfully in future to over his distrust
and support the running ooperation. In ertain irumstanes individual trust
might aet ondene. For example, an agent dereases his trust in a single
network partiipant, who is from his point of view a very important member,
then the strength of the network seems to be weakened and as a onsequene his
ondene dereases.
4.5 Integrating the Perspetives
In the preeding setions, we have presented the individual perspetives of our require-
ments modeling and simulation framework. In an atual modeling proess, espeially
if we start from an existing system and investigate hange options, requirements in-
formation an be aquired aording to any of these perspetives. The problem then
arises to identify and resolve inonsistenies aross these perspetives, and to trans-
fer information onerning some oneptual objet from one perspetive to the others.
Nissen and Jarke [NJ99℄ have presented a repository-based solution (alled M-Telos)
to viewpoint-oriented ontinuous requirements management, whih relies on the exis-
tene of a shared meta meta model (a formally dened base ontology) to whih the
terminology used in eah of these perspetives is formally linked.
For the preursor model of our approah, Kethers [Ket00℄ presents a detailed deriva-
tion of the meta meta model for an integration between the i* formalism and the speeh
at formalism (and a ouple of other ooperative proess formalisms whih are not used
here). We have adapted her meta meta model to the setting desribed in this hapter,
espeially to the dynamis of the overall approah as shown in Figure 4.8, by
 dropping all onepts not required for the i* SD and SR models and speeh at
models
 inluding the possibility to add trust, ondene, and distrust values
 adding preondition and postondition onepts for our SR extensions, while over-
loading the task onept for the triple purpose of serving as a basis for ontratual
ontent, being a result of goal renement/means-ends analysis, being substru-
tured with a plan.
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Figure 4.9: Meta Meta Model for Integration of the Four Perspetives in the TCD
Approah
The resulting meta meta model is shown in a simplied form in Figure 4.9. Briey,
the mapping to eah of the four perspetives in our approah ( f. Figure 4.8) is as
follows:
 i*'s strategi dependeny perspetive is aptured through the onepts of Agent
and Dependeny (upper left of the gure), with a due-to link indiating subtypes
suh as goal dependeny, resoure dependeny, and task dependeny. For sim-
pliity, soft goals are left out in the gure; f. [Ket00℄ where S. Kethers desribes
a meta model of this perspetive.
 i*'s strategi rationale perspetive is aptured through the onepts of Goal and
Task/Ativity (middle of the gure). For our purposes, the basi model is ex-
tended by pre onditions and post ondition objets and their relationship to
resoures and TCD values. The range of TCD values is left open by the meta
meta model. When instantiated, both disrete and ontinuous values an be
aommodated.
3
 Several details aptured in the atual model are left out from the gure for sim-
pliity: renement of goals to other subgoals, the additional ontrol strutures of
the simulation environment will be presented in Setion 5.4, and the omparison
of post onditions with expeted goal ahievement as shown in the ontributes-to
+/- link (this link is intended for bottom-up goal evaluation).
 The speeh at perspetive is aptured by the ustomer/supplier relationships
3
For example, trust values in Coleman's model [Col94℄ are real-valued subjetive probabilities.
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between the agent and task/ativity onepts. Again, for simpliity, the gure
does not show the information exhange ativities assoiated with the negotiation
proess in this perspetive, full details on this aspet are given in [Ket00℄.
 Values of trust, ondene, and distrust are assoiated with eah dependeny
(note that - not detailed in the gure - trust and distrust links are single-valued
whereas ondene links an be multi-valued, as they onern many agents). The
meta meta level leaves open the sope of suh a link: in one extreme, agent A
an trust agent B on anything, in the other extreme, A ould trust for just one
spei performane of a speeh at related to a spei dependeny.
The meta meta model serves as the most abstrat shema of a metadata reposi-
tory through whih the dierent perspetive submodels and tools in our approah an
exhange information or be transformed into eah other, as skethed in the previous
subsetions.
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Chapter 5
Agent Modeling and Simulation in
SNet
In this hapter we introdue our logi- and agent-based modeling and simulation
methodology SNet on a oneptual level. Some details about the implementation and
evaluation results are given in the next hapter.
At the beginning of this hapter, we motivate why we inlude i*, ConGolog, and
ConeptBase into our approah. Then we modify i*, i. e. add some new elements and
restrit the semantis of i*, to give the user the equipment to model strategi inter-
organizational networks in SNet. Although the semantis of the modied variant of i* is
still dened in Telos { and therefore modied i* an be used and stored in ConeptBase
{, we propose a unique transformation from modied i* to ConGolog: Therefore, we
take all possible graphial modied i* patterns and derive the orresponding set of
ConGolog lauses.
In the rest of this hapter, we embed generated ConGolog program skeletons into
an environment of SNet that allows agents to behave deliberative. Among other things,
we desribe how agents in SNet interat, negotiate, ommuniate, and delegate. We
onentrate on agents' planning ativities and show how they make trust- and utility-
based deisions in SNet and shedule new tasks. At the end of the hapter, we ompare
SNet with DTGolog, a deision-theoreti variant of Golog.
The Role of i* in SNet.
For proess modeling the strategi rationale (SR) model of i* does not only provide the
means of hierarhially struturing along a omposition and deomposition dimension
or the modeling of ows but also looks behind the motivation and rationale of pro-
esses when dealing with intentions. As an example, onsider Figure 5.1. Here we an
answer questions like: Why is the MIT Entrepreneurship Center (E-Center) interested
in the fulllment of the goal perform a networking event? The answer onerning
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the motivation is that by this means the ator omes to the end of strengthening
the NW ulture. Conversely, the SR model allows for talking about: How an inten-
tional element
1
an be ahieved. For instane, the goal strengthen the NW ulture
an be ahieved in dierent ways:
 by delegating the task organize event to the event organizer.
2
 Another alternative would be to nd a loation, i. e. to provide the orrespond-
ing resoure, to all for partiipation, and to let a lawyer of the venture
apitalist (VC) bank speak to the audiene.
 Instead of the lawyer, an eonomist ould speak,
 or the entrepreneur ould give a talk.
 A further hoie is to simply write a newsletter.
Means-ends reasoning to answer \How-questions" provides an important input for SNet.
Here, the dierent possible alternative ways to pursue goals ould serve as hoie points
for planning ativities in ConGolog. This is one example where we have to onentrate
on one possible understanding of aspets in the original i* language. Sine our aim is
to reason about these alternatives, we onentrate on \How-questions" in the ontext
of goals and alternatives and neglet the \Why-questions".
Eah of these ve alternatives to reah the goal strengthen the NW ulture or-
responds to a set of hoies resulting in a set of nodes and links. Eri Yu alls suh
an alternative a routine, whih \is a subgraph in the SR graph with a single link to a
\means" node from eah \end" node". In this ontext Yu oers the onepts of abil-
ity , workability , viability , and believability (for details see Setion 3.1). They represent
dierent expeted qualities of routines derived from ommitted or open dependenies.
For example, with the inorporation of the Event Organizer, the E-Center is able to
perform a networking event, sine a orresponding routine exists. But this routine
might not be workable, sine the Event Organizer has not ommitted the delegation.
He perhaps does not have the apaity at the right moment. So, the exeution of this
routine is prinipally possible (ability) but probably not at runtime (no workability).
SNet's aim is to give agents the autonomy to reason about dierent possible alter-
natives, i. e. routines. Agents ask other agents when they onsider delegating tasks.
So they hek the ability of routines and afterwards an hoose a onrete routine.
Whether this routine is workable or not depends on eah agent, who has the autonomy
to perform all the tasks he is expeted to perform on time, delayed, or not at all. In
SNet the degree of trust, whih one agent has in another agent of the network, is ad-
justed dynamially during run-time. We will see the implementation of the SNet trust
model in Setion 5.4 and in Chapter 6.
1
Reall that an intentional element in i* an be a goal, task, resoure, or softgoal.
2
Note that a delegation an be modeled by using links rossing agent boundaries. Further details
are given later in this hapter.
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Figure 5.1: SR Model of an Event Organization
i* supports properties of strategi inter-organizational networks as explained in
Chapter 4. Routines are not restrited to agent-boundaries but an ross them, i. e. they
ontain delegations that enlarge sopes. Delegations are distinguished between dierent
degrees of dependenies { open, ommitted, and ritial {, whih evoke orresponding
degrees of vulnerabilities. Ators an be modeled independently from eah other with
dierent rationales. Thus, the ators are heterogeneous.
Another advantage of i* is that it is a knowledge-based approah embedded in the
oneptual modeling language Telos and an resort to the Organization Modeling En-
vironment (OME) [LYay℄ for supporting the graphial modeling and the semantial
representation in Telos [MBJK90℄ and therefore in CBase, too.
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The Role of ConGolog in SNet.
In ConGolog it is left to the user to dene the level of abstration. The modeler an
dene rather high-level tasks or ne-grained tasks as primitive ConGolog ations, whih
ause eets on the world. Hene, one an remain strategi in some part of the domain
and at the same time operationalize other aspets in detail. This feature, whih is
also harateristi of i*, is very important for SNet. Sine strategi inter-organizational
networks are mostly modeled from one ator's subjetive point of view, the proesses
of other ators might not be known in all details. Consequently, it is up to the modeler
to hoose the level of tasks that are seen as primitive ConGolog tasks. In Figure 5.1,
for example, the network seems to be modeled from the E-Center's point of view. A
hint is that this ator oupies a entral position. Compared with the E-Center part,
for example, the event organizer's part is modeled quite shallow.
The situation alulus beame muh more important after Reiter gave a solution to
the frame problem in this formalism,  f. Setion 3.2. This is a preondition for making
reasoning in ConGolog, and therefore in SNet, eetive. Whenever humans model
their environment, one an not expet that they give an all-inluding desription of the
initial situation: all possible ations, all eets that an be aused by ations. et. The
implementation of ConGolog uses the losed-world assumption (CWA) together with
the solution to the frame problem to make reasoning eÆient.
The dynami part of SNet is based on ConGolog. We are going to modify it in
some parts (see Setion 5.2), for example in order to synhronize agents' ations and
deliberation phases under the progress of time.
For our purposes i* and ConGolog omplement eah other. ConGolog gives our
agents the autonomy to show proativity when pursuing their own goals, whih have
been dened in i* in advane. Thus, the agents an both atively searh for and
independently hoose between dierent routines, whih have been predened in i* SR.
Delegations should be initiated trust-based. Thus, in SNet we have to deal with risky
pre-investments and reiproity expetations expliitly, i. e. over the whole proess from
the initiation to the onsequenes of the results.
ConGolog is well suited for reasoning about alternative ways of reahing predened
states in the world, i. e. planning onerning a given domain (initial situation, ations,
their preonditions, and eets of ations on the world) and a proedural skeleton for
reduing the searh spae. Consequently, ConGolog an be used in SNet to reason
about means-ends and deomposition strutures in models desribed in i* with the aim
of nding the routine with the highest utility. Whenever delegations beome neessary,
negotiation has to be done outside expliitly.
While i* provides a formal desription of the above-mentioned onepts, SNet imple-
ments the orresponding means-ends reasoning mehanisms with the help of ConGolog.
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The Role of ConeptBase in SNet.
In SNet the strategi inter-organizational networks, whih have been modeled by the
user, are stored in the dedutive meta-data repository ConeptBase. We are able to
make stati analyses of the stored networks. For example, we an hek whether there
is a goal element that has no inoming links. If suh an element is found, we an warn
the user, beause there is no possibility to fulll this goal.
During the transformation into ConGolog ode, we make use of the ConeptBase
query language, whih allows us to extrat templates out of the strategi network.
For example, we an ask for all tasks that are further deomposed. ConeptBase is
not important on the oneptual level of SNet but plays a entral role within the
implementation. Therefore, we an nd more details about the role of ConeptBase in
SNet in Chapter 6.
5.1 Representing Strategi Networks in Modied i*
We have seen that i* already overs many aspets that are useful for modeling strategi
inter-organizational networks. For our purpose we want to leave the early requirements
engineering { whih i* was originally aimed at { and deal with simulations for giving
network members a deeper insight into their role within the network. To bridge this
gap between stati modeling in i* and dynami simulations in ConGolog, we modify
the original i*, i. e. add new modeling elements as well as narrow the semantis of some
aspets.
With the help of the SR diagram shown in Figure 5.1, we already introdued an
entrepreneurship domain we want to retain in this setion. In Figure 5.2 we an take a
rst look at the modied i* diagram we use for our example purposes. New elements
and the dierent semantis will be treated in the following pages.
5.1.1 Some Notations
Before going into detail, let us introdue some onventions, in partiular, naming on-
ventions. In SNet tasks an be either primitive or omplex.
 Primitive tasks are tasks that an not be deomposed further, i. e. they do not
have any outgoing deomposition link.
 On the other hand, omplex tasks are tasks that have at least one further deom-
posed element (task, goal, or softgoal), i. e. have at least one outgoing deompo-
sition link. In SNet goals usually are omplex elements, beause they normally
oer planning alternatives. For instane in Figure 5.2, send invitations out is
a primitive task and find a speaker is a omplex one.
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Figure 5.2: Modied i* SR Model of an Event Organization
 A top-level element an either be a goal or a task. The former has only in-
oming means-ends or outgoing deomposition links. The latter has just out-
going deomposition links or outgoing sequene or eet links. For example,
perform a networking event is a top-level element, in partiular top-level task.
Intuitively speaking, in SNet a top level element represents a possible starting
point of proativity , i. e. it has to be triggered \from outside" by the user and not
by another internal element.
5.1.2 New Modeling Elements in i* SR
Tasks with Durations. In order to restrit an agent's time resoures and make
simulations more realisti, we allow to add a duration to eah task. The motivation
is that we beome able to determine a delay between the start and the end of an
ation. Just after the ation has nished, ertain eets an our. As we will see later,
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the duration of tasks, or a sequene of them, will be used as one input riterion for
our utility model when tasks have to be negotiated and delegated. Espeially in the
ontext of delegations, agents that perform tasks fast, may be preferred depending on
the underlying utility funtion. Giving tasks a duration in the stati, graphial model,
requires to deal with time in general in ConGolog and, in partiular, in our simulations.
We will disuss these themes in the following setions.
Timely Ordering of Tasks. We introdue sequene links as a new modeling element
in order to be able to assign tasks an immediate timely ordering. The subsequent
task an only start its exeution when the previous one is nished. For example,
find a loation has to wait till determine date of event has taken plae.
The rst reason to introdue this new element is that in dynami settings, whih
should be desribed with an ation logi, the fulllment of ertain tasks is a prerequisite
for the initiation of other tasks. Additionally, if tasks an be sequentialized and need
not be exeuted in parallel, the resulting ConGolog programs beome more eÆient by
pruning the searh spae.
Pre-/Post-Conditioning of Tasks and Goals. While i* within its early require-
ments modeling level does not need to onsider the exeution of tasks and the fulllment
of goals in simulations, SNet has to deal with logial as well as timely dependenies be-
tween these elements. Comparable to the situation alulus, we add preondition-eet
elements, depited as triangles: f. delay(PID) in Figure 5.2.
Firstly, a preondition-eet element an at as a preondition of tasks or goals.
Outgoing preondition links, direted from a preondition element to a task or a
goal, mean that this task must not start unless the orresponding preondition of the
preondition-eet element is fullled. Seondly, eet links, direted from a task or
a goal to a preondition-eet element, determine that after this task has been per-
formed, respetively the goal has been fullled, the preondition-eet element invokes
a predened eet. Whenever these triangles have inoming as well as outgoing links,
i. e. eet- and preondition-links, they ombine both aspets of a preondition and
an eet. For instane, the preondition-eet element delay(PID) has to guarantee
that the task organize dinner an only be started when send invitations out has
nished and a ertain amount of time has passed. To speak in pre- and postonditions,
send invitations out determines a time in the future and organize dinner has a
preondition that says that organize dinner an only be exeuted when this time is
reahed.
At the graphial modeling level, eah preondition-eet element an be internally
equipped with three entries:
 A formula desribing a preondition,
 a funtion desribing the result of an eet,
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 and the name of the uent whih is aeted by this eet.
More details about all elements' parameters will be given in Setion 5.2, where we talk
about the transformation of our graphial notation into ConGolog programs.
Quantied Contributions for Softgoals. In SNet we quantify the ontribu-
tions of softgoals, i. e. we add numerial values
3
to eah ontribution link.
4
Thus, for
simulation purposes, we are able to use these ontributions as an input for our utility
model to be able to ompare and value the ontributions of dierent possible alterna-
tives. So, the delegator an deide whih way to go, i. e. what routine to hoose. By
annotating ontribution links with +,  , help, make, break, and so forth, Eri Yu's i*
language avoids to use numbers, beause it is not neessary to quantify softgoal on-
tributions during early requirements. But for our intended domains, ontributions to
softgoals are always measurable, i. e. quantiable, sine they are used to make alterna-
tive routines omparable. For instane, a user should not reate a highly aggregated
softgoal like good investment but rather a set of ne grained softgoals like high ROI
(return on investment), high liquidity (period of time to get aess to the money),
and low risk (low volatility of the investment). As a onsequene, softgoals in SNet
should be modeled ne-grained enough so that its ontributions an be measured. Fur-
thermore, in SNet eah softgoal element ontains a user-dened utility funtion. The
single ontributions of one agent are summed up and mapped by this funtion.
Top-Level Elements as Starting Points of Proativity. Top-level elements are
the starting-point of proativity in SNet, i. e. during the simulation an exogenous input
from the user might our to initiate searhing for a routine { the \best" routine { to
fulll this goal or to be able to omplete this task. We remark that during runtime,
whenever the user initiates a proativity, he has to ommuniate the importane of the
underlying softgoals by assigning appropriate weights. This aspet strongly inuenes
the hoie between possible partners to ooperate with. By this means we get a higher
exibility during the simulation and beome able to represent dierent senarios. In
our example, the task perform a networking event is a top level element.
Additional Inuene from Outside. In SNet we oer the possibility to inrease
a user's inuene on the simulation. When modeling, an additional arbitrary list of
parameters an be added to a top-level element and used in the ConGolog lauses of
the orresponding subelements. During runtime, whenever this top-level element is
triggered, the parameters have to be instantiated. For instane, the delay element
might be inuened or the duration of the primitive task find a loation might be
determined by a parameter and therefore inuened by the exogenous input of the user.
3
We are not restrited to numbers but an also use formulas that, for example, again might ontain
probability aspets.
4
Reall that a ontribution link is a link from a task to a softgoal.
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Goals as Choie Elements. Like in the original i*, a goal in SNet desribes a er-
tain situation that has to be reahed in order to fulll that goal. Thus, the way how to
reah that goal is not predened but left to the \means" that reahes that \end" (goal).
In SNet goals solely at as hoie elements where its owner has to hoose atively whih
way (subroutine) to go for reahing that goal. We restrit ourselves to a goal-oriented
view, i. e. asking \How an I pursue a goal?". Therefore, we an use bakward haining
as a reasoning mehanism. Sine original i* does not make use of reasoning expliitly, it
also allows a data-driven forward haining view when answering the question \Why do I
perform this task?". In Figure 5.2 VC-Bank's goal have a VC speaker oers two alter-
natives. Either the bank an let an eonomist speak or she an let a lawyer speak.
Note that in general, goals need not be deomposed elements of tasks but an be top
level elements, too.
The Conept of Delegation in SNet. Whenever deomposition or means-ends
links, normally in ombination with ontribution links, ross agent boundaries, a del-
egation an beome possible during the simulation. For example, VC Bank's task
let a lawyer speak has a ontribution link to E-Center's softgoal good ontri-
bution on patent law. As we see later when disussing simulations, here, the goal
have a keynote speaker is the initiator of the delegation while the two softgoals
good ontribution on patent law and good ontribution on business plan de-
velopment are part of the performane measure for evaluating the delegation before as
well as after its exeution.
i* and Trust. Eri Yu presents an approah for modeling trust in i* [YL00℄. He sug-
gests to deal with speial softgoals that at like a kind of aumulator for representing
the strength of trust relationships. Certain tasks of other agents make orresponding
strengthening or weakening ontributions on these softgoals. We think that interper-
sonal trust should strongly inuene the negotiation phase when agents are looking at
and asking for potential ooperation partners in order to delegate tasks that should
help to support a routine. In this phase the delegator as well as the delegatee should
take their orresponding strength of trust into aount. The former should take strong
trust-ties into aount for the delegation and the latter should have the tendeny to
make better oers. The hange of trust values should be strongly related to the fulll-
ment of ommitted/delegated tasks. Of ourse, all in all we agree with Yu's approah
but need a more ne grained trust update, beause we see trust as a dynami aspet
with regard to the operationalization in terms of exeutable plans. Therefore, trust
is not expliitly mentioned in the graphial modeling phase of SNet but we hard-wire
trust in the simulation, i. e. in the resulting ConGolog ode to support our TCD model
of trust, ondene, and distrust. Already in the graphial modeling phase, the user
is able to refer to uents that deal with trust during the simulation. These uents
an be built into ontributions, preondition-eet elements, and the utility funtion of
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softgoals.
5.1.3 Conluding Remarks
The reader might ask whether we turned the intention of softgoals ompletely upside
down and whether we should rename them into \hardgoals". But in SNet, espeially
during the simulation, the original meaning of softgoals stays the same. For example,
the E-Center an not be sure to what extent the softgoal good ontribution on busi-
ness plan development an be fullled unless all tasks have made their ontributions
to this softgoal.
We have mentioned new elements that we added to i* and the parts of i* that we
modied onerning its semantis, but we did not talk about i* elements we omitted.
Obviously, we onentrate on the SR model of i* and not on the SD model. Of ourse,
the SD model is used in SNet to get a rst understanding onerning the relationships
between ators or an be derived from the modied i* SR model. But in ontrast to
the SR model, it is not diretly integrated into resp. supported by SNet.
Resoure elements an be seen as elements lying between preondition-eet and
goal elements. The availability of a resoure an deide whether tasks an be performed
or not (preondition). A task that should bring about the reation of a resoure an be
done by an eet of a preondition-eet element. Whenever several routines should
be possible to end up with the reation of a resoure X, this senario an be assoiated
with a top level goal expressing \X is reated".
From the purely semantial point of view, the links we all sequene links in SNet
are just syntati sugar. They an be replaed by a onstrut ontaining an eet link,
a preondition-eet element, and a preondition link. But sequene links have two
advantages. Firstly, in pratie they are often needed as useful abbreviations during
the graphial modeling phase. Seondly, they are easier to transform into ConGolog
ode than pre-/post-onditions, i. e. they produe simpler ode fragments, as we will see
later. As an example onerning Figure 5.2, there is a sequene link from prepare meal
to deliver meal, both are tasks of the Party Servie ator. Thus, the meal an just
be delivered after its preparation has been nished.
5.2 Transforming Modied i* Diagrams into Exe-
utable ConGolog Programs
The aim of the modiation of i* is to make the gap between the stati (i*) and
dynami (ConGolog) representation of strategi inter-organizational networks smaller.
In this setion, we step-by-step take eah syntati brik of modied i* and show the
orresponding ConGolog lauses, i.e. we give modied i* a new semantis in ConGolog.
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As a result, we an map an arbitrary user-dened modied i* model to exeutable
ConGolog program skeletons. But rst of all, we start with some preliminary remarks.
 Tasks have a duration:
ConGolog does not expliitly support ations that have a duration. Therefore
in SNet, we have to add a proess model of time. We follow Reiter's sequen-
tial, temporal situation alulus { see Setion 3.2.2 for an introdution or his
book [Rei01℄ for further reading. How our proess model of time is used syntati-
ally in SNet is shown on the following pages. The underlying semantis beomes
lear in Setion 5.3.1, when we embed our ConGolog program skeletons into the
SNet simulation environment, whih, among other things, is responsible for the
modeling of time.
 PID Spei Proesses:
In SNet a proess spei identier (PID) is assigned to every proess the user
initiates by a new proativity.
5
Intuitively speaking, all the ations, preonditions,
eets, et. that are a result of the same proativity belong to one instane of our
model. For example, a task hold leture has a preondition leture prepared
and both are equipped with a PID. So, the exeution of the task hold leture
with PID 5 presumes that the preondition leture prepared with the same PID
holds. Hene, we distinguish between ations with the same name but dierent
PIDs.
 i* tasks vs. ConGolog ations:
In SNet we distinguish between tasks (primitive or omplex ones) as i* elements
(hexagons) and ConGolog ations, whih an be primitive (these, for instane,
ause eets) or omplex (those oer proedural ontrol and refer to primitive
ations or other proedures). For an introdution see Setion 3.2 resp. Setion 3.1.
As we will see in the rest of this setion, tasks will be represented by at least two
ConGolog ations, one for starting and another for nishing the task.
 The exeuted() uent:
In ConGolog we dene a speial uent exeuted(Task(pre post; Ator; pid; t); s).
Task(pre post; Ator; pid; t) an be instantiated by any primitive ation of our
domain.
6
It's rst parameter an be the onstant pre or post to haraterize
whether the ation is a start or nish ation of a task (see Setion 5.2.2). The
rest of the parameters an be instantiated by the name of the ator who performs
the ation, the proess spei identier the ation belongs to, and the time the
ation is exeuted. We initialize this uent with false and set it true when the
5
A proativity in SNet has to be modeled as a task or goal that is not subordinated to any other
task or goal. The user an trigger suh an element during the simulation
6
We distinguish between these ations that belong to the domain, i. e. they are user-dened, and
those that are given by the system, i. e. relevant for running the system. More details are given in
Setion 5.3.1.
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orresponding ation is exeuted. For instane, a user-dened task has a duration
of 3. Then, SNet generates a primitive pre-ation and a primitive post-ation.
Both are instantaneous and haraterize the start resp. the end of the task. A
neessary preondition onerning the exeution of the post-ation in situation
s
post
at time t
post
is that the exeuted uent of the orresponding pre-ation in
situation s
pre
at time t
pre
exists and t
post
  t
pre
= 3 holds,  f. Formula 5.4.
 A fully automati and omplete mapping:
The mapping from i* to ConGolog, whih we desribe in the following subse-
tions, is fully automati and omplete. All modeling elements of SNet, both those
that are taken from the original i* SR-model of Eri Yu and those that are new
{ for example preondition-eet elements as triangles { an be transformed into
ConGolog ode. Therefore, we oer plugins in the organization modeling envi-
ronment (OME) for, among other things, modeling and transformation purposes.
Some details onerning the implementation are desribed in Chapter 6.
We identied nine patterns, whih orrespond to the following nine subsetions, to
haraterize modied i*:
 Ators
 Primitive Tasks
 Complex Tasks and Deomposition Links
 Goals and Means-Ends Links
 Additional Clauses Conerning Proativity
 Additional Clauses Conerning Delegation
 Softgoals and Contribution Links
 Eets on Preondition-Eet Elements via Eet Links
 Preonditions via Preondition-Eet Elements and Sequene Links
In eah of the following subsetions, we rst of all desribe the orresponding pattern
{ mostly by using a graphial representation. Then we translate the pattern into
ConGolog ode fragments. Usually, we present a short example for illustration.
5.2.1 Ators
If A
1
; :::; A
n
{ see Figure 5.3 { are the identiers of all ators that belong to our domain
of disourse and [A
1
; :::; A
n
℄ is shorthand for a term whih denotes a list, then the
following fat is generated:
agents([A
1
; : : : ; A
n
℄) (5.1)
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In SNet the names of all ators are stored in a list within the prediate agents(). For
our example (Figure 5.2), the lause looks as follows:
agents([e Center; party Servie; vC Bank; entrepreneur℄)
Furthermore, in the implementation of SNet, eah ator gets a trustWeight-value ex-
pressing his fundamental attitude towards trust on one hand or money on the other
hand when dealing with delegation. This value an be individually dened for eah
ator by the user. So, the user an determine whether and to what extent an ator
prefers short-term prot without onsidering trustful and long-term interations or an
ator prefers the opposite. In the urrent implementation of SNet, the trustWeight
value of an ator is a onstant, but, in general, it an be a variable. Ator names are
used as parameters to identify the owner who is responsible for this element. They are
inluded in several of the following ConGolog program lauses.
5.2.2 Primitive Tasks
Sine primitive tasks have a duration in SNet, we add { following Pinto's and Reiter's
model of time, see Setion 3.2.2 { two instantaneous primitive ConGolog ations for
starting and ending the task for eah primitive task PT { see Figure 5.4. The former
ation gets the onstant pre and the latter one post as rst parameter followed by the
82 5 Agent Modeling and Simulation in SNet
ator's name, Ator, who is responsible for this task:
7
prim ation(PT (pre; Ator; pid; t
pre
))
prim ation(PT (post; Ator; pid; t
post
))
(5.2)
The last two parameters are instantiated during runtime. In partiular, they are the
proess identier PID, whih enables the simulation environment to distinguish between
dierent proativities, and the last parameter, t
pre
resp. t
post
, will be instantiated with
the exeution time of the instantaneous ation.
For eah primitive task, we have a 3-ary proedure ontaining the orresponding
primitive \pre" and \post" ation { Formula (5.2) { in the proedure's body:
pro(PT (Ator; pid; t);
[PT (pre; Ator; pid; t
pre
);PT (post; Ator; pid; t
post
)℄)
(5.3)
It is guaranteed that there an not take plae any ollision between these prediates
with a rst \pre" or \post" onstant and those without, beause we assume unique
names.
The primitive \post" ation an be exeuted i the urrent time is the time resulting
from \pre" ation's time of exeution plus the duration t
delay
of the primitive task
itself. t
delay
is just a parameter, whih is annotating the orresponding modied i*
task. Figure 5.4 tries to show this delay eet by the dashed arrow labeled t
delay
. We
add an ation preondition axiom for eah \post" ation.
poss(PT (post; Ator;pid; t
delay
); s) 
9t
0
:exeuted(PT (pre; Ator; pid; t
0
); s)
^ time(s)  t
0
+ t
delay
(5.4)
Here we make use of two uents, exeuted(Ation; s) and time(s) that are system
relevant and therefore hard-wired in our ConGolog ode, i. e. appliation-independent.
Intuitively, exeuted(Ation; s) is responsible for assigning the simulation time of the
\pre" ation's termination to t
0
. time(s) reets the urrent simulation time.
Referring to our example, SNet generates the following lauses onerning the prim-
7
prim ation is the IndiGolog notation that is equivalent to the ConGolog expression  for primitive
ations, see Figure 3.3.
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itive ation find a loation:
prim ation(find a loation(pre; e Center; pid; t
pre
))
prim ation(find a loation(post; e Center; pid; t
post
))
pro(find a loation(e Center; pid; t);
[find a loation(pre; e Center; pid; t
pre
);
f ind a loation(post; e Center; pid; t
post
)℄)
poss(send invitations out(post; e Center; pid; t); s) 
9t
0
:exeuted(send invitations out(pre; e Center; pid; t
0
); s)^
time(s) = t
0
+ t
Obviously, we omitted the ation preondition axiom of the \pre" ation as well as the
eets primitive tasks an ause. While the former axiom is left for subsetion 5.2.9
when we talk about preondition and sequene links, the latter one is treated in the
ontext of eet links.
5.2.3 Complex Tasks and Deomposition Links
Similar to primitive tasks, eah omplex task CT , see Figure 5.5 of ator Ator is
translated into two primitive ConGolog ations: \pre" and \post".
prim ation(CT (pre; Ator; pid; t))
prim ation(CT (post; Ator; pid; t))
(5.5)
The preonditions of the \pre" ation are handled similar to that of primitive tasks and
are desribed in subsetion 5.2.9.
A omplex task is not equipped with a duration expliitly but its exeution-time
depends on the nalization of all of its subtasks or subgoals E
1
; :::; E
n
, see Figure 5.5.
8
8
We use the graphial overlay tehnique (hexagon plus oval) in order to show that eah subelement
an either be a task or a goal.
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It's job is to guarantee that all the subtasks between its \pre" and \post" ation
are nished. The \post" ation's preondition of a omplex task CT holds when the
exeuted uents of all \post" ations of the subtasks resp. subgoals hold:
poss(CT (post; Ator
CT
; pid; t); s) 
9t
1
; :::t
n
: exeuted(E
1
(post; Ator
E
1
; pid; t
1
); s) ^ ::: ^
exeuted(E
n
(post; Ator
E
n
; pid; t
n
); s)
(5.6)
Ator
E
1
; :::; Ator
E
n
represent the names of the ators that own the subtasks or subgoals
E
1
; :::; E
n
. Therefore, we do not introdue them as existentially quantied variables both
in Formula 5.6 and in the following formulas. Of ourse, there need not exist n dierent
ators, but ators an own more than one subelement.
Similar to the translation of primitive tasks, a ConGolog proedure is generated for a
omplex task. The body of the proedure onsists of the sequential exeution of the
task's \pre" ation, a middle part, and nally its \post" ation.
pro(CT (Ator
CT
; pid; t);
[CT (pre; Ator
CT
; pid; t
pre
); Æ(E
1
; :::; E
n
); CT (post; Ator
CT
; pid; t
post
)℄)
(5.7)
The middle part of the proedure's body, Æ(E
1
; : : : ; E
n
), aounts for the sequential
dependenies of the subtasks and represents a struture onsisting of onurrent and
sequential exeution of all subelements depending on the existene of sequene links
between the elements. If there is no sequene link between any of the fE
1
; : : : ; E
n
g then
Æ(E
1
; : : : ; E
n
)  E
1
jj : : : jj E
n
, i. e. we are not able to indue any sequential ordering.
9
Let fE
1
; : : : ; E
n
g be the nodes and the sequene links between them the edges of a
direted graph, then we reate tree strutures via depth rst searh. Hene, we are
able to identify a partial order onsidering the timely ordering of the elements. Notie
that from the semantial point of view it would not make any dierene if the middle
part would be just the onurrent exeution of all subtasks, beause the timely orret
exeution of the subtasks is already guaranteed by their preonditions. But the more
speial middle part narrows the searh spae and therefore inreases the eÆieny of
our resulting ConGolog program.
Translating the omplex task organize dinner of the ator Party Servie in our
9
Æ
1
jjÆ
2
is the inx notation onerning the onurrent exeution of the two ations Æ
1
and Æ
2
.
on(Æ
1
; Æ
2
) is the equivalent prex notation,  f. Figure 3.3.
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example (Figure 5.2) results in:
poss(organize dinner(post; party Servie; pid; t); s)  9t
p m
; t
d m
:
exeuted(prepare meal(post; party Servie; pid; t
p m
); s)^
exeuted(deliver meal(post; party Servie; pid; t
d m
); s)
pro(organize dinner(party Servie; pid; t);
[organize dinner(pre; party Servie; pid; t
pre
o d
);
prepare meal(party Servie; pid; t
p m
);
deliver meal(party Servie; pid; t
d m
);
organize dinner(post; party Servie; pid; t
post
o d
)℄)
5.2.4 Goals and Means-Ends Links
The translation of a goal named G (see Figure 5.6), again starts with generating two
primitive ConGolog ations \pre" and \post":
prim ation(G(pre; Ator
G
; pid; t))
prim ation(G(post; Ator
G
; pid; t))
(5.8)
The preondition axiom of the \post" ation holds if at least one means { fT
1
; : : : ; T
n
g
{ has been exeuted in the past. Notie, ompared to omplex tasks { Formula (5.6)
{, the juntor _ (or) is used instead of ^ (and):
poss(G(post; Ator
G
; pid; t); s) 
9t
1
; :::t
n
: exeuted(T
1
(post; Ator
T
1
; pid; t
1
); s) _ : : :_
exeuted(T
n
(post; Ator
T
n
; pid; t
n
); s)
(5.9)
The body of the resulting omplex ConGolog ation, whih is responsible for the pro-
edural ontrol, onsists of the sequential exeution of (1) the primitive \pre" ation,
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(2) the nondeterministi exeution of all those tasks that are a means to that goal, and
(3) the nishing primitive \post" ation:
10
pro(G(Ator
G
; pid; t);
[G(pre; Ator
G
; pid; t
pre
);
T
1
(Ator
T
1
; pid; t
1
) j : : : j T
n
(Ator
T
n
; pid; t
n
);
G(post; Ator
G
; pid; t
post
)℄)
(5.10)
During runtime the ndet onstruts will be treated in a speial manner. How our SNet
planning omponent atively deides whih routine to hoose along all these possible
goals, will be shown later. Sine goals in the SNet ontext are hoie points during the
exeution, we often all these elements homonymously hoie elements.
Conerning our example, the resulting ConGolog fragments are:
poss(have a V C speaker(post; vC Bank; pid; t); s)  9t
law
; t
eon
:
exeuted(let a lawyer speak(post; vC Bank; pid; t
law
); s)_
exeuted(let an eonomist speak(post; vC Bank; pid; t
eon
); s)
pro(have a V C speaker(vC Bank; pid; t);
[have a V C speaker(pre; vC Bank; pid; t
pre
);
(let an eonomist speak(vC Bank; pid; t
eon
)j
let a lawyer speak(vC Bank; pid; t
law
));
have a V C speaker(post; vC Bank; pid; t
post
)℄)
5.2.5 Additional Clauses Conerning Proativity
In SNet a task or a goal element is alled proative if it has neither inoming
deomposition- nor outgoing means-ends links. For instane, perform a networking -
10
Here we use the inx notation (Æ
1
jÆ
2
) instead of the prex notion ndet(Æ
1
; Æ
2
) to express the
nondeterministi hoie between ations,  f. Figure 3.3.
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event is the one and only proative element (in partiular, proative task) in our
senario.
For eah proative element P with attahed softgoals named SG
1
; : : : ;SG
n
, see
Figure 5.7, we add
11
one more primitive and exogenous ConGolog ation.
prim ation(P(exog; Ator
P
; pid; t; Citeria))
exog ation(P(exog; Ator
P
; pid; t; Citeria))
(5.11)
Both lauses ontain the onstant \exog" as their rst parameter. Criteria is a list
of tuples ontaining all the softgoal-riteria that are attahed to the proativity and a
orresponding variable to store the user's weight onerning these riteria when starting
the proativity. timeWeight is always an impliit softgoal-riterion, whih need not be
mentioned as a softgoal in the graphial model expliitly:
Criteria = < (timeWeight; val
time
); (SG
1
; val
SG
1
); : : : ; (SG
n
; val
SG
n
) >
(5.12)
A onrete example of suh a list of riteria-tuples ould be:
< (timeWeight; 0:3); (good ontrib bus plan; 0:6); (good ontrib patent law; 0:1) >
Here a fast exeution of the delegation is weighted 30%, a good ontribution on business
plan development 60%, and a good ontribution on patent law 10%. The values of the
weights need not be normalized in the sense that they have to sum to 1. Later, we
will see how a simulation an be started by a proativity of the user, who weights the
orresponding riteria onerning their urrent importane.
5.2.6 Additional Clauses Conerning Delegation
From the graphial point of view, delegation in SNet is depited by deomposition- or
means-end links that ross agent boundaries.
11
For tasks and goals we already have generated primitive \pre" and \post" ations { see (5.2),
(5.5), or (5.8).
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For eah omplex task or goalD with an outgoing deomposition link respetively an
inoming means-ends link to a task or a goal E that reet a delegation ( f. Figure 5.8),
we add two more primitive ations:
prim ation(E delegated(pre; Ator
D
; pid; t; Ator
E
))
prim ation(E delegated(post; Ator
D
; pid; t; Ator
E
))
(5.13)
E delegated is just the onatenation of the string expressing the name of E and the
string \ delegated". Note that the orresponding primitive ConGolog ations we gen-
erate for primitive and omplex modied i* tasks own four arguments. Here, the two
additional lauses for a delegation, own a fth argument that identies the delegatee.
So, both delegator and delegatee are mentioned in these lauses.
The proedures we generate for omplex tasks and goals with delegated elements
only dier slightly from the ase without any delegation (5.7) respetively (5.10). The
dierene is onerning the body when we are alling all sub-elements. For eah dele-
gated subelement, we replae the all by a sequene of three ations.
[E delegated(pre; Ator
D
; pid; t
pre
; Ator
E
);
delegate(E(Ator
E
; pid; t));
E delegated(post; Ator
D
; pid; t
post
; Ator
E
)℄
(5.14)
For example, if T
i
in Formula (5.10) belongs to the delegatee Ator
E
, T
i
(Ator
T
i
; pid; t
i
)
would be replaed by (5.14). (Of ourse, the name of the goal and the delegator
have to be replaed, too.) The rst and the last ation of (5.14) indiate Ator
D
when the delegation starts and ends. The ation in the middle is wrapped with a
prediate delegate() and will be \unpaked" and exeuted during the simulation to
ativate the delegatee. How this is implemented in SNet will be treated in Setion 5.3
and Setion 5.4. Then we will deal with the more interesting ase that there are dierent
\alternatives" to fulll a goal or support a task. This ase is more interesting, beause
rational hoies have to be made by the delegator and the possible delegatees.
5.2.7 Softgoals and Contribution Links
We want to explain the ontext of ontributions to softgoals in SNet in two separate
steps. Firstly, we only onsider ontributions within a single agent. Then we take
delegated proativities into aount so that on one hand the delegatee makes the on-
tribution and on the other hand the delegator owns the orresponding softgoal and
therefore has to evaluate the ontribution.
Part One { Without any Delegation.
In Figure 5.9 we an see n softgoals SG
1
,..., SG
n
, whih uniquely belong to one proativ-
ity P (whih an be a goal or a task). They are equipped with utility funtions: Util
SG
i
.
5.2 Transforming Modied i* Diagrams into Exeutable ConGolog Programs 89
PSfrag replaements
P
SG
1
SG
n
T
1
T
m
Util
SG
1
Util
SG
n
ontr
SG
1
T
1
ontr
SG
n
T
1
ontr
SG
1
T
m
ontr
SG
n
T
m
: : :
: : :
Figure 5.9: Pattern \Softgoals and Contribution Links Within One Agent"
Additionally, the tasks T
j
an make their ontributions ontr
SG
i
T
j
to the softgoals SG
i
via ontribution links (i 2 f1; : : : ; ng and j 2 f1; : : : ; mg). Both the ontribution values
of the ontribution links and the utility funtions of the softgoals an be determined
in the graphial modeling part of SNet. The tasks are part of a non-further speied
struture. Their translation into ConGolog program ode was and will be desribed in
the Setions 5.2.1, 5.2.2, and 5.2.9. All the elements we want to onentrate on belong
to one single ator, Ator, beause we neglet delegation at the moment.
For eah softgoal we reate a pid-spei uent. Further parameters are the name of
the softgoal's owner and the name of the unique proativity. These uents are initialized
with 0, beause their job is to ollet, i. e. sum up, ontributions from dierent tasks.
For instane, the uent denition of the softgoal SG
1
in Figure 5.9 would be:
prim fluent(SG
1
(pid; Ator;P; s))
SG
1
(pid; Ator;P; S
0
) = 0
(5.15)
To support planning ativities and utility omputation, we add another uent experiene
per softgoal to express the experienes made during the simulation. This uent an be
initialized with a user-dened value ExpInit:
prim fluent(experiene(Ator;P;SG
1
; s))
experiene(Ator;P;SG
1
; S
0
) = ExpInit(ontr
SG
1
)
(5.16)
For eah inoming ontribution link, a suessor state axiom
12
is generated in order to
add the annotated ontribution { in the following we take ontr
SG
1
T
1
{, whih later on
12
In the implementation when we use the orresponding syntax of the IndiGolog interpreter, we
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serves as input of our SNet utility model:
SG
1
(pid; Ator;P; do(a; s)) = newV alue  9t
T
1
; ontr
SG
1
T
1
a = T
1
(post; Ator; pid; t
T
1
) ^ newV alue = SG
1
(pid; Ator;P; s) + ontr
SG
1
T
1
_a 6= T
1
(post; Ator; pid; t
T
1
) ^ newV alue = SG
1
(pid; Ator;P; s)
(5.17)
One unary utility funtion (binary prediate) named with the softgoal-identier is de-
ned for eah softgoal. It maps the sum of ontributions by means of a utility funtion,
whih is diretly taken from the SNet graphial model, to a numerial value for further
omputation within the utility model:
SG
1
(X; Y ) = Util
SG
1
:
(5.18)
Util
SG
1
represents a user dened funtion (lause) that maps X to Y . For instane, if
a ontribution link between a task T and softgoal SG is labeled with 20 and Util
SG
would be Y :=
X
100
, then the exeution of T delivers a Y of
20
100
, i. e. 0:2: SG(20; 0:2).
This mapping is neessary to assign ontributions to a utility. If a lower ontribution
might result in a higher utility, then X, for example, an be in the denominator of the
utility funtion. The utility funtion an be used for normalization purposes or time
an be mapped individually. For instane, if somebody expets to earn $20:000 by her
softgoal money, then Utility
money
ould be Y :=
X
20:000
. If the result of Y is 1:5, then
50% is earned more than expeted.
Part Two { Inluding Delegation.
Figure 5.10 shows a delegation pattern between one delegator Ator
P
and m delegatees
Ator
P
1
; :::; Ator
P
m
. It onentrates on softgoals and ontribution links rossing agent
boundaries. Again, the elements labeled with P and P
j
j 2 1; :::; m do not introdue
a new SNet ion, but they are an overlapping of the piture of two elements: a goal
and a task. Similarly, the link between P
j
and P an be a deomposition link or a
means-ends link, depending on P. While P should be an initial proativity, i. e. it has
to be started by the user during runtime, P
j
is a delegated proativity.
In order to prevent a delegator { here Ator
P
{ from seeing ontributions of any
delegatee { here, for example, ontr
SG
P
1
T
1
of Ator
P
1
{ already during the exeution
of delegated tasks, a further uent
13
is generated for eah softgoal of a delegator a
have to use eet axioms instead of suessor state axioms, whih we use during the speiation. The
IndiGolog interpreter makes a ompletion assumption. Hene, eet axioms suÆe to solve the frame
problem,  f. Setion 3.2.
13
Of ourse, a uent that diretly ollets the ontributions of SG
P
1
, see formula (5.15), is reated,
too.
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Figure 5.10: Pattern \Softgoals and Contribution Links With Delegation"
delegatee an make ontributions to, for instane ( f. Formula (5.15)):
prim fluent(SG
P
1
(pid; Ator
P
;P; s))
SG
P
1
(pid; Ator
P
;P; S
0
) = 0
(5.19)
The \job" of this uent is to sum up the ontributions and just to deliver this value
to the delegator when the delegation is nished. This property is desribed within
a suessor state axiom. Here the delegated-post ation,  f. Formula (5.13), plays a
entral role:
SG
P
1
(pid; Ator
P
;P; do(a; s)) = newV alue  9t
P
; ontr
SG
1
P
1
:
a = P
1
delegated(post; Ator
P
; pid; t
P
; Ator
P
1
)^
newV alue = SG
P
1
(pid; Ator
P
1
;P; s) + ontr
SG
1
P
1
_
a 6= P
1
delegated(post; Ator
P
; pid; t
P
; Ator
P
1
)^
newV alue = SG
P
1
(pid; Ator
P
;P; s)
(5.20)
SNet is not limited to a delegation level of two. Generally, ontributions a delegatee
makes towards his delegator are olleted and summed up by a bottom-up strategy
using \delegated-post" suessor state axioms as shown above.
In SNet two (funtional) uents with orresponding initializations are reated for eah
ontribution link, whih starts at a task T
i
owned by ator Ator
T
i
and ends at a
softgoal SG ( f. Figure 5.11):
prim fluent(SG(pid; Ator
T
i
; T op
T
i
; s))
SG(pid; Ator
T
i
; T op
T
i
; S
0
) = Init(ontr
T
i
)
(5.21)
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Figure 5.11: Pattern \Softgoals and Contribution Links"
and
prim fluent(experiene(Ator
T
i
; T op
T
i
; SG; s))
experiene(Ator
T
i
; T op
T
i
; SG; S
0
) = ExpInit(ontr
T
i
)
(5.22)
The PID-spei uent, SG, determines the onrete ontribution of a task to a soft-
goal: Init(ontr
T
i
). The other non-PID spei uent, experiene, is used for simula-
tion purposes when dealing with utilities in SNet. It reets the situation-dependent
ontribution that Ator
G
expets.
For eah inoming ontribution link, a suessor state axiom is generated in order to
add the annotated ontribution, whih later goes into our SNet utility model:
SG(pid; Ator
T
i
; T op
T
i
; do(a; s)) = newV alue  9t
i
; ontr
SG
T
i
:
a = T
i
(post; Ator
T
i
; pid; t
i
) ^ newV alue = SG(pid; Ator
T
i
; T op
T
i
; s) + ontr
SG
T
i
_a 6= T
i
(post; Ator
T
i
; pid; t
i
) ^ newV alue = SG(pid; Ator
T
i
; T op
T
i
; s)
(5.23)
Top
T
i
is a task. It belongs to the same ator as T
i
. T
i
and Top
T
i
are either idential
or they are onneted by a path onsisting of deomposition and means-ends links.
While T
i
has a ontribution link to SG, Top
T
i
has a means-ends link to a goal that
belongs to the same ator as SG does. This goal and the softgoal SG belong to the
same proativity. Conerning our example, if T
i
was let a lawyer speak then Top
T
i
would be find a speaker { see Figure 5.2.
As in the ase without delegation,  f. Formula 5.18, one unary utility funtion
(binary prediate) named with the softgoal-identier is dened for eah softgoal. It
maps the sum of ontributions by means of a utility funtion, whih is diretly taken
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from the SNet graphial model, to a numerial value for further omputation within
the utility model:
SG(X; Y ) = Util
SG
:
(5.24)
Example. find a speaker is the top-level task of the VC Bank onerning the rele-
vant delegation that makes ontributions to the above mentioned softgoal. Thus, this
task is mentioned in the orresponding uents,  f. Formulae (5.21) and (5.22):
prim fluent(good ontr on patent law(pid; vC Bank; find a speaker; s))
good ontr on patent law(pid; vC Bank; find a speaker; S
0
) = 70
prim fluent(experiene(vC Bank; find a speaker; good ontr on patent law; s))
experiene(vC Bank; find a speaker; good ontr on patent law; S
0
) = 50
The initial values of the two uents need not be the same neessarily. For example, the
rst uent an be dened as a probability distribution between 40 and 100.
The example of the suessor state axiom (5.23) is:
good ontr on patent law(pid; vC Bank; find a speaker; do(a; s)) = newV alue  9t:
a = let a lawyer speak(post; vC Bank; pid; t)^
newV alue = good ontr on patent law(pid; vC Bank; find a speaker; s) + 70 _
a 6= let a lawyer speak(post; vC Bank; pid; t)^
newV alue = good ontr on patent law(pid; vC Bank; find a speaker; s)
An example of our utility funtion,  f. Formula (5.24), is:
good ontr on patent law(X; Y ) :  Y is X=100
For instane, E-Center delegated the fulllment of the goal have a keynote speaker
to the VC Bank. When the VC Bank has nished her task to find a speaker, the
ontribution of 70 to the softgoal good ontribution on patent law will be mapped
to a value of
70
100
, whih is 0:7.
5.2.8 Eets on Preondition-Eet Elements via Eet Links
SNet in its graphial modeling part oers three elements { one uent and two formulas {
to eah preondition-eet element that an be dened by the user: uent(s), funtion,
and formula (see Figure 5.12). While the rst two are to support the eet harater
of a preondition-eet element, the last one is for the preondition-harater and will
be used in the next subsetion.
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ts"
If the uent named uent(s) does not already appear within another ontext, SNet
denes it as a new uent:
prim fluent(fluent(s))
(5.25)
Eah task T
i
, i 2 1; ::; n, with an outgoing eet link to PE, see Figure 5.12, generates
a suessor state axiom that inuenes the uent speied with the uent uent(s) in
the way desribed in funtion of the orresponding preondition-eet element PE.
14
fluent(do(a; s)) = newV alue  9t:
a = T
i
(post; Ator
T
i
; pid; t) ^ newV alue = funtion
_ a 6= T
i
(post; Ator
T
i
; pid; t) ^ newV alue = fluent(s)
(5.26)
We use funtion and formula as a representation of formulas ontaining arbitrary uents
and onstants. Therefore, we do not extentially quantify them here. In our example
the orresponding three elements of delay(PID) are instantiated as follows:
fluent(s) : most replies reeived time(s)
funtion : time(s) + 2
formula : time(s) >= most replies reeived time(s)
For instane, nishing the task send invitations out auses the following eet (we
abbreviate the uent most replies reeived time(s) by re time(s) and the ation
send invitations out by send inv):
re time(do(a; s)) = newV alue  9t:
a = send inv(post; e   Center ; pid; t) ^ newV alue = time(s) + 2
_ a 6= send inv(post; e Center; pid; t) ^ newV alue = re time(s)
Here the system internal uent time(s) is used to determine a time-stamp that is two
time-steps away from the urrent time. This way a delay of two time-steps an be
realized.
14
For readability, we omit to add subsripts to uent(s), funtion, and formula to indiate that they
belong to PE.
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onditions"
5.2.9 Preonditions via Preondition-Eet Elements and Se-
quene Links
Preondition axioms of the \pre"-ations of tasks or goals, E in Figure 5.13, depend
on inoming sequene links of tasks T
1
; :::; T
n
as well as inoming preondition links
of preondition-eet elements PE
1
; :::;PE
n
. E might not start before both eah T
i
's
\post"-ation has been performed and eah PE
i
's formula (formula
PE
i
) holds.
poss(E(pre;Ator
E
; pid; t); s)  9t
T
1
; :::; t
T
n
:
exeuted(T
1
(post; Ator
T
1
; pid; t
T
1
); s)
^ : : :^exeuted(T
n
(post; Ator
T
n
; pid; t
T
n
); s)
^formula
PE
1
^ : : : ^ formula
PE
n
(5.27)
If a task or goal E has neither inoming sequene nor preondition links, E 's \pre"-ation
is always possible:
poss(E(pre; Ator
E
; pid; t); s)  true
(5.28)
For example, the E-Center is not allowed to perform its organize dinner task unless
most replies on the invitation have been reeived:
poss(organize dinner(pre; e Center; pid; t); s) 
time(s) >= most replies reeived time(s)
Another example is:
poss(send invitations out(pre; e Center; pid; t); s)  9t
0
:
exeuted(find a loation(post; e Center; pid; t
0
); s)
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If a preondition-eet element is just used as a preondition, only formula is needed. In
the other ase, when only an eet should be realized, just the other two are of interest:
uent(s) and funtion. Last but not least, when all these three elements are neessary,
the preondition-eet element overs both aspets: ating as a preondition as well
as an eet. For readability the modeler should (but is not restrited to) ombine a
preondition and an eet in one element if they our in the same ontext.
5.3 Deliberation in SNet
In this setion we embed the generated ConGolog program skeleton (see Setion 5.2)
into an domain independent environment of SNet that allows agents to behave in a
deliberative way. Deliberation in SNet means the following: Our agents make loal
deisions under given onditions via rational and trustful onsideration of their inter-
ations with others. It is assumed that the agents \know" that their behaviour has
onsequenes onerning the quality of relationships to other agents they ooperate
with in the future. In our opinion deliberative agents in strategi inter-organizatio-
nal networks have to perform planning following a trust-, utility-, and goal-oriented
behaviour.
5.3.1 The SNet Simulation Environment
In Setion 5.2 we explained how appliation-dependent aspets an be desribed in
ConGolog. In the SNet simulation environment , the appliation-independent part of
SNet is treated. For example, with the uent time(s) and its orresponding suessor
state axiom, we already saw appliation independene in SNet. In what follows, an
environment is generated that gives agents a mehanism to deal with trust and utility,
to allow for exogenous input of the user from outside, and for supporting planning-
ativities.
In SNet we synhronize agents' ativities. That means that our model of time has
to take are that just those ations an be exeuted that refer to the urrently valid
time unit. The simulation ativities are led from one phase to the next one, as shown
by the retangles in Figure 5.14. The ellipses depit underlying models, whih are used
in SNet. The whole proess is a yli one: one yle per disrete time unit. To give
an overview, we rstly seth the single phases and go into detail in the subsequent
setions:
 In the rst ConGolog ation phase (see Figure 5.14, upper left), all the appliation-
dependent ConGolog-ations { those that are explained in Setion 5.2 { that are
exeutable within the urrent time unit are proessed.
 In the omparison- and update phase, eah agent ompares his expetations,
whih are the result of plans made in the past, with results made at the "real"
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Figure 5.14: Agent-Controlling Cyle of SNet
appliation-dependent part of SNet. Whenever there are deviations, the agents
an draw onlusions by aneling tasks and re-planning the whole proess again.
For instane, an agent that delegates a task to another agent has an expeta-
tion when this task should end. Additionally, updates in our trust model an be
made. Of ourse, not only negative onlusions an be drawn but also positive
ones. Conerning this phase we present an extension that deals with monitoring
delegated ativities (see Chapter 7).
 If neessary, exogenous input an be made by the user in this phase. Conrete
goals an be triggered and orresponding softgoals weighted onerning their im-
portane,  f. Formula (5.12). Exogenous input an be done manually during the
simulation or in a bath mode before the simulation. See Chapter 6 for examples.
 Here we an see that planning in SNet plays a entral role, beause all models
{ utility, trust, expetation, ommuniation, delegation, sheduling, and nego-
tiation { are involved. We will see that both the delegator and the potential
delegatees, i. e. those that are able to support a goal or task of the delegator,
have to make hoies during the planning phase autonomously. Thus, generally,
it should be possible to start a onrete planning ativity in a planning phase and
ontinue in later planning phases. So, planning needs some time.
 After planning has taken plae, agents possibly have new tasks to perform in the
present or in the future. If some of these tasks an be exeuted within the urrent
time slot, appliation-dependent ConGolog ations an be exeuted a seond time
in this yle.
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 A new yle is started by a system-spei ation that inreases the system-time
by one.
5.3.2 Exogenous Input
As we stated in Setion 5.2.5, top-level goals or tasks are elements that are not a result
of a deomposition. Exatly these top-level elements are possible starting points of
exogenous input from the user. As we saw in Setion 5.2.7, a set of softgoals is assigned
to suh top-level elements. These softgoals represent the quality of the fulllment of
the orresponding goal, and their importane has to be weighted by exogenous user
input,  f. Formula (5.12). We all the owner of suh a top-level element the initiating
agent . Consequently, dierent exogenous input onerning the same goal (i. e. dier-
ent proativities with dierent PIDs) may have dierent weightings of softgoals and
therefore ompletely dierent requirements to the agents' apabilities.
15
Besides all softgoals that have been modeled expliitly in the ontext of a top-
level element, SNet always oers an impliit softgoal time that represents the expeted
duration to fulll the orresponding goal. For instane, if time is not relevant in a ertain
ontext, the weight of time an be set to zero. So, additionally to the weighting of all
the expliit and one impliit softgoal, the user determines an earliest possible starting
time (EPST). While planning onerning an exogenous input an start immediately
after an exogenous input has taken plae, the atual exeution has to wait until this
earliest possible starting time is reahed.
In SNet we added a bath mode. Hene, the user is able to pre-speify a list of
exogenous input, whih is automatially integrated during the simulation. This is very
useful when we want to run many simulations. So, a large amount of exogenous input
an be generated automatially, for example via randomization, and in advane. We
hoose this bath-mode in one of the evaluation examples in Chapter 6. Exogenous
input of SNet makes use of exogenous ations of ConGolog.
5.3.3 Communiation and Delegation
As seen in Setion 5.2, delegation in SNet exists when subtasks do not belong to the
owner of the orresponding original supertask or supergoal. In Figure 5.15 we see a
delegator A with potential delegatees: B and C. For instane, B has a task T
1
, whih is
triggered by A's top-level goal G and makes ontributions toA's softgoals SG
1
and SG
2
.
In SNet we implemented a simple delegation mehanism in order to let the delegator
negotiate with his potential delegatee(s).
In this ontext, SNet's implementation of ommuniation strongly follows what
Lesperane et al. propose in [LLL
+
95℄. The ommuniation protool is realized via a
15
Of ourse, we just have to talk about more than one agent if at least one way to fulll the top-level
element inludes the help of another agent than the initiating agent.
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Figure 5.16: Communiation between Delegator and Delegatee
mailbox/blakboard-system for storing inoming messages from the sender and sensing
messages stored for the orresponding reeiver. Thus, it is an asynhronous ommuni-
ation medium.
Message exhange is only possible during the planning phase. In that phase new
delegation requests or answers are generated, whih inrease the number of messages
stored in the mailbox. On the other hand, agents that proess their reeived messages
remove messages from the mailbox. At the end of the planning phase, all messages in
the mailbox have to be proessed. Hene, if the mailbox is empty and no more agent
is planning, the planning phase is nished.
Reeiving messages in SNet an be ompared with sensing ations in ConGolog.
Here, an agent inreases his knowledge about the world, too. But in SNet the reeiver
of the message is determined by a speial agent, the delegator, and the only one that
is able to sense that message.
In SNet we use a delegation protool as shown in Figure 5.16. As already seen in
the desription of the SNet planning phase, (1) a delegator asks for ontributions, (2)
the delegatees send their oers bak, i. e. they give their answers, and (3) the delegator
onfirms or anels the ooperation onerning the urrent task. This behaviour is
established in the algorithm in Figure 5.19.
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5.3.4 Inluding Time
In Setion 3.2.2 we already presented the sequential, temporal situation alulus, the
underlying logi of our model of time is built on. The integration of time plays an
important role in SNet. In the following aspets, time is essential:
 Time is neessary to synhronize our simulation and planning environment, see
Setion 5.3.1 and Figure 5.14.
 Tasks an just be nished, when the predened duration has passed, see for
example the ation preondition axiom in Formula (5.4).
 The time that is needed to fulll a goal is an impliit softgoal riterion, whih
goes into the planning omponent of SNet.
 Time an be part of formulas desribing preonditions or eets. As an example,
see the delay(PID) preondition eet element in Figure 5.2, whose eet is to
just let the orresponding preondition hold after some time units have passed.
5.4 Planning in SNet
The aim of planning in SNet is to transform nondeterministi ConGolog program parts,
whih are a result of nondeterministi ndet program strutures of goal-task hierarhies
{ see Setion 5.2 { to deterministi programs. In Figure 5.17 we see an example of a
modied i* diagram. Via planning a nondeterministi struture is transformed (pruned)
into one possible orresponding deterministi struture. During planning, agents make
loally optimal deisions under onsideration of trust and utility in the ontext of
deision theory , and they negotiate and shedule tasks. In SNet agents an be modeled
with dierent apabilities and dierent attitude onerning trust and gain, i. e. they
behave dierently, they are heterogenous. There are three dierent ases to initiate
planning in SNet.
 Firstly, an exogenous input triggers an agent onretely to fulll a ertain goal.
This agent an take the role of a delegator if he delegates tasks to other agents.
 Seondly, whenever a delegator asks a potential delegatee for help, the delegatee
himself starts planning and possibly tries to delegate tasks to other agents. Con-
sequently, the planning task in SNet an be nested. Agents in SNet an take the
role of a delegator and a delegatee at the same time within the same ontext.
 Thirdly, whenever a ooperation fails, the initiating agent an restart the original
planning task.
Within planning the initiating agent is the top-level agent that owns the top-level
element (goal or task).
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Figure 5.18: Four Dierent Planning Alternatives
5.4.1 Generating all Possible Alternatives.
An agent that starts planning rstly generates all possible alternative ways to reah his
goal out of the relevant goal-task hierarhy supporting his goal. In Figure 5.18 we depit
a top-level task T , whih is divided up into a struture of tasks and goals by deomposi-
tion links and means-ends links. For simpliity, we just label the primitive tasks at the
leaves of this tree struture and do not mention the owners of the elements. This g-
ure represents four alternatives, whih we desribe by enumerating the primitive tasks:
A
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g. As
the reader an see, deomposition strutures reet an and-harater while means-ends
strutures have an or-harater in this ontext. These alternatives are generated by
depth-rst searh in SNet.
Of ourse, if the owner of the top-level task needs elements of another ator { T
2
and
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ision('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(17) to all the others: sendDelegDe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Figure 5.19: Algorithm: Agent as Delegator and Delegatee during Planning
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{ onerning one ertain alternative, delegation has to take plae. Only alternative
A
3
does not need any delegation. How agents interat and negotiate when they take
delegation into onsideration to pursue their goals is desribed in the next hapter.
5.4.2 Interation and Negotiation Between Delegating Agents
As we saw, eah alternative to reah a goal an inlude a set of neessary delegatee
agents. The algorithm in Figure 5.19 { for reasons of simpliity, we present a pseudo-
ode algorithm { shows an abstrat view of interation between agents along the del-
egation path in SNet. In partiular, the algorithm omprises all (ommuniation-)
ativities of an agent that has the role of a delegatee as well as the role of a delegator.
 Planning starts with a sensing event. The agent reognizes that there is either an
exogenous input { then he is the orresponding initiating agent and an not be
a delegatee { or a request of a delegator { then he is a potential delegatee. The
user or the delegator informs the delegatee about the importane of the softgoals
by weighting them. (1)
 To pre-shedule a task means that the agent globally has experienes how long the
task will take. He abstrats from any delegations that have to take plae. Thus,
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he an nd a proper time slot, in whih the task should t { see Setion 5.4.4.
(2)
 The agent determines all n possible alternatives, as desribed before in Se-
tion 5.4.1. Of ourse, here the agent has just a loal view and is not able to
see or even inuene the alternatives that other agents have. (3)
 Then the agent has to nd the alternative with the highest utility. (4)-(11)
 Therefore, the agent has to look at eah possible alternative i. (4)-(9)
 All potential delegatees j of alternative i are asked for their ontributions (send-
DelegReq) and the agent waits for all the answers (senseDelegContribs). Here
we invoke a new instane of our algorithm: While the delegator sends a delegation
request (7), the orresponding delegatee senses the delegation request (1). Of
ourse, there might be no alternative with any delegation. Then the agent just
takes the role of a delegatee and not the role of a delegator. (7),(8)
 If the agent herself has to make own ontributions within alternative i, then she
adds them. (9)
 Afterwards, the total utility of eah alternative is alulated. Therefore, the agent
makes use of the utility model as well as the trust model, see Setion 5.4.3 and
Setion 5.4.4 for details. (10)
 At the end, the agent alulates her best alternative (out of her subjetive point
of view) and informs the delegator. (11),(12)
 If the agent is not the initiating agent, then she has a delegator from whom she
expets an onrm or anel message. (14)
 If the agent herself takes the role of a delegator, i. e. she delegated some parts
of her task, then she sends onrm and anel messages to all her delegatees.
(16),(17)
5.4.3 The Role of Trust and Utility in SNet
Following von Nietzsh [vN02℄, we alulate utilities in SNet as a linear-ombination,
i. e. a weighted sum of qualitative goals. In SNet these qualitative goals are our softgoals,
whih belong to a ertain goal. The weights are determined by the user when giving
an exogenous input. In our implementation, the weighting is not just known by the
initiating agent but also \told" to the potential delegatees. On SNet's oneptual level it
ould also be possible that the delegator does not mention his preferenes. In this ase,
a delegatee an use default weights, whih are based on experienes or information given
by third parties, or he an assume that the weights are equally distributed. A delegator,
who has to hoose between dierent alternatives,
16
has to ombine the ontributions
16
Reall that eah alternative is built by a group of agents and their ontributions to the delegator's
softgoals.
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Figure 5.20: Delegator Chooses Depending on Trust and Utility
of all delegators for eah alternative and alulate the orresponding total utility {  f.
Figure 5.20. The alternative that promises the highest utility is hosen. All the agents
needed to serve this alternative get a positive onfirm message from the delegator {
see line (16) of the algorithm in Figure 5.19. Those agents that are not taken into
onsideration get a anel message.
The intention of the inuene of the trust model in the gure is that in SNet the
promised ontributions of a delegatee are modied by the trust the delegator has in
this delegatee. Bad experienes, i. e. a low trust value, should make the promised
ontributions doubtful. In this ase the ontributions are lowered.
In Setion 5.2, we showed how to generate ConGolog programs inluding non-
deterministi elements. This non-determinism led to dierent alternatives, from whih
one is hosen and the others are eliminated. Hene, during planning in SNet we generate
the orresponding deterministi ConGolog program, whih follows the hosen branh,
 f. Figure 5.17.
More details and example alulations are given in the implementation and evalu-
ation part, Chapter 6. For example, we will present some details about mapping the
duration of a delegated task to a utility and give an implementation to alulate pos-
sible alternative starting times of delegated tasks and evaluate them onerning trust
and utility.
5.4.4 Sheduling a New Task
Whih of the possible alternative starting times are preferred at the end in SNet de-
pends on the alulation of utility, trust, and gain. Their onnetion in this ontext
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is outlined in Figure 5.21. Depending on the determined possible alternative starting
times, the anellation of one or more tasks, whih are still sheduled or perhaps already
in exeution, our. While the hopefully suessful exeution of a new task should have
a positive inuene on the trust model, the anellation of an already sheduled task
has a negative inuene. The dierent generated alternatives serve as input onern-
ing the trust model, beause the later the task starts the less probable is the positive
ommitment of the delegator and therefore the hane to inrease trust between this
delegatee and his delegator dereases. Of ourse, this statement just holds if the un-
derlying time utility funtion dereases monotonously, whih we assume in SNet. For
example, see Figure 6.3.
Analogously, the utility model has to alulate the dierent ontributions and build
the overall utility for eah alternative. At the end, the agent weights the utility the
resulting trust onerning his internal trustWeight value for eah alternative. So, the
delegatee tries to make a good oer, but at the same time he tries not to hurt other
ooperation partners. The alternative with the maximum value is the preferred one.
In Setion 6.2 we present a onrete implementation of task sheduling in SNet.
5.4.5 Expetation Deviation and Trust Update
As a result of planning, the initiating agent has expetations when and in what quality
{ softgoal ontributions { delegatees have to deliver their results. In the omparison-
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and update-phase suh a delegator determines whether aims are already reahed or not.
Firstly, it is possible that the goal is reahed in time and the quality is as expeted
or better. In a seond ase, the goal is not reahed in time or the quality is too low. In
both ases an update onerning trust takes plae, in a positive respetively negative
way. In the seond ase, the initiating agent tries to re-start planning with new time-
restritions if possible.
In literature, trust updates are handled similar to our approah by omparing ex-
petations or promises with reality. For example, Witkowski et al. [WAP00℄ state that
eah \agent an update its own trust vetor... by omparing the quantity of resoure
requested against that atually utilized". Marsh [Mar94℄ says: \The amount of the
inrease or derease (of trust) depends on the osts and benets of the situation that
have been inurred" and at the same time takes reiproity expetations into aount.
5.5 Comparison with DTGolog
Boutilier et al. [BRST00℄ proposed DTGolog , a synthesis of high-level agent program-
ming (Golog) and deision theoreti planning. DTGolog programs speify poliies and
restrit the searh spae. DTGolog an be seen as a deision theoreti extension of
Golog in order to speify Markov Deision Proesses (MDPs). Like in SNet, DTGolog
programs serve the whole spetrum from nondeterminism (muh planning) to determin-
ism. Similar to SNet, planning leads to deterministi programs. In DTGolog besides
deterministi ations, stohasti ations are speied together with probabilities that
map them to assoiated deterministi ations. DTGolog's optimization theory ontains
axioms speifying reward funtions, whih depend both on the urrent situation and
the last ation done and an ontain a temporal argument, too. The prediate BestDo
plays the role of Do in Golog but additionally an deal with stohasti ations. As a
result, BestDo \grounds" all hoie points (stohasti ations) to sensing-ations and
onditionals that, depending on the sensing result, oer n further poliies to pursue
if the orresponding stohasti ation is assoiated with n deterministi ations. So,
BestDo oers the struture of a MDP searh tree. At the end, the interpreter has to
hoose the best way to go at those branhing-points depending on the highest expeted
utility.
 Like in SNet, DTGolog maps nondeterministi hoie points of programs { in
SNet: ndet-program strutures { to a deterministi program. In SNet agent-
programs have to plan loally after a delegation request has been reognized.
Reahing one goal of an agent an lead to a asade of loal planning inluding
negotiation and agent interation if delegations are possible.
 In ontrast to DTGolog, we do not make use of any stohasti ations that have to
be mapped to assoiated deterministi ations with a ertain probability. We deal
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with the onept of delegation, whenever more than one agent an be involved to
pursue a ertain goal. All the potential delegatees have their private, subjetive
view and therefore they plan loally. So, a delegator an never be sure about
planning results of his delegatees, whih are heterogenous and behave dierently.
 During planning in SNet, we intensively make use of the reiation of our Con-
Golog programs. So, we beome able to simulate single agent's expeted ontri-
butions to the softgoals of interest. Conretely, a delegator loally exeutes one
ConGolog simulation for eah planning alternative. Eah simulation ends when
the own ontributions have been alulated. These ontributions are the reward
of an alternative. The expeted ontributions of other agents are diretly inte-
grated into the simulation. While in DTGolog alternatives immediately depend
on the branhes of the program ode, alternatives in SNet depend on means-ends
branhes as shown in Setion 5.4.1.
 The orresponding BestDo of SNet is agent-spei and therefore loal. The
agent weights the expeted ontributions onerning eah alternative under on-
sideration of the trust he has in the delegatees he needs for this alternative. For
example, promised ontributions of agents that are not trustful form the dele-
gator's perspetive are evaluated. Hene, with SNet's loal BestDo, eah agent
alulates the best alternative with the highest utility onerning ontributions
under onsideration of trust aspets.
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Chapter 6
Implementation and Evaluation of
SNet
In this hapter we onsider SNet from its implementation point of view and evaluate
our approah { among other things { by two detailed examples.
We start by giving an overview of the SNet software arhiteture. We show SNet's
implementation in the organization and modeling environment OME [LYay℄, explain the
role of ConeptBase [JEG
+
95℄ in the ontext of SNet, and present the SNet simulator
{ a graphial representation tool for simulations in SNet. Then we introdue onrete
implementations of the utility and trust alulation as well as the sheduling task.
In the third and fourth setion, we evaluate two examples of simulations of strategi
inter-organizational networks in SNet. The rst example is a more omplex one. We
onentrate on the utility and trust omputation and the resulting deision making. In
the seond example, we observe simulations that have long durations. The simulations
are based on one single network-senario but vary onerning their initial trust values.
We ompare the results of SNet with our (intuitive) expetation. Sometimes we also
will see unexpeted but plausible developments.
6.1 The SNet Software Arhiteture
At its ore, SNet is based on the ombination of the languages modied i* for statially
modeling networks, ConGolog for dynamially simulating networks, and ConeptBase
as a kind of glue between i* and ConGolog as well as for stati analyses.
Figure 6.1 laries the interplay of the dierent involved languages, and it depits
interfaes to the human users. The user employs OME (see Setion 6.1.1) to build a
stati model of an inter-organizational network in the modied variant ( f. Chapter 5)
of the strategi rationale model of i*. Most gures showing networks, for instane Fig-
ure 6.2, are designed by using OME. The orresponding Telos frames an be stored
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Figure 6.1: The SNet Software Arhiteture
in our meta-data repository ConeptBase. Its query-language an be used for stati
analyses and is espeially involved in the transformation into exeutable ConGolog
ode. The transformation rules are desribed in Setion 5.2. The SNet Simulation
ViewerSNet!simulation viewer shows a step by step view of the simulation run and
provides aess to ontrol the simulation, whih uses the ConGolog Interpreter to ex-
eute the ConGolog program. Renements
1
on agent behaviour an be made easily at
the level of ConGolog programs, while adaptations onerning the stati model have to
be made in OME and thus requires re-transformation.
6.1.1 OME { Representing Modied i* Diagrams
The Organization Modeling Environment OME [LYay℄ allows both to graphially reate
and represent i* SD- and SR-models and to store them in Telos (see Setion 3.3). OME
oers a layered and modular arhiteture, i. e. the i* framework is just one of several
frameworks that are supported. Conveniently, other frameworks, like SNet with its
modiations on i*, an be added easily via Java plugins. Figure 6.2 shows a sreenshot
of OME inluding the SNet framework. We an see, for instane, the new menu-entry
\ConeptBase\ as well as the orresponding pull down menu-entries we added.
In detail we add the following to OME to support SNet:
 Adapting OME's Menu-Entries and Graphial Elements. We added new
1
Here we merely think of adjusting initial values (for example, trust). Sine this information is not
present in the i* model, no inonsistenies with the i* view an our.
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Figure 6.2: OME Sreenshot { inluding the SNet Plugin
graphial elements { as .gif images {, for instane the triangle as the preondition-
eet element or sequene links as a new kind of links. We integrated several new
menu-entries, for example to establish the onnetion to the ConeptBase server,
transforming the modied SR diagram to ConGolog ode, or performing stati
analyses.
 Adding New Funtionality. The new menu-entries in OME oer new fun-
tionality, whih is enoded in Java plugins.
 Modifying the Syntax and Semantis of the Resulting Telos-Frames.
The semantis of all the graphial SNet elements is integrated into OME. So, for
example, already during the graphial omposition, OME refuses to onnet a
preondition-eet element with a deomposition link.
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In partiular, OME onsists of two parts: The OME kernel and the plugins. From
bottom to top, the OME kernel is divided into the following three layers.
 The OME's KB manager in the Knowledge Base (KB) Layer has among other
things to reate, delete, modify, and store models, give responses on queries,
perform basi semanti heking, and notify possible exeptions. The underlying
knowledge base is a Telos repository and implemented in C++.
 The next layer, whih has diret aess to the previous one, is alledModel/Frame-
work Layer. It provides a simpler and more abstrat interfae to the information
stored in the KB, reates new models, loads and saves existing ones, and inludes
(user dened) frameworks. In addition, this layer insulates the rest of OME from
a potential reimplementation of the KB and oneptually separates the model
from its framework. The Model-Manager determines whih plugins should be
loaded and provides an interfae to them.
 The View Layer provides the graphial representation of the model and drawing
failities to plae, move, and label objets (graphial symbols/images). Moreover,
it allows to all funtionalities provided by plugins reahable via mouse lik on
menu-bar entries. These pre-dened methods are, among others, load, save, ex-
port, and print a model and resize, rename, and hange elements. Framework-
dependent methods ould serve for speial network analyses or speial transfor-
mation routines.
The plugins, whih are a olletion of Java methods, are loaded dynamially, depending
on the used model and used framework.
6.1.2 ConeptBase { Our Meta-data Repository
We use the ConeptBase meta-data manager [JEG
+
95℄ based on the oneptual mod-
eling language Telos [MBJK90℄ as the representation language of modied i* diagrams.
ConeptBase plays at least three roles in the ontext of SNet: (a) it stores the models
generated by the user in OME, (b) it is able to perform stati analyses on the dened
models, and last but not least () the ConeptBase query language is used to generate
the dynami exeutable ConGolog ode as well as the graphial representation in the
SNet viewer.
Storing Models in ConeptBase. The Organization Modeling Environment OME
diretly stores the user-generated modied i* models in a Telos dialet. These so-
alled Telos frames again an be stored in ConeptBase. Here we do not just keep
the diagram with its labeling and parameters but also the graphial positions of the
elements. Thus, we are able to support the SNet viewer { see the following paragraph
{ with these graphial information, too.
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Stati Analyses in ConeptBase. The query language of ConeptBase allows us
to perform stati analyses of our networks. Syntatial heks are one appliation. For
example, it is useful to know whether there are network nodes with neither in- nor
outgoing links, beause isolated elements usually do not make muh sense. This query
an be formulated as follows in the ConeptBase Query Language:
QueryClass elements_without_link isA SNetElement with
retrieved_attribute
name: String
onstraint
rule: $not exists l/SNetLink (l from this) or (l to this)$
end
Another example desribes that it is not allowed for subtasks to be a deomposition
of more than one supertask. If there are tasks with more than one in-going task-
deomposition-link (tdl) they will be found by the following query:
QueryClass subTask_with_n_tdls isA SNetTaskElement with
onstraint
rule: $exists tdl1,tdl2/SNetTaskDeompLink
(tdl1 to this) and (tdl2 to this) and (not (tdl1==tdl2))$
end
Intermediate Storage for Transformation Support. Queries to ConeptBase
also play an important role to supply the relevant information for the translation from
modied i* diagrams into ConGolog programs. For example, we ask for all sub-elements
of a task: This query retrieves all task elements from the model database that are al-
ternatives onerning a goal-hoie element, i. e. all task elements with an outgoing
means-ends link to this goal. As attributes the element's name and ator as well as the
goal-hoie element's ID and ator are returned.
QueryClass alternatives isA SNetTaskElement with
retrieved_attribute
name: String;
duration: String;
parameters: String
omputed_attribute
ator: String;
super_id: SNetGoalElement;
super_ator: String;
ontraint
rule:
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$exists ml/SNetMeansEndsLink
(ml from this) and (ml to ~super_id) and
(exists a/SNetAtorElement (this parent a) and
(a name ~ator)) and
(exists sa/SNetAtorElement (~super_id parent sa) and
(sa name ~super_ator))$
end;
6.1.3 Viewing and Controlling Running Simulations
 The SNet Viewer. The SNet viewer is a Java program that (a) shows SNet
simulations graphially and (b) oers features to ontrol the simulation. It takes
the stored Telos frames of a SNet model as a basis onerning its own graphial
representation of the model. The positions of eah element are used, too. The
user has the possibility to ontrol the orresponding ConGolog program, whih
again delivers the simulation's progress. This progress is shown in a graphial
manner. For example, preonditions are highlighted in green or red depending
on whether they hold or do not hold. The user has the possibility to generate
exogenous input to ontrol the exogenous ations he modeled before.
 The Prolog Command Line. Often it is a good idea just to use the ommand
line and examine, for example utility values to reognize deisions made by agents.
In the two larger examples desribed in this hapter, we generated dozens of pages
of output showing the development of trust and utility values to understand the
deisions made.
 The Bath Mode of Exogenous Input. In SNet we inluded the possibility
to perform simulations with a long duration on the basis of a pre-generated list
of exogenous input. The simulation environment then pays attention to eah
exogenous ation at the right time. We make use of this feature in the seond
evaluation example ( f. Setion 6.4).
6.1.4 The SNet User { Renement, Adaptation, and Intera-
tion
The human user of SNet has the following roles ( f. Figure 6.1):
 He generates the modied i* model by using the Organization Modeling Environ-
ment OME.
 During the simulation of the network, the user provides exogenous input. Alter-
natively, he makes a list of exogenous ations in advane, whih he wants to be
exeuted while the simulation is running.
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 The user an adapt formulas and models that SNet uses for utility and trust
omputation in the ontext of planning.
 He an rene the automatially generated ConGolog ode diretly. For instane,
it might be neessary to modify initial trust values.
 Furthermore, the user adapts the modied i* model he generated at the very
beginning. For instane, he might hange some ontribution values.
6.1.5 Internal ConGolog Simulations via Reiation
During planning in SNet, agents alulate ontributions of their alternatives via internal
simulation. That means that they exeute \private" ConGolog programs based on
several subjetive assumptions. The exeution does not inuene the environment
diretly, but it provides deeper insight into a possible development of a part of the
world and possible resulting ontributions. In SNet we oer this feature by reiation
of our programs. For planning purposes, for example, the programming parts of other
agents are set to empty programs. The dierent ontributions to relevant softgoals
an be initialized by zero or other values, whih are delivered by the delegatees. In
this ontext we make use of a system-spei ation, whih allows us to set uents
arbitrarily. So, for instane, we an set the time. Whenever delegation has to take
plae in the \original" program-phase, the ontributions of the delegatees an be set
to those values that the delegatees told before. After the internal simulation of a
single agent, when new expeted ontributions are alulated, the original state
2
an
be restored.
6.1.6 ConGolog, Prolog, Java, and Telos in SNet
The automatially generated program skeletons from modied i* diagrams (see Se-
tion 5.2) are pure ConGolog ode. The whole domain dependent part is represented
by ConGolog. We use Prolog routines to establish deliberative planning agents (see
Setions 5.3 and 5.4). In partiular, Prolog is used to derive the dierent planning
alternatives { we use depth-rst searh { and to deal with utility and trust. The agent-
ontrolling yle of SNet is implemented in Prolog, too. But not the whole domain
independent part of SNet is represented in Prolog, but also in ConGolog. For example,
the SNet time model is implemented in ConGolog. Additionally two other languages
are used to implement SNet: Java and Telos [MBJK90℄. While the former one is used
to adapt the organization modeling environment (OME) [LYay℄ to SNet, the latter is
neessary to semantially desribe modied i*.
2
Of ourse, not the situation { in terms of the situation alulus { an be restored, beause its
history has been hanged.
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6.2 Trust and Utility Calulation
In this setion we want to give the reader an impression of how our trust-, utility-,
and sheduling-model of SNet, whih we proposed in Setion 5.4, an be implemented
onretely and how we an use them to make deisions during planning ativities.
First of all, we introdue some new uents and a utility funtion, whih maps the
duration of a delegation depending on an expeted duration to a utility-value. Then
we onsider the planning ativities step by step and examine how trust and utilities
inuene deisions before a delegation in SNet an take plae and how new delegations
an be sheduled. At the end, we show how agents an store the experienes they make
during a simulation, i. e. how they an adapt their trust.
6.2.1 Basi Elements
During the transformation from stati modied i* diagrams to ConGolog ode, ertain
uents onerning the modeling of trust and utility in our urrent implementation of
SNet are added. They build the basis of our trust and utility model:
 If there are n agents in the network, n (n 1) uents are generated representing
the trust eah agent has in eah of the other agents. Currently, we allow these
uents to have values between 0:1 and 0:9. A higher value represents higher
trust. As an additional information, we do not want to have a trust value of 0:0,
beause the uent deals as a fator of a produt, whose result should not be zero.
Otherwise, agents with very low trust would never work together anymore. To
use a linear funtion to map values between 0:1 and 0:9 to a onrete level of
trust, is just a rst suggestion. Another valuable approah, for example, is to use
a sigmoid funtion instead.
 A delegator gets one uent per potential delegatee indiating an experiene value
onerning the duration the delegatee needs to nish the delegation. Of ourse,
this value has to be determined by the user onerning the initial situation S
0
and
will be updated after eah nished delegation. In SNet a few update-funtions
are predened and an be hosen: the average among all experienes, the fastest,
or the slowest fulllment of the delegated job.
For example, a delegator initially has the expetation that a delegated task needs
ve time-steps. The rst delegatee he hooses just needs four time-steps. If this
delegator always takes the fastest exeution of delegation as his new estimation,
he expets that this delegated task an be exeuted in just four time-steps in the
future.
 For eah proativity, a value representing the gain of this task is stored. Currently
in SNet, all agents that are suessfully involved in this proativity simply get
this gain.
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Figure 6.3: Mapping the Duration of a Delegated Task to a Utility
 The agents in SNet an be dierentiated by their behaviour to prefer more trustful,
i. e. long-term, ooperations or whether they are looking for ooperations that
oer muh gain {  f. the item above. Therefore, a uent trustWeight(Agent; s)
is inserted for eah agent. In our urrent implementation, the uents' values
are reals ranging from 0:0 to 1:0. A higher value indiates that this agent is
looking for more long-term trustful ooperations and neglets the inuene of
the promised gain. The role of this uent will be disussed in more detail in
Setions 6.3 and 6.4, when we present two evaluation examples.
We already mentioned that the duration of the exeution of a task that makes ontribu-
tions to a softgoal is an impliit ontribution, too. Consequently, a utility funtion has
to map the expeted duration t
exp
and the time really needed, t, (both have to have
positive values) to a time utility value: util(t
exp
;t). In our urrent implementation
we use the following funtion util(t
exp
;t), whih is depited in Figure 6.3, too:
util(t
exp
;t) =
8
>
<
>
:
1 if t  t
exp
;
1:5 
1
2t
exp
if t
exp
< t < 3  t
exp
;
0 if 3  t
exp
 t
(6.1)
Notie, the duration t has to be seen relative to the start time that the delegator
expets. So, if a delegation an be nished within the expeted time t
exp
, the utility is
maximal. In our implementation between t
exp
and 3  t
exp
the utility linearly dereases
to zero. So, we follow the intuition of a monotonously dereasing time utility funtion,
i. e. a faster exeution of a delegation an never produe a lower utility.
Of ourse, this utility funtion is just one simple example, whih we use in our
implementation of SNet. For instane, we ould take an asymptotially dereasing
funtion, too. Furthermore, it ould be helpful if the utility funtion already dereases
between 0 and t
exp
. In this ase, we are able to reward a delegation that is already
nished before the time we expeted, t
exp
.
Generally in SNet, we allow the user to inlude an arbitrary funtion that maps the
duration of a delegated task to a utility value. So, he an hoose the one that ts to
his domain.
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Figure 6.4: Delegatee's Possible Alternative Starting Times
6.2.2 An Implementation of Delegation in SNet
A Delegator Asks for Delegation. In our urrent implementation of SNet, a dele-
gator sends delegation requests to all his delegatees. Trust and utility do not have any
inuene on the ask messages he broadasts { see Figure 5.16. There is no neessity to
exlude a delegatee he has very low trust in, beause high potential ontributions may
ompensate a low trust value.
In this early phase of the delegation, the delegator uses his experiene-value on-
erning the duration of the task that has to be delegated in order to determine the
earliest possible starting time (EPST) of the delegation. In SNet the delegator just
takes the rst free position in his shedule. This orresponds to t
EPST
used in the ask
message.
A Delegatee Shedules a Delegation Request. A delegatee that gets a dele-
gation request, i. e. ask message, wants to reply by an answer message. As seen in
Figure (5.16), he has, among other things, to alulate his earliest possible starting
time he wants to provide. Therefore, the delegatee has to shedule the possible task,
whih the delegator wants to delegate, depending on the tasks he already sheduled in
the past.
Let us assume that the delegatee, we want to observe, has to shedule a new task
with duration dur and has already n tasks in his shedule. While the tasks' starting
times are t
s
1
; t
s
2
; : : : ; t
s
n
, their orresponding expeted ending times are t
f
1
; t
f
2
; : : : ; t
f
n
(t
s
i
<
t
f
i
; i 2 1; : : : ; n).
In our example, shown in Figure 6.4, dur is 3, the earliest possible starting time
t
1
is 22, and n is 5, i. e. ve tasks are already sheduled. The rst possible time-slot
for sheduling a new task is generally from EPST , here 22, to EPST + dur, here 25.
Sine an already sheduled task has to be aneled,
3
in our ase, it would be a seond
3
The urrent implementation of SNet does not allow to shift already sheduled tasks. This is left
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alternative to let the new task start at time t
2
= 27. Following the same argument,
t
3
and t
4
are the third resp. forth alternative sheduling positions in our example.
Sheduling the new task at time t
4
= 34 means that no other task has to be aneled.
Thus, it is not neessary to searh for further sheduling positions that start later than
t
4
, beause the time utility funtion we use dereases monotonially over time, see
Figure 6.3. Thus, the overall utility would just derease if the new task started later
than t
4
= 34.
Whih of these possible alternative starting times are preferred at the end, depends
on the alulation of utility, trust, and gain. Their inuene in this ontext is outlined
in Figure 5.21. While this setion gives a global impression about the origin of the
utility and trust values, here we want to show the formulas we use in our onrete
utility and trust model.
A Delegator Chooses Between Dierent Alternatives. How the delegator
hooses between dierent alternatives is oneptually desribed in Setion 5.4.3. As
an implementation detail, in SNet the delegator evaluates the dierent possible alter-
natives by what we all detailed planning. Here we exeute the ConGolog program
for eah alternative as a kind of simulation but replae all the delegated tasks other
agents would have to do by all the promised ontributions
4
of the delegatees. Thus,
just the ConGolog program part of the delegator herself is going to be simulated. As a
onsequene, the delegator simulates the dierent trust and utility development of all
his possible alternatives and then is able to ompare them and hoose the best one.
Trust Update After a Delegation. Of ourse, suessful or failed ooperations
have to inuene the value of trust between the (former) ooperation partners. At the
oneptual level, SNet allows an agent to value the history of ooperations taken plae
individually in order to alulate a trust value. In our urrent SNet implementation, we
assume that three suessful ooperations are neessary to ompensate one negative.
In partiular, for simpliity the value that is subtrated after a failed ooperation is
three times higher than the value that is added after a suessful ooperation.
6.3 Evaluation-Example One { \Step by Step"
In the last setion, we saw some implementation details of SNet models, whih we
introdued in Setion 5.4. In order to understand the interplay of the dierent models
in the ontext of our planning and simulation environment SNet, we onsider two
examples in detail. While in the rst example, we fous on the origin of utility and
for further renements.
4
As already mentioned, in SNet the delegator modies the promised ontributions of a delegatee
depending on the degree of trust he has in his potential ooperation partner.
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trust values, in the seond example, we fous on the development of utility and trust
within a long-term simulation.
To show how agents ome up with their deisions when searhing for delegation
partners or ommitting to delegations, we use an example whih is again taken from
the entrepreneurship domain. Before Venture Capitalists deide to support a promis-
ing entrepreneur nanially, they need help from people who are familiar with the
entrepreneur's domain. Thus, usually { like in our example { they ask Professors for
writing an expertise who again might delegate
5
this task to researh sta.
6.3.1 The Setting
Figure 6.5 reets the setting, whih is modeled in OME. The Venture Capitalist's (VC)
intention is to get an expertise. Whenever an entrepreneur's hane of suess has to
be evaluated, the VC an weight his ve softgoals
6
aordingly in order to nd the best
delegatee for this job. These ve softgoals in partiular are: good IT review quality,
good engineering quality, broad review, good market analysis, and good read-
ability. The VC has four ways to get an expertise. He an approah three dierent
faulties,
7
namely Faulty Alaska, Faulty Belgium, or Faulty Cuba, or do the
task by himself (internal expertise). Eah faulty again delegates the expertise
tasks to members of their faulty, who ontribute to the softgoals in their own spei
manner. For example, when Faulty Member Abraham performs his task do IT review,
he ontributes 30 to the softgoal broad review.
A more abstrat view on this example setting is given in Figure 6.6. It is a ondensed
view, whih ontains the following aspets:
 What we neglet, for instane, is the fat that Faulty Member Abraham delivers
his ontributions via two tasks, whih are exeuted in parallel. We rather sum up
his ontributions and take the maximum of the two durations.
 Some names are shortened. For instane, Abraham is the abbreviation for
Faulty Member Abraham.
 Sine Faulty Belgium does not have the hoie between Bob, Barbara, and
Bill, but has to delegate a job to all of them, we sum up the ontributions to an
imaginary faulty member B-Sum.
 The leaves of the depited tree ontain all faulty members with their ontribu-
tions and the orresponding duration to fulll their tasks.
 The ontributions to the ve softgoals are assigned to ve boxes as shown in the
legend of Figure 6.6. For example, Abraham is able to make a ontribution of 30
5
In this ase we neglet that the relationship between Professors and their researh sta is hierarhi.
6
Reall that besides the expliitly shown softgoals, SNet aounts for the time, i. e. one is able to
ommuniate the importane of a quik proessing.
7
Stritly speaking, VC has a ontat person in eah faulty.
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Figure 6.5: SR Diagram - \Step by Step"
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Figure 6.6: Example Setting
to the softgoal broad review.
 The whole exeution of his task perform a review, whih is deomposed into do
IT-review and do market analysis needs three time-slots. We are able to vary
durations. For example, 3 1 is based on an equally distributed probability over
the interval [2; 4℄.
 Parent-hild edges orrespond to delegator-delegatee relations and are annotated
with weights reeting the trust between them.
 Contributions assigned to non-leaf nodes (dotted boxes) are just initial experiene
values, whih are updated during runtime. The agents use them for preliminary
planning to shedule new inoming delegations.
 Aordingly, exp. dur is just the initial experiene value reeting the expeted
duration of the delegation.
For example, before the rst delegation took plae, Faulty Alaska expets a on-
tribution of 25 to the softgoal broad review and a duration of 4 when delegating a task
to either Abraham or Alex. These values will be updated whenever new experienes are
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made. Stritly speaking, Figure 6.6 represents two trees in a single one. One should
have the already known Venture Capitalist (VC) as the initiating delegator { rep-
resented as the root node in the tree { and the seond one another venture apitalist,
namely VC2. Sine all of the relationships to the known faulties and faulty members
as well as the initial trust and experiene values are the same, we omit the seond tree.
Consequently, the OME piture in Figure 6.5 ompletely omits the ator VC2 with his
goal, softgoals, and links to the faulties, mainly beause it inreases readability. There
is one dierene between VC and VC2. VC2's promised gain for a suessful ooperation
is three times higher than VC's. Therefore, espeially agents with a lower trustWeight
favor VC2's delegation requests. For simpliity, all agents that are aepted for a ertain
delegation (one path through the graph) get the same gain, i. e. either 100 { in the ase
of VC { or 300 { in the ase of VC2.
6.3.2 Running The Example
Although we ould show the exeution of our example in pitures of our SNet viewer (see
Setion 6.1.3), we rather selet a domain spei more informative illustration, whih is
omparable to the design of Figure 6.6. The gures we present during the simulation,
i. e. Figure 6.7 and the following, should help explain eah agent's deisions after an
exogenous input has ourred. The weights of the exogenous input are listed in the
boxes at the top. The ordering orresponds to the ordering of the softgoals shown in the
legend of Figure 6.6. The weights onerning the softgoals good engineering review
and good readability, for example are 0:4 in Figure 6.7. The entry within the dotted
box shows the weight onerning the impliit \standard softgoal" time. The root node
of the tree belongs either to VC or VC2, who are the starting point of a delegation and
nally deide to delegate a urrent job to Alaska, Belgium, or Cuba. They take the
branh with the highest utility value.
1st Step. In the rst step, see Figure 6.7, VC prefers Alaska promising the highest
utility: 0:529. Previously, Alaska hose Alex as a result of the maximum utility value
0:364. The values at the leaf nodes represent the utilities of this agent's ontributions
to VC's or VC2's softgoals. In the following we all these values job utilities. This value
is subjetive in one aspet. Eah agent evaluates the duration of his task aording
to his own experienes. Intuitively speaking, one agent alls the exeution time \fast"
while another one alls it \fairly fast". For instane at the beginning, Faulty Alaska
simply expets that the exeution takes 4 steps, whih is orret for Alex but not for
Abraham.
Alex needs four steps to fulll the delegation and wants to start as soon as possible.
In his opinion, he performs the task as quik as possible. Therefore, his ontributions
to the impliit softgoal time is maximal, i. e. 1,  f. Formula 6.1 and Figure 6.3. So,
his softgoal-ontributions are {  f. Figure 6.6 { (1:0; 0:0; 0:6; 0:0; 0:1; 0:8) while the rst
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Figure 6.7: 1st Step
entry is the time utility. The weights onerning the softgoals during this rst step
are (0:2; 0:0; 0:4; 0:0; 0:0; 0:4), as shown in Figure 6.7. Hene, the weighted sum, whih
results in the job utility value, is: 0:2  1:0 + 0:0  0:0 + 0:4  0:6 + 0:0  0:0 + 0:0 
0:1 + 0:4  0:8 = 0:76. The orresponding alulation of Abraham's job utility is:
0:2  1:0 + 0:5  0:0 + 0:2  0:6 + 0:3  0:0 + 0:7  0:1 + 0:6  0:8 = 0:52 and therefore
lower than Alex's ontributions. Alaska trusts in Alex: 0:7. Therefore, he ompares
0:52  0:7 = 0:364 with Abraham's 0:249. The path that is ruial for the delegation {
here VC! Alaska! Alex { is marked with bold numerial representing utility values.
Planning in SNet is roughly divided into two parts:
 Pre-planning determines the shedule position of the job. Agents with higher
trustWeight values have the tendeny to prefer strengthening trust relationships.
Those with lower trustWeight values prefer to maximize their prot, among other
things regardless of losses in trust. For instane in Figure 6.7, Alex exeutes the
job as early as possible, i. e. from 3 to 7, sine all ators start with an empty
shedule ( f.Setion 6.2.2).
 In the detailed planning phase, the utility of the rst part, whih is based on
experiene values, is updated by the delegatee's planning input and additionally
ombined with the trust in the subontrator (delegatee), whih reets a kind of
risk due to delegation. For those ators, who might (or have to) delegate parts of
their task, for example Alaska, they ask these potential delegatees and evaluate
their resulting answers to hoose for the best ooperation sheme.
Again, while pre-planning is based on experiene, detailed planning is based on promises
a delegatee gives his delegator and trust relationships.
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2nd Step. The seond exogenous ation is initiated by VC2 and weights the softgoal
ontributions exatly the same as VC did before, see Figure 6.8. Consequently, the
utilities of the ontributions { at the leaf-nodes { are similar to the previous step. But
here, Alaska has to hoose between two possible starting times of the job, sine VC's
job (from 3 to 7) is still in the shedule. Hene, he an either anel VC's job and start
as early as possible, i. e. at time 4 or start at time 7. The agent omes up with his
deision as follows:
The rst option, to start early, results in a job utility of 0:68, a trust utility of 0:487,
a gain utility of 0:956, and an overall utility of 0:363. The seond option, to start late,
results in a lower job utility of 0:605 (the time ontribution is worse), a higher trust
utility of 0:75 (no job needs to be aneled), a slightly higher gain utility of 0:99 (gain
of 400 instead of 300), and results in an overall utility of 0:468.
While the expressions job utility (at the leaf-nodes) and overall utility (at the inner
nodes) have already been explained, let's briey introdue the other two utility values.
To shedule a new task oers a gain utility , whih depends on the gain the new task
provides and the gain-losses anellations of other tasks ause. Similar to shedule and
suessfully exeute a new delegated task inreases the trust between the delegator and
the delegatee but in the same time dereases the trust other delegators have in this
delegatee if anellations take plae. These two eets result in the trust utility .
Cruial for the upoming deision is the overall utility, whih, among other things,
is inuened by Alaska's tendeny to prefer long-term trust relationships. Therefore,
he deides not to anel any job and shift the new job. At the end Alaska and Alex are
aepted by VC2, beause their ontribution, in spite of a delayed exeution, is slightly
better than Cuba's oer: 0:477 in ontrast to 0:474.
Again, although the rst two steps are nearly the same, Alaska's and VC2's utility
values are dierent. The reason is that these utility values are subjetive and are based
on experienes, whih have hanged. Espeially the utility value 0:373 is based on the
randomized time Belgium and his delegatees need. Here, Belgium expets to need a
longer duration than he promised to need for VC in the last delegation.
3rd and 4th step. The next two exogenous ations take plae at time 2 resp. 3. Sine
no delegation is nished, yet, all trust relationships are valued equally with 0:7. These
two delegation requests, depited in Figure 6.9 and Figure 6.10, again deal with the
same ontribution weights. In the rst ase, VC is the initiator and in the seond VC2.
But this time, Cuba and Caesar, who obviously deliver the highest utilities onerning
this onstellation, both deide to perform the seond (4th step, pid3), three times more
protable, job of VC2 as early as possible. Consequently, they aept to anel
8
the
just before (3rd step, pid2) ommitted delegation with VC.
8
Note that in the urrent implementation, VC is not informed about the anellation immediately,
but has to wait till the time passes by (see step 5).
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ChristineCaesar
Belgium CubaAlaska
Abraham Alex
current time:
start time:
PSfrag replaements
pid1 0:2 0:0 0:4 0:0 0:0 0:4 1
4
VC2
0:477 0:373 0:474
0:255 0:371 0:56 0:294 0:455
0:52 0:76 0:44 0:68
0:7 0:7 0:7
0:7 0:7 0:7 0:7
time: 7-11
Figure 6.8: 2nd Step
ChristineCaesar
Belgium CubaAlaska
Abraham Alex
current time:
start time:
PSfrag replaements
pid2 0:4 0:4 0:0 0:2 0:0 0:0 2
10
VC
0:460 0:425 0:571
0:406 0:215 0:68 0:549 0:268
0:66 0:40 0:82 0:40
0:7 0:7 0:7
0:7 0:7 0:7 0:7
time: 10-14
Figure 6.9: 3rd Step
Let us reognize the intention of this deision. Firstly, Cuba has to ompare the two
options: (1) start as early as possible at time 11 with a high job utility of 0:76 and aept
the anellation of the already ommitted pid2 job or (2) start at time 14 and oer
a lower job utility of 0:61. Although the seond alternative has a higher trust utility,
0:75 instead of 0:487, and a higher gain utility, 0:99 instead of 0:956, the overall utility
onerning the rst alternative is higher: 0:691 instead of 0:589. The reason is that
Cuba has a low trustWeight value and therefore low trust utility values only marginally
inuene him. Seondly, Caesar has to hoose between the same alternatives and omes
up with the same deision. The nal job utilities (at the leaves) and overall utilities
(inner nodes) are shown in Figure 6.10 and explain why the delegation hain is VC2 !
Cuba ! Caesar.
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ChristineCaesar
Belgium CubaAlaska
Abraham Alex
current time:
start time:
PSfrag replaements
pid3 0:4 0:4 0:0 0:2 0:0 0:0 3
11
VC2
0:460 0:495 0:571
0:358 0:217 0:76 0:522 0:254
0:66 0:40 0:82 0:40
0:7 0:7 0:7
0:7 0:7 0:7 0:7
time: 11-15
Figure 6.10: 4th Step
5th step, time 15. After the rst four exogenous events took plae, we stepped
further without any exogenous input. Alaska and Alex are able to fulll their two
tasks identied with pid0 and pid1. At time 15 Cuba and Caesar nish their pid3 job,
and at the same time VC reognizes that pid2 is overdue. The resulting trust values
are depited at the edges of the tree in Figure 6.11, whih illustrates the automati-
ally re-initiation of the aneled pid2 job named pid2 re. Comparing Figure 6.9 and
Figure 6.11, one an see how the utility values depreiate along the 0:5-trust-branh
Caesar-Cuba-VC. All in all, Belgium gets the ommitment.
Again, the dierene between Belgium's job utility value onerning pid2 and
pid2 re is aused by dierent durations that Belgium promises { see Figure 6.6 on-
erning the randomized durations. As a seond eet, VC updated his experienes
onerning his job's duration.
6th step. One time-step later { no more delegations have been nished { VC2 oers
another job. The deision onerning the delegation is quite interesting, see Figure 6.12.
Regarding only the job utilities at the leaf nodes, Abraham promises the highest job
utility. Alaska has the tendeny to prefer Alex in whom he has higher trust in, i. e. a
lower risk in aneling the job. As a result, Alaska forwards Alex's oer to VC2. This
is the only reason why VC2 ommits to Cuba's oer, whih is a little bit higher. So,
Alaska was rejeted, beause he did not hoose Abraham.
6.4 Evaluation-Example Two { \Simulations"
In ontrast to our former example, the seond evaluation senario is kept quite simple
regarding the modeling perspetive. We have extrated the relationship between the
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ChristineCaesar
Belgium CubaAlaska
Abraham Alex
current time:
start time:
PSfrag replaements
pid2 re 0:4 0:4 0:0 0:2 0:0 0:0 15
16
VC
0:525 0:529 0:383
0:406 0:281 0:76 0:365 0:265
0:66 0:40 0:77 0:40
0:8 0:7 0:5
0:7 0:8 0:5 0:7
time: 16-21
Figure 6.11: 5th Step
ChristineCaesar
Belgium CubaAlaska
Abraham Alex
current time:
start time:
PSfrag replaements
pid4 0:2 0:16 0:0 0:0 0:07 0:57 16
20
VC2
0:528 0:397 0:533
0:413 0:466 0:577 0:508 0:302
0:671 0:663 0:670 0:456
0:8 0:7 0:8
0:7 0:8 0:8 0:7
time: 20-24
Figure 6.12: 6th Step
vcA
vcB
vcC
vcD
vcE
vcF
Capitalist
Venture Faculty
Member
ask for
evaluation
evaluation
do
fmA
fmB
fmC
quality
report
Figure 6.13: SR Diagram of the Seond Evaluation Example \Simulations"
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Venture Capitalist and the Faulty Member onerning the performane of evalua-
tions from the former evaluation example. Six agents { vA, vB, vC, vD, vE,
vF { over the role of a venture apitalist and delegate the task ask for evaluation to
any of the three Faulty Members { fmA, fmB, fmC {, see Figure 6.13. Thus, for eah
exogenous input onerning the top-level task ask for evaluation, the orresponding
Venture Capitalist (delegator) has to ooperate with and has to hoose exatly one
of the three Faulty Members (delegatees), who again make ontributions to the VC's
expliit softgoal report quality and his impliit softgoal time weight.
6.4.1 The Setting
 The agents within their groups, Venture Capitalists (VCs) resp. Faulty Members
(FMs), are exhangeable onerning their apabilities, ontribution, and their du-
ration to exeute the delegation (two time steps).
 The VC agents dier only in the gain they promise to the FM agents: vA promises
a gain of 100, vB 200, vC 300, vD 400, vE 500, and vF 600.
 The faulty members solely dier in their trustWeight.
9
fmA has a trustWeight
of 0, fmB of 0:5, and fmC of 1. Consequently, fmA's deision to make a good
oer, i. e. shedule the task early, only depends on the gain he is able to get, i. e.
he should have the tendeny to prefer vF when sheduling new tasks. On the
other hand, fmC prefers trustful long-term ooperations without regarding gain.
fmB joins both properties, i. e. he both prefers long-term ooperations and at the
same time delegations with high gain.
Due to this simple struture, we ran several simulations omprising one-hundred
time steps
10
and about ninety exogenous ations as input using the already mentioned
bath-exeution mode. The list of exogenous ations and some details are shown in
Appendix A. For eah sequene of exogenous ations, we performed three simulations
that dier onerning the initial trust values between the delegators and their delega-
tees. Figure 6.14 shows these three ases. In the rst ase, every delegator trusts in
eah of the delegatees with the same value of 0:5. In the following two ases, these
values are hosen randomly as values between 0:1 and 0:9. For instane, in the seond
ase, initially, vD trusts in fmA with a value of 0:2. Consequently, vD will prefer fmB
(0:7) and fmC (0:9). For intuitive reasons of fairness, eah row an be summed up to the
same value: 3:0. The idea is that no delegatee should get a preferred starting situation.
The following six tables { Figure 6.15 to Figure 6.20 { give an impression of the
results of the three simulations. Eah gure depits the suessful and failed oop-
9
Reall that trustWeight is a parameter (between 0 and 1) that is assigned to eah ator. The
higher the value the more the ator is interested in long-term ooperations and does not simply try to
maximize his gain.
10
Eah simulation ran about two hours on a Pentium 4, 3 GHz system.
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vA vB vC vD vE vF
fmA 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5
fmB 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5
fmC 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5 0:5
vA vB vC vD vE vF
fmA 0:9 0:1 0:4 0:2 0:8 0:6
fmB 0:5 0:6 0:2 0:7 0:2 0:8
fmC 0:1 0:8 0:6 0:9 0:1 0:5
vA vB vC vD vE vF
fmA 0:6 0:7 0:1 0:2 0:5 0:9
fmB 0:8 0:4 0:3 0:5 0:4 0:6
fmC 0:6 0:2 0:6 0:6 0:5 0:5
Figure 6.14: Initial trust values in three dierent simulations
erations during all three simulations over the time (x-axis) from the point of view of
one spei delegator, vA to vF. While \
+
\ indiates a suessful ooperation, \


\
stands for a failed one. In our urrent implementation, \
+
\ inreases trust by 0:1 and
\


\ dereases trust by 0:3. The fourth olumn shows the dierent initial trust values
onerning simulation one, two, and three (seond olumn) as desribed in the ontext
of Figure 6.14. The rst and the third olumn hint at the delegator resp. the delegatee.
The last olumn reets the resulting trust values at the end of the simulation after
the suessful or failed ooperations have taken plae.
For analysis purposes, the six Venture Capitalists are sorted into three groups.
vA and vB build a group, whih is haraterized by the relatively low gain they
oer. Group two, onsisting of vC and vD, oers money on average. The last group
omprises vE and vF and oers muh gain. Aording to these three groups, we
desribe intuitive expetations, talk about the observed simulation results, and last
but not least try to explain these simulation results that meet our expetations and
those that do not meet them immediately.
6.4.2 Intuitive Expetations
Group 1: Ators that do not oer muh gain: vA and vB.
What do we expet when delegatees are ooperating with an ator that oers only little
money (f. Figure 6.15 and Figure 6.16)? Espeially fmA should have the tendeny
to anel vA's and vB's tasks, beause he only uses gain as input onerning his
sheduling deisions. But fmC should behave ompletely dierent. His deisions are
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Figure 6.15: vA's view on three simulations with dierent initial trustWeights.
just based on trust relationships. Thus, he should not value delegators by the gain
they promise but by the onsequenes of trustful ooperations.
Group 2: Ators that oer an average amount of gain: vC and vD.
In this ontext, shown in Figures 6.17 and 6.18, we expet that in some ases fmA gets
a task with an average amount of gain and in other ases he anels these tasks in order
to get higher valued tasks, i. e. tasks promising more gain, from vE or vF. fmB might
show some aspets of this behaviour.
Group 3: Ators that oer muh gain: vE and vF.
Regarding the two delegators that oer the highest gain { vE and vF,  f. Figure 6.19
and Figure 6.20 {, we expet that fmA as well as fmB will try to strive for ooperations
with them in order to earn muh money. At the same time vE and vF might anel
tasks that promise low gain in order to serve fmA and fmB.
6.4.3 Observations and First Evaluations
Group 1: Ators that do not oer muh gain: vA and vB.
 In the rst simulation of Figure 6.15, we an exatly observe the behaviour we
expeted. After a rstly suessful ooperation with vA, fmA prefers a task
that oers more money, in partiular he prefers an oer of vF (as shown in
Figure 6.20), whih promises a six times higher gain. Looking at all the three
simulations of vA, fmC and fmB play the role of a trust ooperation partner,
while fmA does not. In the seond simulation, fmC starts with a disadvantage in
trust and no ooperation between fmC and vB takes plae. During these three
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Figure 6.16: vB's view on three simulations with dierent initial trustWeights.
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Figure 6.17: vC's view on three simulations with dierent initial trustWeights.
simulations and 48 ooperations in total, six anellations took plae, and fmA
was responsible for ve of them.
 But notie that even fmC sometimes, i. e. in the rst and third simulation, makes
bad oers to vA and thus fmB takes over. The reason for this behaviour is that
fmC serves another good trust relationship to vC (Figure 6.17).
 The third simulation is quite interesting. In the starting situation, vB highly
trusts in fmA and therefore some ooperations take plae at the beginning. But
after two anellations, fmB beomes the most preferred ooperation partner.
Group 2: Ators that oer an average amount of gain: vC and vD.
 In all three ases of the evaluation senario, shown in Figure 6.17, vC has a
more or less most preferred ooperation partner he works together with during
the whole time.
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Figure 6.18: vD's view on three simulations with dierent initial trustWeights.
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Figure 6.19: vE's view on three simulations with dierent initial trustWeights.
 In the seond and third simulation, vC mainly ooperates with fmC, who starts
with an advantage onerning trust. Here we an see that an agent with a high
trustWeight is looking for long-term ooperations.
 In ontrast to this, the rst simulation, i. e. the extensive ooperation between
vC, who oers just an averagely high amount of gain expetation, and the gain-
preferring agent fmA is absolutely not typial. There are two irumstanes that
lead to this development. Firstly, fmA is not able to establish \more attrative"
11
ooperations with vD or vE. Seondly, most of the suessful ooperations with
vF fortunately do not overlap with vC's tasks. So, either anellations were not
neessary or vC was willing to shift some tasks.
11
Here \More attrative" just means that the expeted gain of ooperations is higher.
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Figure 6.20: vF's view on three simulations with dierent initial trustWeights.
Group 3: Ators that oer muh gain: vE and vF.
 The third ase of Figure 6.19 is very interesting. When omparing the initial trust
values with the starting trust values of ase one, one an see that they are nearly
the same. But the ooperation ativities take a ompletely dierent ontinuation.
Like in the rst ase, fmB has the rst ooperation with the delegator. But then
fmA beomes able to push himself into foreground. Interestingly, the delegatee
with the lowest initial trust value, fmB, is able to get the rst task. Both fmA and
fmC are not willing to anel their tasks they sheduled at the same time. While
fmA does not want to lose money, fmC does not want to hurt trust relationships.
Here, the very minor variation of an initial trust situation results in a very dif-
ferent end situation. This reveals that one has to be very areful when deriving
onlusions and generally, a set of simulations inluding small variations in the
initial situation should be onsulted.
 Generally, in these two gures, we an see that strong onnetions between one
delegator and one single delegatee (one of our gain-interested agent) an be es-
tablished.
6.4.4 Disussing the Simulation Results
In the simulations of the seond example, we often saw what we expeted. But some
simulations take interesting, unexpeted ontinuations, whih are plausible when look-
ing at them in more detail.
Furthermore, we saw that our trustfully ating fmC does not neessarily have a good
relationship to delegators that oer low gain. Instead she tries to lassify potential
delegators in two groups: preferred for ooperation and only when nothing else is to
do. Nevertheless, unsurprisingly one an say that the number of aneled delegations
dereases by the gain the orresponding delegator promises. Conerning the usefulness
6.4 Evaluation-Example Two { \Simulations" 135
of the TCD approah, the results show that while the desribed senario is, of ourse,
very simple we nevertheless experiened outomes that were not obvious. Thus, for
more omplex, realisti examples, we indeed an expet helpful insights from suh
simulations in the future.
Whenever someone dealing with strategi inter-organizational networks tries to de-
sribe or model a network, he normally does not have the omplete knowledge about
the world. For instane, let's take the situation of our simulation example in Figure 6.19
and fmB wants to know about the hanes when ooperating with vE. He expets an
initial trust situation like in ase one. Performing only this rst simulation, his ooper-
ation hanes seem to be perfet. But when exeuting simulations with small hanges
onerning the initial trust values like in the third ase, fmB's hanes are getting worse.
When we sum up the number of anellations in all three simulations, then we see
that the gain-loving fmA has aneled 12 tasks, fmB 7, and fmC 6.
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Chapter 7
Monitoring in SNet
In the urrent SNet implementation, the delegator is not in a position to observe,
evaluate, or even inuene any of the tasks he delegated until they are nished. Es-
peially in the ontext of long-term delegations, this seems unnatural. For instane, a
venture apitalist wants to be aware of an entrepreneur's ativities, after giving him
$ 1; 000; 000.
Monitoring progress during the exeution of tasks is one means to estimate possible
risks in order to be able to avert worst-ase senarios and emphasizes the important role
of distrust in inter-organizational networks as proposed in Setion 4.2 or in [GJKL03℄.
Firstly in this setion, we introdue a general framework for monitoring in strategi
inter-organizational networks. We present six postulates that should take a entral po-
sition in desribing properties of monitoring in inter-organizational strategi networks.
Then, based on this framework, we develop a SNet spei version as an instantiation
of the general framework. For a better understanding, the SNet spei ontributions
are aompanied by an example. At the end of the hapter, we make some onluding
remarks and disuss how the presented monitoring framework an be rened.
7.1 A Monitoring Framework for Strategi Inter-
Organizational Networks
Environments like inter-organizational networks that oer hanes are always on-
fronted with the risk of losses. As in life generally and, in partiular, in these networks,
everybody wants to apture hanes and at the same time minimize possible risks. Ev-
erybody has to be aware of the problems and losses other partners ould ause them.
Even if all members of a network make their own prot, there are probably individuals
that want to reah more than the others by exploiting the network. Often in these net-
works, parasites, free-riders, break through non-written rules (they transgress ethial
rules) or even break written network rules. They trustfully ooperate for some time
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and seem to be integrated in the network, but they only wait for the opportunity to
maximize their own prot and take others' losses into aount by suddenly leaving the
network. Normally, the losses of the aggrieved parties are muh higher than the gain
of the parasiting party. So, the network itself is weakened by this kind of so-alled exit
strategy .
From our point of view, distrust an ator has against another ator seems to be
a good parameter to steer his level of awareness, his intensity of monitoring towards
the other agent. In this hapter we onentrate on monitoring performed by a dele-
gator , who wants to gather new information about his delegatee performing a task he
delegated.
Of ourse, Monitoring an be understood in many ways. When we use this notion,
we mean one of the following two aspets. What aspet is meant should be reognizable
from the ontext. (a) Monitoring an be the onrete ation to observe somebody or
something. (b) Monitoring an be understood as the whole set of ativities inluding:
the reasoning and the deision how to initiate an observation, the observation itself ( f.
(a)), the reasoning about onlusions that an be drawn onerning the new information
won, and resulting ativities.
7.1.1 Six Postulates
To start, we propose six postulates (P1-P6) that should be fullled by a monitoring
onept in strategi inter-organizational networks, whih are { in our opinion { essential
for understanding monitoring as a mehanism that an serve as a omputational model
of monitoring in these networks.
(P1) In-Between Update. Monitoring provides in-between information, whih in-
reases the delegator's quality of information. Therefore, the delegator has a better
estimation of the delegatees' reliability, an update its own model of the world, and
an augment his experienes made with the delegatee.
(P2) Drawing Conlusions. Due to the new model of the world obtained by mon-
itored information, the delegator should draw onlusions he never would have drawn
without monitoring. We do not only mean internal onsequenes like hanging a delega-
tee's distrust value, but also real onsequenes should be possible, for example thinking
about alternatives and new ooperation partners, negotiate with the delegatee, or even
abort the ooperation.
(P3) Monitoring is not For Free. It is obvious that ators that perform monitoring
are better informed about their ooperation partners and inrease their own probability
of suess onerning urrently delegated tasks. Everybody wants to alulate his
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expeted gains and losses as exatly as possible. So, why not doing as muh monitoring
as possible? The reason is that monitoring is not for free in general. Monitoring means
eort, whih normally orrelates with the depth of the monitoring ativity.
(P4) Monitoring { A Rational Deision. A delegator has to weigh the advan-
tages (P1) and (P2) against the disadvantage (P3) of monitoring to make a rational
deision whether to perform monitoring { and to what extent { or not. A ost/utility
analysis onsiders at least the following omponents: (a) the experienes made with
the delegatee, (b) the possible losses the delegatee ould ause the delegator, and ()
the expeted monitoring osts.
(P5) Reliability-Inertia of Monitoring. The delegator's deision how to monitor
should be inuened by the experienes he has made with his delegatee: the more
positive the experienes are the less probable is a deviation from the expeted goals
and additionally the monitoring ativities an be less. The basis of this postulate is an
inertia assumption onerning the reliability of a delegatee. A lot of positive experienes
should result in something representing less distrust.
(P6) Distrust Aumulation and Self-Strengthening. As we stated in Se-
tion 4.2, on one hand an ator an ultivate and hide distrust and on the other hand
high distrust an inrease itself without any new negative { but also no positive { infor-
mation onerning the delegation progress. If a ertain individual threshold is reahed,
the desribed self-strengthening eet appears.
7.1.2 A Generi Framework
In what follows, we sketh a general framework for monitoring in strategi inter-
organizational networks, whih implements the six postulates we proposed above. We
onentrate on monitoring between two ators, a delegator and a delegatee, who have
an ongoing delegation relationship.
Figure 7.1 gives an overview of the framework. Coneptually, we distinguish between
a rationale layer and an ativity layer . The former is used to speify the underlying
agent-internal rationales. The latter details how an ator atually initiates his obser-
vations, performs them, and draws onlusions. Within the ativity layer, we propose
three phases namely initiating monitoring, gathering information, and drawing onlu-
sions. This ontrol-yle-like struture may onstitute monitoring in our ontext.
The Rationale Layer of Monitoring
Firstly, the rationale layer provides the basis of deision-making ( f. Figure 7.1) on-
erning when to perform monitoring and to what extent. Seondly, this layer serves as
140 7 Monitoring in SNet
Trigger
Module
Update
Module Activities
Resulting
Monitoring
Utility
Monitoring
Importance
Monitoring Cost
Model
Expectation
Model
Utility
Model
data
trigger
Legend
Distrust
Accumulation
Self−Stregthening
Initiating Monitoring Gathering Information Drawing Conclusions
− kind of monitoring
− degree of monitoring
Activity Layer
Rationale Layer
Experiences
Figure 7.1: A General Monitoring Framework
a storage of historial data, whih an be used to value the integrity of the delegatee
and therefore inuenes the need of monitoring.
Experienes. The experiene store is updated by monitoring results. It serves as
one information soure of the utility model. As depited, a self-strengthening eet
that inreases distrust appears if a ertain individual threshold is reahed. Experienes
might be stored in dierent ways:
 as raw and uninterpreted data. This information ould be, for instane, ations
whih the delegatee has performed in the ontext of former delegations or oop-
eration results, i. e. ontributions made to softgoals during delegations.
 as interpreted data. Maybe not the ations and ontributions of delegatees should
be stored but the onsequenes the behaviour of a delegatee has had. A delegator
might update a list of positive resp. negative experienes of ooperations for eah
delegatee.
 highly aggregated interpreted data. For example, one single numerial value {
representing a distrust level { seems to be a good hoie for omputation in the
ontext of monitoring. In the SNet spei modeling of monitoring, see Se-
tion 7.2, we make use of suh values representing distrust.
Utility Model. The utility model ontains the reasoning part of our monitoring
framework. So, reasoning is based on deision theoreti (eonomi) aspets. In detail,
the delegator evaluates the monitoring importane on the basis of the importane of
the delegated task and the experienes made with the delegatee. Obviously, monitoring
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beomes more important for delegation tasks that promise high gain and ould ause
high osts if the delegatee does not fulll his task seriously. These osts do not need
to be real osts the delegator has, but an also be so-alled opportunity osts, i. e.
not realized gain. Due to experienes the delegator has made with the delegatee, he
an dedue how probable the delegatee might deviate from his promises to do the
job. This probability again makes monitoring more or less important. Additionally,
the monitoring framework inludes a monitoring ost model in order to ope with the
postulate that monitoring is not for free. Of ourse, dierent intensities of monitoring
ause appropriate osts. Combining the importane of monitoring and the expeted
monitoring osts leads to the monitoring utility , whih diretly reets when and what
kind of monitoring is appropriate in a speial situation. For example, if the delegator
has made good experienes with the delegatee, the losses to be expeted are low, and
monitoring in this ontext is expensive, then the next monitoring ativity need not
our soon.
The Ativity Layer of Monitoring
Initiating Monitoring. At the ativity layer, the initiating monitoring omponent's
responsibility is to ativate monitoring at the right time. If for example the delegator
has had good experienes with the delegatee, the losses to be expeted are low { maybe
the importane of the task is low {, or monitoring in this ontext is expensive, then the
next monitoring time need not our soon.
Gathering Information. Monitoring an be done at dierent levels, whih often
orrelates with osts and the quality of the orresponding information. For example,
the venture apitalist gets information about the entrepreneur he gave a lot of money
to by reading the newspaper, making phone alls, visiting the entrepreneur, or even
{ more expensively { hiring a onsultant with domain-spei knowledge. It is not
exluded that several levels of monitoring an be performed in parallel.
Drawing Conlusions. The delegator's utilities and experienes made with the part-
ner have to be updated after information has been gathered. New information serves as
a better estimation of the urrent risks and the expetations onerning the monitored
task. Additionally, the extent of the disrepany between the expeted performane of
the delegated task and the monitored performane has an inuene on what further a-
tivities the delegator takes (inrease future monitoring ativities, reonsider situation
by searhing for better alternatives, or even abort the ooperation diretly to avoid
wasting more resoures). For instane, in our example it might be a suitable deision of
the VC to anel his nanial funding if the entrepreneur fails to meet his expetations.
To sum up, the proposed monitoring framework an be seen as a iruit/loop. Expe-
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Figure 7.2: A long-term delegation
rienes and eonomi onsiderations determine and initiate monitoring ativities. In-
formation is gathered, new experienes are won, and afterwards onlusions are drawn,
whih might have diret inuenes on the world. We think that this generi framework
meets the six postulates, whih we presented in Setion 7.1.1.
 (P1) In-Between Update: The ator has to hoose by herself when to start obser-
vations in order to update her own view on the delegatee.
 (P2) Drawing Conlusions: To draw onlusions is an expliit element within the
generi framework.
 (P3) Monitoring is not For Free: We provide a separate monitoring ost model,
whih (negatively) inuenes the utility of a monitoring ativity.
 (P4) Monitoring { A Rational Deision: On the rationale layer, we give some
models and their dierent inuenes. So, we an be sure that implementations of
our framework oer alulations that result in onrete observation-ativities.
 (P5) Reliability-Inertia of Monitoring: Here, we demand to store experienes.
Thus, reputation is not just a onsequene of a single interation between two
agents but a result of all ooperations between them.
 (P6) Distrust Aumulation and Self-Strengthening: We onsider this in the on-
text of experienes.
7.2 Monitoring in SNet
Figure 7.2 shows a long-term delegation between a venture apitalist (VC) and an
entrepreneur. The situation is as follows. The VC agreed to the business plan proposed
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by the entrepreneur. A market study took plae and as a result the whole projet
seems to have a realisti hane of beoming a suess. Additionally, an appropriate
oÆe was found and the VC is willing to support the rst three months nanially in
order to give the entrepreneur the hane to hire five employees, buy hardware, and
make a first prototypial implementation of the software to be developed.
7.2.1 Partial Observability
Performing a monitoring ativity inludes getting exeptional and temporal aess to
information that is hidden normally. In SNet we have hosen to let the softgoal ontri-
butions be the aspets that an be monitored, i. e. the delegator an see intermediate
softgoal ontributions and not only the overall ontribution after the delegated task is
nished. Reall that softgoals are represented by uents in ConGolog  f. Setion 5.2.7.
By oneptually distinguishing between global and loal uents, we an indue partial
observability into SNet, a prerequisite onerning monitoring. While the global uents
are always visible to all ators, the loal ones belong to an ator and an only be a-
essed temporarily during monitoring by the delegator. These aess restritions an
be guaranteed by the system, i. e. by the automati transformation.
In our example (see Figure 7.2), the Entrepreneur's ontributions onerning the three
softgoals hire 5 employees, buy hardware, and do a prototypial implementation
remain invisible to the venture apitalist during the delegation proess. Only when the
VC performs a monitoring ativity, the ontributions beome aessible. Without any
monitoring, the VC does not realize the degree of the Entrepreneur's suess until the
end of the delegation relationship.
7.2.2 Cost Model
An agent who deides to monitor a delegation in SNet is allowed to take a look at ertain
loal uents, whih are normally invisible to the delegator. SNet has to take are that
the agent has to pay for the advantage of monitoring. This, for instane, an be realized
by reduing the reward that the agent expets by the whole ativity. An agent and
delegation spei funtional uent moni ost(Agent; delegation; s) an be introdued
{ initialized by 0. It's job is to sum up the monitoring osts onerning a onrete
delegation. After the delegation has nished, in situation s
fin
, agent's resulting reward
has to be dereased by moni ost(Agent; delegation; s
fin
).
7.2.3 Expetations vs. Reality
To monitor a task, the delegator must have an expeted development of the monitored
aspets, i. e. eah softgoal ontribution, in his mind. These an be represented by real-
valued funtions over the time. A utility funtion ombines these expeted softgoal
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Figure 7.3: Expeted development of ontributions
ontribution funtions to a funtion of the expeted utility development over the time.
The relevane of the dierent riteria an be ontrolled by their weights, i. e. a weight
of zero is assigned if a riterion is irrelevant. If the expliit representation of a deadline
is needed, it an be modeled as a separate softgoal.
Let us turn to our example. Here the VC has a (subjetive) expeted development of eah
softgoal ontribution in his mind, see Figure 7.3, e^(t),
^
h(t), and
^
i(t). To keep it simple,
the utility-funtions are user-dened linear-ombinations. While ExpUtil(t) reets
the expeted utility at time t, Util(t) is the utility based on the atual ontributions {
e(t), h(t), and i(t) { whih are the monitored values of the orresponding (loal) uents
at time t. So, for example, the overall expeted utility of the whole delegation, i. e. the
expeted utility after three months, is
ExpUtil(3) = 4000  5 + 20000  1 + 60000  1 = 20000 + 20000 + 60000 = 100000:
At the beginning of the delegation, the VC already knows the overall expeted utility
after one month:
ExpUtil(1) = 4000  3 + 20000  0:6 + 60000 
1
9
= 12000 + 12000 + 6667 = 30667:
Thus, he has to weight his expetation against the reality, for example after one month.
7.2.4 Distrust and Monitoring Importane
In SNet a delegator stores a distrust value { a real between zero and one { for every
delegatee. This value represents the experienes made so far and orrelates with the
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expeted deviation that ould take plae. This deviation is mapped via utility funtions
to possible losses onerning the whole delegation and thus results into a measure
onerning the monitoring importane. The monitoring importane ombined with the
monitoring osts, whih are dened by the user, determine the next monitoring time.
Reall that we have a speial view on distrust, whih diers from the prevalent
opinion that distrust is just the absene of trust [Mar94℄. While trust reets the level
of ommitment in SNet, distrust reets the level of awareness. So, it is possible that
somebody has a lot of distrust in another ator { and therefore performs monitoring
again and again { but is not able to nd a better strategy without this ator. So, he
has to at trustfully. We disussed this issue in detail in Setion 4.2.2.
7.2.5 Initiating Monitoring
We propose a formula to determine the next monitoring time (nmt) in SNet by the
least value satisfying the following inequality:
ExpUtil(nmt)   ExpUtil(now) >
MonitoringCosts
 Distrust
(7.1)
where now is the urrent moment, Distrust 2 ℄0; 1℄, and  2 ℄0; 1℄, too. The value
of  indiates, whih portion of the expeted gain might be used at most to pay for
monitoring.  is intended to be a onstant representing an agent's attitude onerning
the target level of monitoring and his willingness to pay for monitoring. The value of
the MonitoringCosts must be speied by the user, beause they are domain spei.
Intuitively, the inequality does the following. Let's suppose the distrust value is maxi-
mal, i. e. 1. Monitoring is useful if the inrement of the expeted utility from now until
the next monitoring point is higher than a multiple of the monitoring osts.
For instane  is
1
9
, Distrust is 0.6 and theMonitoringCosts are 2000
1
then monitoring
should happen when the expeted utility has grown by 30000. So the rst monitoring
has to take plae approximately after one month, beause nmt = 1 is the least positive
integer value holding:
30667  0 >
2000
1
9
 0:6
If distrust is halved, for example, the next threshold onerning monitoring would be
doubled.
The funtional uents next monitoring time(delegation; s) = time are rstly de-
termined at the beginning of a delegation and then after eah monitoring ativity took
plae again. In order to be ready to trigger a monitoring ativity at the right time, we
1
In our example, sine normally the VC has the right to see the entrepreneur's performed tasks
and an take a look into the books, the information gathering is quite easy and therefore the resulting
monitoring osts are low.
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have to augment the system proedure. So, we are able to enfore monitoring at the
right time.
7.2.6 Handling Deviations and Drawing Conlusions
In order to be able to handle deviations between expeted utility values and monitored
values, the user has to speify some kind of funtion updateTrust mapping the utilities
of the expeted ontributions, utilities of the real ontributions, the monitoring time
point, the duration of the whole delegation, and the urrent distrust value to a new
distrust value.
In our running example, let the monitored real utility value after one month, Util(1),
be 20000. As an absolute value, the resulting deviation is about 10000 or relatively one
an say that only two third of ExpUtil(1) = 30:667 are reahed.
Beside the realulation of the distrust value, whih inuenes the determination
of the next monitoring time (we use a disrete time model, see [GJLS03℄ for details),
in our example, the VC might notie that the entrepreneur is not able to hire any
employees, i. e. supporting the orresponding softgoal. Thus, it should be possible to
speify exeption handling mehanisms in i*. In this example, this might result in
identifying an agent who is speialized in hiring employees and willing to help.
By introduing monitoring in SNet, the delegator rstly gets the possibility to a-
tively inuene his delegatee.
7.2.7 Experienes
The distrust values an be stored in uents, one uent for eah possible delegation
relationship. Fats onerning the ooperation between delegators and delegatees an
be stored in ConeptBase. We need an appropriate mehanism to store only relevant
data.
7.2.8 Aumulation and Self-Strengthening of Distrust
Eah agent in SNet an get a parameter that represents a threshold onerning dis-
trust. If her distrust of a delegation exeeds this threshold, distrust will be additionally
inreased by a ertain amount round by round independent of new negative or positive
or even no monitoring information.
7.2.9 Monitoring in the Agent-Controlling Cyle of SNet
Sine monitoring is a further aspet of deliberation in SNet, we have to integrate
it into our agent-ontrolling yle, see Setion 5.3.1, espeially Figure 5.14. Dur-
ing the omparison and update phase of SNet, eah agent ompares his expetations
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with the fats. Here, monitoring in SNet makes further fats, in partiular uents,
visible. At the same time, the monitoring osts { moni ost(Agent; delegation; s)
{ are inreased. These fats an be taken into aount in order to rene the
model of the world and to rene planning within the planning phase. In this phase
next monitoring time(delegation; s) = time an be determined. Furthermore, the in-
formation the agent gathered by monitoring an be used to rene the fats within the
expetation model. The agent might diretly draw onsequenes out of the monitored
information. For example, the immediate anellation of a ooperation. Hene, new
tasks that should aet the world an be added and exeuted during the ation phase.
7.3 Disussion
Monitoring omprises a wide area,  f. Chapter 2. Monitoring, among other things,
is done within prodution proesses and ritial omputer systems, for instane in
airplanes. In this hapter, we have onentrated on monitoring in strategi inter-organi-
zational networks. We proposed six postulates that should be met by implementations
in the ontext of monitoring. We showed a generi framework based on yle-like
struture. As an example, we gave a rst simple implementation in the ontext of
SNet.
The proposed general framework as well as the SNet spei instantiation might
omprise multiple aspets regarding monitoring in strategi inter-organizational net-
works. Of ourse, a lot of aspets have not been onsidered or may seem (over-)
simplied. In what follows, we reonsider some interesting aspets and identify alter-
native views as well as possibilities to rene the monitoring framework presented in
this hapter.
 Dierent levels of monitoring. It would be desirable that the delegator an hoose
between dierent intensities of monitoring. Our intuition says that the intensity
has to orrelate with the prie to pay as well as the quality and quantity of
information one ould expet. To introdue this feature in SNet, the user has to
speify appropriate domain-spei parameters.
 The simpliations we made. In the framework we highly aggregated our experi-
enes, i. e. the ommon history between the delegator and the delegatee. This may
seem oversimplied. In the whole SNet framework, this history might be stored
in an appropriate way in ConeptBase. Additionally, the proposed inequality to
determine the next monitoring time might be too simple.
 Set a time to monitor. In reality a delegator hooses the time to monitor while
a delegation is running and probably not at the beginning and after eah moni-
toring ativity. The prerequisite for this kind of behaviour is that the delegator
permanently gets a small portion of information about the delegatee's progress.
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To integrate this more realisti behaviour, we have to distinguish between two
soures of information. One is for free and permanently available. This soure
serves as one additional basis for determining when to use the seond soure, the
ostly ative monitoring part (as desribed).
 Changing estimations during a delegation. Eventually, the delegator gets the
deeper insight that the estimation onerning the expeted development funtions
have been wrong. So, it would be nie to be able to hange these funtions
during the delegation. These hanges would initiate some kind of reovery. If the
expetations towards the delegatee have been too high, monitored estimations
have been valued too pessimisti as well as the onsequenes drawn too rigorous.
 Are softgoals always aessible? One an ask whether all softgoal ontributions
an be measured during a delegation, or do they only provide a ontribution at
the end. So, sometimes it might be hard to nd the right monitoring riteria.
 Information from third parties. A monitoring framework might inlude the possi-
bility that agents who highly trust exhange their experienes with other agents.
So, an agent an get a rst impression about another agents he never met.
 Handling possibly wrong information. We an ask how agents behave when they
are not sure about the quality of information or when they afterwards learn that
information from the past had been wrong.
 Unfairly high monitoring ativities. If the monitored party (in our ontext the
delegatee) beomes aware of unfairly high monitoring ativities against herself,
this might ause onsequenes, too.
Currently, monitoring in SNet is going to be implemented and the onepts are going
to be extended, too.
Chapter 8
Conlusions
8.1 Thesis Summary
Strategi inter-organizational networks represent fruitful but at the same time fragile
kinds of long-term ooperation platforms between organizations. They neither an
be subsumed under markets nor under hierarhies, but they lie between them and
ompetition and ooperation take plae at the same time. Soiologists have made
rst attempts to examine the funtioning of these networks. For example, they saw
that trust takes the role of the main oordination mehanism. In this thesis we have
proposed an agent-oriented way from requirements engineering over analysis and design
to implementation in order to formalize and apture the funtioning of strategi inter-
organizational networks. We have alled this approah SNet, whih is based on the
agent modeling language i*, the logi-based high-level planning language ConGolog,
and the dedutive objet-base ConeptBase.
As a basis, we have investigated the funtioning of strategi inter-organizational
networks and the requirements to a orresponding modeling and simulation approah.
For example, there are at least three requirements onerning dynami aspets of suh
a network. Firstly, trust, ondene (trust in the network as a whole), and distrust
are the main oordination mehanisms. Seondly, ooperation and delegation is often
based on risky pre-investments. Here network members make investments and hope
for a time-shifted reward. So, thirdly, they have reiproity expetations, whih often
might be fullled but not always. Hene, ations of individuals in the present have
an inuene on the network struture in the future. Conversely, the network struture
represents possibilities for future ooperations. This phenomenon an be alled miro
meso phenomenon with regards to the popular miro maro phenomenon of Soiology,
whih stands for a similar oherene between individual ations and the soiety as a
whole. We have presented further models to apture the requirements of a model of
strategi inter-organizational networks. In partiular, we have shown our TCD model
150 8 Conlusions
of trust, ondene, and distrust and expetation management via speeh ats. A
multi-perspetive methodology inludes agents' internal strategi rationales and plans
as well as inter-agent strategi dependenies and delegation proesses. Models dealing
with trust, ondene, and distrust oordinate these dierent perspetives and their
interplay.
The modeling language i* seemed to be a good starting point for SNet { our model-
ing and simulation methodology for strategi inter-organizational networks {, beause it
deals with both agents' internal modeling of goals, resoures, abilities, et. and agents'
external dependenies. For our purpose, we have modied i* to bridge the gap between
strategi rationale aspets of an agent and the operationalization to plans. Firstly, we
have added new modeling elements, whih, for instane, allow for timely ordering of
tasks, for giving tasks a duration, or for pre- and post-onditioning of tasks. Seondly,
we have restrited or newly dened the semantis with regard to further dynami sim-
ulations. For example, a goal in SNet ats as a kind of hoie element. Whenever a
(sub-)goal has to be fullled, its owner has to hoose atively whih way (subroutine)
to go for reahing that goal. So, we need to be able to perform bakward haining as
a reasoning strategy.
We have introdued transformation rules to map modied i* models to ConGolog
program fragments. For instane, a primitive modied i* task is represented by (1) two
ConGolog ations, one instantaneously indiates the beginning of the task, another
stands for the end, (2) one ConGolog proedure for sequentially exeuting the start
and nish ation, and (3) one ation preondition axiom for the nish ation that just
an be performed when the orresponding start ation has been performed and the
duration of the original i* task has passed.
Planning in SNet needs both the domain spei ConGolog ode fragments mapped
out of the modied i* models and a domain independent part, whih we have alled
the SNet simulation and planning environment. This environment, for instane, oor-
dinates the interation, ommuniation and negotiation between delegating agents and
ontains aspets like trust and utility alulation, and plan generation. It is written in
ConGolog and Prolog. At the ore of this environment, it oordinates and synhronizes
the agents' ativities. Conerning the underlying time model, for eah time step, the en-
vironment swithes between on-line exeution of ations, o-line exeution { projetion
{, and phases of input from the user, and oordinates the trust, utility, and expetation
alulation as well as ommuniation, delegation, negotiation, and sheduling in the
ontext of planning.
We have given an overview of the arhiteture of the implementation of SNet. The
Organization Modeling Environment { OME has been used for graphially designing
and representing our modied i* models. Therefore, both the syntax and the semantis
of SNet has been integrated in OME. Telos { as the underlying semantis { ould have
been used in ConeptBase diretly. With the help of the ConeptBase query language,
we have been able to divide up modied i* models into its atomi omponents in order
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to provide and appliate expliit transformation rules. The SNet viewer, whih has
been written in Java, allows for graphially representing simulations.
We have evaluated the onrete SNet software implementation by two examples.
In the rst example, we examined the development and interplay of trust, utilities,
delegation, ooperation, and planning in detail. In the seond example, we observed
and ompared the results of some simulations onerning the development of similar
network ongurations that just diered onerning the trust between the ators. We
both have seen ooperations whih we had expeted and ativities that were not obvious
but imaginable afterwards.
Last but not least, we have demonstrated that there is muh room for extending
SNet by oneptually introduing monitoring in SNet as a means of in-between esti-
mation of the progress of delegated ativities. We have worked out the requirements
of a general monitoring framework onerning strategi inter-organizational networks
and have shown how monitoring ould be introdued in SNet. In partiular, it has
been neessary to provide means to allow for partial observability, to identify to what
extend expetations meet reality, to assign osts to monitoring ativities, to alulate
the importane of monitoring, and to handle deviations and draw resulting onlusions.
8.2 Future Work
There are many details of SNet that ould be improved in the future. Dominik Shmitz,
who has had a strong inuene on SNet, is working on ontinuing SNet. In partiular,
improvements of SNet ould be done in the following areas.
Improving The Implementation of the TCD Model. In the implementation of
SNet we have had to make parts of the TCD model onrete. Therefore, we have had
to onentrate on ertain aspets and at the same time some general aspets of the
TCD model have been ignored.
 The alulation of individual trust between agents has been implemented in a way
following Coleman's results { see Setion 2.3 and [Col94℄. A failed ooperation
dereases trust in a way that three suessful ooperations have to take plae
in order to ompensate the failure. So, we just inrease or derease a single
variable. Of ourse, this ould be improved in the sense that the whole history of
experienes one agent has made with another agent is used to alulate a trust
level. With Coleman's model, an agent is willing to make a risky pre-investment
{ by delegating a task or aepting a delegation { if his trust level is high enough.
This model meets our requirements of interations in strategi inter-organiza-
tional networks quite good, but other approahes ould be tested in the future,
too.
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 We diretly map trust to a utility value and add a utility value that represents
the expeted gain. Agents an individually weight the importane of trust and
gain. This agent-spei weight haraterizes whether an agent is interested in
trust (long-term) or in gain (short-term). It would be possible to handle gain and
trust more ne-grained.
 Condene is integrated less obvious in SNet than trust. So, for example, suess
or failure of the network is not taken into onsideration, yet. Our implementa-
tion does not take into aount our speeh at based result that high ondene
inreases the probability of a fast ommitment.
 Network rules are onsidered impliitly in the implementation. For example, o-
operation failures are punished by weakening trust relationships. There is enough
room for improvements by making network rules in SNet expliit and therefore
exhangeable for the user, too. As a result simulation results that are based on
dierent network rules an be ompared.
Suessful Cooperations. A ooperation in SNet is suessful when all the promised
ontributions have been delivered in time. Additionally, a delay in time dereases
the degree of suess. Just when the ontributions are delivered too late or do not
meet the expetations, a ooperation fails. Here, to get a suessful ooperation, all
ontributions { exepted time { have to be fully fullled. Comparable to the delay in
time, the transition form suess to failure onerning the other ontributions ould be
ontinuous, too.
Integrating Monitoring in SNet. In Chapter 7 we introdued monitoring in strate-
gi inter-organizational networks and in SNet at the oneptual level. We also gave
hints onerning implementation details. First implementations are done by Dominik
Shmitz. More information about future work onerning monitoring in SNet is already
given in Setion 7.3.
Modeling Roles. As seen in Setion 6, already the models of a part of real world
examples beome very large, beause eah network member is diretly identied by
one single and individual agent instane in SNet. Espeially in the seond evaluation
example, we separately modeled many agents with similar apabilities in order to get a
ompetition senario. Thus, many redundant information unneessarily produes large
models in SNet. The idea is to introdue roles and positions, whih are already present
in the original i*, to speify apabilities more generally and provide the instantiation
separately. A rst disussion onerning the introdution of roles and positions in SNet
is given in [GSA
+
04℄.
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Agent Evolution in SNet. With the introdution of roles in SNet, it ould be
interesting to allow agents to hange their apabilities { and therefore, their strategi
dependenies to others, too { over time. For instane, the several nanial stages
through whih an entrepreneur evolves ould be identied (see [Nat01℄) and desribed
in a kind of evolution meta-model in SNet. In this ontext it would be interesting to
allow agents to joint or leave the network. A rst disussion onerning the introdution
of agent evolution in SNet is given in [GSA
+
04℄.
Sheduling and Task Canellation. Sheduling of tasks in SNet is just rudimen-
tary implemented. This is due to the fat that an agent an only handle at least one
task at one time unit and is not able to shift or interrupt a task and ontinue it further.
Thus, an agent that deides to start with a new task quite early, nevertheless he had
planned to perform another task at that time, has to fully anel the former task. This
seems to be unnatural and limits the ability of network members.
Trust in Third-Parties. In networks ommuniation is essential. Among other
things, it an be used to exhange experienes one network member has made with
others. So, trust in third-parties ould be interesting to integrate into SNet, too. The
quantity (and quality) of information that is exhanged between agents should orrelate
to the strength of their trust relationship. The information that an be given to others
ould be, for instane, the level of trust or distrust to third agents or the number of
suessful and failed ooperations between agents.
Planning Tehniques. To inrease the eÆieny of planning in SNet, we already
implemented progression as Lin and Reiter proposed in the ontext of the situation
alulus [LR97℄. Currently, Claen, Eyerih, Lakemeyer, and Nebel deal with integrat-
ing Golog and state-of-the-art planners [CELN07℄. They onentrate on planners in
the ontext of ADL [Ped89℄. ADL is a subset of the plan language PDDL (Planning
Domain Denition Language) [MD98℄. Applying these and further results to SNet
ould open another eld of researh.
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Appendix A
Evaluation-Example Two { Some
Details
When we generated the list of exogenous ations onerning evaluation example two {
\simulations" { Setion 6.4, we followed these rules:
 Six exogenous ations our one after another within one turn. Every v-agent
(delegator) has to have exatly one exogenous input in eah turn, but the ordering
is hosen randomly.
 During eah simulation, we have 16 turns with six exogenous ations in eah turn
as desribed above. After 12 exogenous ations, two \normal" primitive ations
take plae.
 The earliest possible starting time of a task is at least one and at most ten time
steps behind the ourrene of the exogenous ation. The time of ourrene
of an exogenous ation, is enoded in the proess identier. For instane, pid4
indiates that the ation will take plae at time 4. As a onstraint, two tasks of
one ator { of ourse they have to our in dierent turns { must not overlap.
 For eah exogenous ation, the weights a delegator assigns to the riteria,
here time weight and quality, are determined randomly in the following way:
time weight gets a value between 0:0 and 0:8, quality gets the dierene to 1:0.
The fail entries indiate that no exogenous ation takes plae in the orresponding
time step. An ask entry (abbreviation for the task ask for evaluation) ontains the
following arguments:
 The onstant exog shows that the ation is an exogenous one.
 The seond argument reets the delegator, who initiates the exogenous ation.
 The proess identier is a unique onstant and additionally ontains the time of
exeution.
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 Then the earliest possible starting time follows.
 The last argument is a list that ontains pairs of softgoal names and weights.
Here we have the impliit softgoal time weight and the expliit softgoal quality
(report quality).
In the following, we show the list of all the ations, whih we used in our simulation.
[
% 1.Turn
ask(exog, vD, pid0, 9, [pair(time_weight, 0.93), pair(quality, 0.07)℄),
ask(exog, vB, pid1, 11, [pair(time_weight, 0.06), pair(quality, 0.94)℄),
ask(exog, vA, pid2, 7, [pair(time_weight, 0.56), pair(quality, 0.44)℄),
ask(exog, vC, pid3, 12, [pair(time_weight, 0.10), pair(quality, 0.90)℄),
ask(exog, vF, pid4, 11, [pair(time_weight, 0.89), pair(quality, 0.11)℄),
ask(exog, vE, pid5, 11, [pair(time_weight, 0.62), pair(quality, 0.38)℄),
% 2.Turn
ask(exog, vF, pid6, 9, [pair(time_weight, 0.91), pair(quality, 0.09)℄),
ask(exog, vA, pid7, 15, [pair(time_weight, 0.22), pair(quality, 0.78)℄),
ask(exog, vD, pid8, 18, [pair(time_weight, 0.50), pair(quality, 0.50)℄),
ask(exog, vC, pid9, 15, [pair(time_weight, 0.90), pair(quality, 0.10)℄),
ask(exog, vE, pid10, 14, [pair(time_weight, 0.11), pair(quality, 0.89)℄),
ask(exog, vB, pid11, 20, [pair(time_weight, 0.94), pair(quality, 0.06)℄),
fail,
fail,
% 3.Turn
ask(exog, vB, pid14, 18, [pair(time_weight, 0.58), pair(quality, 0.42)℄),
ask(exog, vF, pid15, 18, [pair(time_weight, 0.08), pair(quality, 0.92)℄),
ask(exog, vD, pid16, 20, [pair(time_weight, 0.78), pair(quality, 0.22)℄),
ask(exog, vC, pid17, 27, [pair(time_weight, 0.29), pair(quality, 0.71)℄),
ask(exog, vE, pid18, 25, [pair(time_weight, 0.31), pair(quality, 0.69)℄),
ask(exog, vA, pid19, 24, [pair(time_weight, 0.47), pair(quality, 0.53)℄),
% 4.Turn
ask(exog, vF, pid20, 30, [pair(time_weight, 0.29), pair(quality, 0.71)℄),
ask(exog, vE, pid21, 30, [pair(time_weight, 0.31), pair(quality, 0.69)℄),
ask(exog, vC, pid22, 31, [pair(time_weight, 0.23), pair(quality, 0.77)℄),
ask(exog, vB, pid23, 33, [pair(time_weight, 0.96), pair(quality, 0.04)℄),
ask(exog, vA, pid24, 27, [pair(time_weight, 0.06), pair(quality, 0.94)℄),
ask(exog, vD, pid25, 27, [pair(time_weight, 0.73), pair(quality, 0.27)℄),
fail,
fail,
% 5.Turn
ask(exog, vC, pid28, 35, [pair(time_weight, 0.85), pair(quality, 0.15)℄),
ask(exog, vE, pid29, 34, [pair(time_weight, 0.63), pair(quality, 0.37)℄),
ask(exog, vA, pid30, 32, [pair(time_weight, 0.26), pair(quality, 0.74)℄),
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ask(exog, vB, pid31, 38, [pair(time_weight, 0.52), pair(quality, 0.48)℄),
ask(exog, vD, pid32, 33, [pair(time_weight, 0.40), pair(quality, 0.60)℄),
ask(exog, vF, pid33, 35, [pair(time_weight, 0.10), pair(quality, 0.90)℄),
% 6.Turn
ask(exog, vA, pid34, 42, [pair(time_weight, 0.41), pair(quality, 0.59)℄),
ask(exog, vD, pid35, 43, [pair(time_weight, 0.22), pair(quality, 0.78)℄),
ask(exog, vB, pid36, 40, [pair(time_weight, 0.17), pair(quality, 0.83)℄),
ask(exog, vC, pid37, 46, [pair(time_weight, 1.00), pair(quality, 0.00)℄),
ask(exog, vE, pid38, 45, [pair(time_weight, 0.12), pair(quality, 0.88)℄),
ask(exog, vF, pid39, 42, [pair(time_weight, 0.10), pair(quality, 0.90)℄),
fail,
fail,
% 7.Turn
ask(exog, vC, pid42, 48, [pair(time_weight, 0.70), pair(quality, 0.30)℄),
ask(exog, vA, pid43, 53, [pair(time_weight, 0.01), pair(quality, 0.99)℄),
ask(exog, vE, pid44, 54, [pair(time_weight, 0.49), pair(quality, 0.51)℄),
ask(exog, vF, pid45, 52, [pair(time_weight, 0.25), pair(quality, 0.75)℄),
ask(exog, vB, pid46, 53, [pair(time_weight, 0.09), pair(quality, 0.91)℄),
ask(exog, vD, pid47, 49, [pair(time_weight, 0.97), pair(quality, 0.03)℄),
% 8.Turn
ask(exog, vA, pid48, 50, [pair(time_weight, 0.29), pair(quality, 0.71)℄),
ask(exog, vB, pid49, 51, [pair(time_weight, 0.20), pair(quality, 0.80)℄),
ask(exog, vC, pid50, 54, [pair(time_weight, 0.64), pair(quality, 0.36)℄),
ask(exog, vE, pid51, 58, [pair(time_weight, 0.52), pair(quality, 0.48)℄),
ask(exog, vF, pid52, 60, [pair(time_weight, 0.91), pair(quality, 0.09)℄),
ask(exog, vD, pid53, 56, [pair(time_weight, 0.50), pair(quality, 0.50)℄),
fail,
fail,
% 9.Turn
ask(exog, vD, pid56, 62, [pair(time_weight, 0.21), pair(quality, 0.79)℄),
ask(exog, vE, pid57, 67, [pair(time_weight, 0.17), pair(quality, 0.83)℄),
ask(exog, vA, pid58, 63, [pair(time_weight, 0.00), pair(quality, 1.00)℄),
ask(exog, vC, pid59, 68, [pair(time_weight, 0.56), pair(quality, 0.44)℄),
ask(exog, vB, pid60, 61, [pair(time_weight, 0.57), pair(quality, 0.43)℄),
ask(exog, vF, pid61, 63, [pair(time_weight, 0.74), pair(quality, 0.26)℄),
% 10.Turn
ask(exog, vA, pid62, 66, [pair(time_weight, 0.71), pair(quality, 0.29)℄),
ask(exog, vF, pid63, 69, [pair(time_weight, 0.44), pair(quality, 0.56)℄),
ask(exog, vC, pid64, 72, [pair(time_weight, 0.02), pair(quality, 0.98)℄),
ask(exog, vD, pid65, 70, [pair(time_weight, 0.08), pair(quality, 0.92)℄),
ask(exog, vB, pid66, 70, [pair(time_weight, 0.48), pair(quality, 0.52)℄),
ask(exog, vE, pid67, 75, [pair(time_weight, 0.66), pair(quality, 0.34)℄),
fail,
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fail,
% 11.Turn
ask(exog, vC, pid70, 79, [pair(time_weight, 0.14), pair(quality, 0.86)℄),
ask(exog, vF, pid71, 76, [pair(time_weight, 0.58), pair(quality, 0.42)℄),
ask(exog, vB, pid72, 77, [pair(time_weight, 0.04), pair(quality, 0.96)℄),
ask(exog, vD, pid73, 81, [pair(time_weight, 0.44), pair(quality, 0.56)℄),
ask(exog, vE, pid74, 84, [pair(time_weight, 0.87), pair(quality, 0.13)℄),
ask(exog, vA, pid75, 79, [pair(time_weight, 0.28), pair(quality, 0.72)℄),
% 12.Turn
ask(exog, vE, pid76, 80, [pair(time_weight, 0.79), pair(quality, 0.21)℄),
ask(exog, vB, pid77, 84, [pair(time_weight, 0.09), pair(quality, 0.91)℄),
ask(exog, vD, pid78, 85, [pair(time_weight, 0.78), pair(quality, 0.22)℄),
ask(exog, vF, pid79, 85, [pair(time_weight, 0.92), pair(quality, 0.08)℄),
ask(exog, vC, pid80, 89, [pair(time_weight, 0.77), pair(quality, 0.23)℄),
ask(exog, vA, pid81, 85, [pair(time_weight, 0.03), pair(quality, 0.97)℄),
fail,
fail,
% 13.Turn
ask(exog, vC, pid84, 91, [pair(time_weight, 0.97), pair(quality, 0.03)℄),
ask(exog, vE, pid85, 88, [pair(time_weight, 0.44), pair(quality, 0.56)℄),
ask(exog, vA, pid86, 88, [pair(time_weight, 0.26), pair(quality, 0.74)℄),
ask(exog, vB, pid87, 96, [pair(time_weight, 0.32), pair(quality, 0.68)℄),
ask(exog, vD, pid88, 96, [pair(time_weight, 0.73), pair(quality, 0.27)℄),
ask(exog, vF, pid89, 96, [pair(time_weight, 0.05), pair(quality, 0.95)℄),
% 14.Turn
ask(exog, vE, pid90, 93, [pair(time_weight, 0.98), pair(quality, 0.02)℄),
ask(exog, vC, pid91, 94, [pair(time_weight, 0.44), pair(quality, 0.56)℄),
ask(exog, vA, pid92, 96, [pair(time_weight, 0.03), pair(quality, 0.97)℄),
ask(exog, vF, pid93, 100, [pair(time_weight, 0.27), pair(quality, 0.73)℄),
ask(exog, vD, pid94, 103, [pair(time_weight, 0.32), pair(quality, 0.68)℄),
ask(exog, vB, pid95, 101, [pair(time_weight, 0.38), pair(quality, 0.62)℄),
fail,
fail,
% 15.Turn
ask(exog, vE, pid98, 106, [pair(time_weight, 0.50), pair(quality, 0.50)℄),
ask(exog, vB, pid99, 109, [pair(time_weight, 0.98), pair(quality, 0.02)℄),
ask(exog, vD, pid100, 106, [pair(time_weight, 0.05), pair(quality, 0.95)℄),
ask(exog, vC, pid101, 103, [pair(time_weight, 0.48), pair(quality, 0.52)℄),
ask(exog, vF, pid102, 106, [pair(time_weight, 0.80), pair(quality, 0.20)℄),
ask(exog, vA, pid103, 106, [pair(time_weight, 0.27), pair(quality, 0.73)℄),
% 16.Turn
ask(exog, vD, pid104, 108, [pair(time_weight, 0.97), pair(quality, 0.03)℄),
ask(exog, vF, pid105, 111, [pair(time_weight, 0.84), pair(quality, 0.16)℄),
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ask(exog, vC, pid106, 110, [pair(time_weight, 0.87), pair(quality, 0.13)℄),
ask(exog, vE, pid107, 115, [pair(time_weight, 0.02), pair(quality, 0.98)℄),
ask(exog, vB, pid108, 116, [pair(time_weight, 0.06), pair(quality, 0.94)℄),
ask(exog, vA, pid109, 117, [pair(time_weight, 0.54), pair(quality, 0.46)℄),
fail,
fail,
fail,
fail,
fail,
fail,
fail,
fail,
fail,
fail
℄).
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